United States v. Jonathan Washington , 528 F.3d 573 ( 2008 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-2139
    ___________
    United States,                          *
    *
    Appellee,                  * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    *
    Jonathan Washington,                    * [PUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 26, 2008
    Filed: June 12, 2008
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Jonathan Washington pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been
    convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Reasoning that
    Washington possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense, the
    district court1 applied a 4-level increase under the advisory Guidelines, see U.S.S.G.
    § 2K2.1(b)(6). On appeal, Washington challenges this increase and the
    reasonableness of his sentence.
    1
    The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas.
    The district court did not err in applying the 4-level increase because
    Washington possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense. See
    United States v. Ingram, 
    501 F.3d 963
    , 968 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review);
    United States v. Johnson, 
    474 F.3d 1044
    , 1048 (8th Cir. 2007) (conviction for being
    felon in possession of firearm requires government to prove, inter alia, that defendant
    knowingly possessed firearm); United States v. Regans, 
    125 F.3d 685
    , 686 n.2 (8th
    Cir. 1997) (former U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) applied when weapon was possessed with
    requisite connection to another offense); Mack v. United States, 
    853 F.2d 585
    , 586
    (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (guilty plea admits all elements of criminal charge).
    While this case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided
    Watson v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 579
    , 586 (2007), which held that one does not
    “use” a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) by receiving it in trade for drugs.
    Washington argues that Watson controls his case. Watson is inapposite because it
    addresses “use” of a firearm, not possession. See United States v. Wint, 261 Fed.
    Appx. 340, 342 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying 4-level enhancement for possession of
    firearm, distinguishing Watson); United States v. Winfrey, 
    2008 WL 399325
    , at *1
    (9th Cir. Feb 13, 2008) (remanding for determination of possession, after considering
    Watson).
    Washington contends that he never “possessed” the firearm because, after he
    selected it and offered the drugs, he was arrested before he could touch the gun. The
    district court’s finding of possession is not clearly erroneous, as Washington
    constructively possessed the firearm by knowing of it and having the intent and ability
    to exercise control over it. See United States v. Robertson, 
    519 F.3d 452
    , 455 (8th
    Cir. 2008).
    Washington objects that any possession of the firearm was not “in connection
    with” another felony offense because he may have used it for self-defense. Again, the
    district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, because the firearm need only have
    -2-
    “the potential of facilitating” the drug trade (a real potential in light of the various
    other drugs Washington brought to the scene). See United States v. Moore, 
    212 F.3d 441
    , 447 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Harper, 
    466 F.3d 634
    , 650 (8th Cir. 2006)
    (“[i]n connection with” in former U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) meant that firearm had
    “purpose or effect with respect to” other felony offense because its presence facilitated
    or had potential to facilitate offense, as opposed to being result of mere accident or
    coincidence) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 1504
    (2007).
    We also conclude that Washington’s 57-month prison sentence – the bottom of
    the advisory Guideline range – is not unreasonable. See Rita v. United States, 127 S.
    Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (approving appellate presumption of reasonableness for
    sentences within applicable Guidelines range); United States v. Harris, 
    493 F.3d 928
    ,
    932 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Long
    Soldier, 
    431 F.3d 1120
    , 1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasonableness of sentence is reviewed
    for abuse of discretion, which occurs if court fails to consider relevant factor that
    should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or
    irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but commits clear error of
    judgment in weighing factors).
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    -3-