Reginald Dunahue v. Wendy Kelley ( 2020 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-1691
    ___________________________
    Reginald L. Dunahue
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Marshall D. Reed,
    Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Jeremy C. Andrews,
    Warden, EARU, ADC; David Knott, III, Chief of Security, EARU, ADC; Jamin
    M. Crawford, Shift Supervisor, EARU, ADC; S. Lane, Captain; James Dycus,
    Deputy Warden; Kathy Baxter, Sergeant, EARU, ADC
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Helena
    ____________
    Submitted: December 27, 2019
    Filed: January 27, 2020
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Reginald Dunahue, an inmate at the East
    Arkansas Regional Unit (EARU) of the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC),
    appeals the district court’s1 denial of his request for appointed counsel, preservice
    dismissal of some of his claims, and adverse grant of summary judgment as to his
    remaining claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
    In verified complaints, Dunahue named in their individual and official
    capacities, ADC Director Kelley, ADC Deputy Director Reed, EARU Warden
    Andrews, EARU Chief of Security Knott, EARU Shift Supervisor Crawford, EARU
    Captain Lane, EARU Deputy Warden Dycus, and EARU Sergeant Baxter. He
    claimed defendants failed to protect him from being stabbed by inmate Antonio
    Smith, who had escaped a damaged “cage” in the recreation yard. Dunahue also
    moved for appointment of counsel. The district court dismissed Dunahue’s claims
    against Kelley, Reed, and Andrews under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; denied Dunahue’s
    motions for appointment of counsel; and later granted summary judgment in favor of
    the remaining defendants, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity
    because it was undisputed the attack on Dunahue was a “surprise.”
    We first conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Dunahue’s motion for appointment of counsel. See Patterson v. Kelley, 
    902 F.3d 845
    , 849-50 (8th Cir. 2018) (denial of motion for appointment of counsel is reviewed
    for abuse of discretion; pro se litigants have no right to appointed counsel).
    We further conclude that the district court properly dismissed defendants
    Kelley, Reed, and Andrews because Dunahue failed to allege facts indicating how
    they were personally involved in any misconduct. See Cooper v. Schriro, 
    189 F.3d 781
    , 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (dismissal under § 1915A is reviewed de novo);
    1
    The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the
    Honorable Jerome T. Kearney, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District
    of Arkansas.
    -2-
    see also Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 
    690 F.3d 1017
    , 1030-31 (8th Cir. 2012) (supervisors
    cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for actions of subordinate; to state
    claim, plaintiff must allege supervising official violated Constitution through their
    individual actions). We also conclude that Dunahue’s failure-to-protect claims
    against defendants Knott, Crawford, Lane, Dycus, and Baxter in their official
    capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Glasgow v. Neb. Dep’t of
    Corr., 
    819 F.3d 436
    , 441 n. 5 (8th Cir. 2016) (Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits
    for damages against state officials in their official capacities).
    Finally, we uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to
    Dunahue’s individual-capacity failure-to-protect claims against the remaining
    defendants based on qualified immunity. See Moyle v. Anderson, 
    571 F.3d 814
    , 817
    (8th Cir. 2009) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo; summary judgment
    is appropriate when evidence viewed in light most favorable to non-movant presents
    no genuine issue of material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as matter of law).
    “We have held in a number of cases that prison officials are entitled to qualified
    immunity from § 1983 damage actions premised on an Eighth Amendment
    failure-to-protect theory when an inmate was injured in a surprise attack by another
    inmate.” Curry v. Crist, 
    226 F.3d 974
    , 978-79 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing cases).
    Because there is nothing in the record to indicate that Dunahue was exposed to a
    substantial risk of serious harm, or that the defendants acted with deliberate
    indifference, we find that summary judgment was proper. See Farmer v. Brennan,
    
    511 U.S. 825
    , 833-38 (1994) (prison officials have duty to protect prisoners from
    violence by other inmates; prison official violates Eighth Amendment only when (1)
    condition poses objective and substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) official knows
    of, and disregards risk).
    Accordingly, we affirm all aspects of the judgment, and we deny Dunahue’s
    motion for appointment of counsel.
    ______________________________
    -3-