United States v. Kenneth Sanders ( 2020 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-1497
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Kenneth Lamont Sanders
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque
    ____________
    Submitted: March 13, 2020
    Filed: April 14, 2020
    ____________
    Before ERICKSON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
    Kenneth Lamont Sanders entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
    firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 922(g)(9), and
    924(a)(2). Sanders appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress. On
    appeal, he argues that law enforcement officers’ initial warrantless entry into the
    house was not supported by the community caretaker exception and, once inside, their
    search for a firearm was not supported by exigent circumstances. He also challenges
    the court’s application of an obstruction of justice enhancement and denial of
    acceptance of responsibility at sentencing. We affirm.
    I.    Background
    On February 16, 2018, just before 10:00 a.m., N.R. contacted her grandmother
    and said that her mother, Karina LaFrancois, and her mother’s boyfriend, “Kenny”
    Sanders, were “fighting really bad” and that “they need[ed] someone to come.” N.R.
    is LaFrancois’ daughter, who was eleven years old at the time. N.R.’s grandmother
    called 911 and relayed to the operator that she had been told an altercation was
    occurring at LaFrancois’ house. N.R.’s grandmother also told the 911 operator that
    she had trouble understanding N.R. and that she did not know if any weapons were
    involved or whether the fight was verbal or physical. Additionally, N.R.’s
    grandmother informed the operator that two additional minor children were inside the
    residence, ages seven and one.
    The Dubuque Police Department dispatched officers to the LaFrancois
    residence on a report of a domestic disturbance. Officer Joel Cross arrived first on
    scene with Officer Tom Pregler close behind. Additional officers subsequently
    arrived as well. When Officer Cross arrived at the residence, he saw N.R. “acting
    excited” and gesturing through an upstairs window. After reporting his observations
    to Officer Pregler, the two officers knocked on the front door. LaFrancois came
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa, adopting the Report and Recommendation from the Honorable C.J.
    Williams, then Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of
    Iowa.
    -2-
    outside to talk to the officers. LaFrancois was visibly upset and unstable. The
    officers observed red marks on LaFrancois’ face and neck. Despite her obvious
    emotional state and the visible injuries, LaFrancois told the officers that everything
    was okay. Officer Cross told LaFrancois that he understood that N.R. had heard the
    disturbance and contacted law enforcement. LaFrancois became concerned and
    responded, “Do not tell him that she called you guys.”
    Officer Pregler told LaFrancois that the officers needed to talk to Sanders.
    LaFrancois made clear that she did not want the officers to go inside the house. She
    offered to have Sanders speak with the officers outside. The officers initially
    assented to allowing LaFrancois to go inside and get Sanders. However, when
    LaFrancois opened the door to the residence, the officers heard crying inside. After
    hearing the crying, the officers decided to enter the house to make sure that everyone
    was safe. They opened the door and saw Sanders and LaFrancois standing just inside
    the door and a crying infant located in a nearby playpen.
    As soon as the officers entered the home, Sanders became noncompliant,
    uncooperative, and argumentative with the officers. When Officer Cross began to go
    upstairs to check on N.R. and N.R.’s brother, who was also upstairs, Sanders
    attempted to block him from going upstairs. The officers directed Sanders to sit on
    the couch. Officer Cross found N.R. distressed and crying. She told Officer Cross
    that Sanders “had a gun out,” that it “was downstairs,” and that she thought it was
    located in one of the drawers below the “big mirror.” Officer Cross went back
    downstairs and looked through the drawers where N.R. indicated the gun might be.
    When he did not find a gun, Officer Cross returned upstairs to talk to N.R. again.
    N.R. admitted that she did not see Sanders with a gun, but during the fight with
    Sanders, she had heard her mother yelling, “Put the gun down! Put the gun down!”
    N.R. said that it sounded like LaFrancois was being choked during the fight.
    -3-
    During these events, LaFrancois and Sanders had been separated, with
    LaFrancois outside and Sanders on the couch. Officer Cross then went outside to
    speak to LaFrancois. LaFrancois had been texting Sanders informing him that she
    was telling the officers that nothing happened. Officer Cross pointedly asked
    LaFrancois where the gun was located. LaFrancois initially denied there was a gun,
    but quickly expressed concern that Sanders would find out that she had been talking
    to the officers. LaFrancois asked if she could be arrested instead of Sanders. After
    further questioning, LaFrancois admitted that she believed Sanders had a gun while
    the couple were arguing and that it could be in the couch. Officer Cross went back
    inside the residence, asked Sanders to get off the couch where he had been directed
    to sit, and discovered a Smith & Wesson .380 caliber pistol in the couch cushions.
    Sanders was arrested on state domestic assault charges and a no-contact order
    was issued. That order was modified to allow phone and written contact with
    LaFrancois. When an officer went to execute the federal warrant on May 30, 2018,
    for the instant case, he found Sanders and LaFrancois together. Sanders was arrested
    for violating the no-contact order, and on May 31, 2018, the order was modified again
    to prohibit all contact with LaFrancois. Despite the no-contact order, Sanders called
    LaFrancois from the jail numerous times. He has asserted that he did not know the
    no-contact order had been modified to once again prohibit all contact with
    LaFrancois. During one recorded call, Sanders told LaFrancois that her statements
    from the domestic “need to go away.” Sanders arranged for LaFrancois to get a new
    phone and he called her on a new telephone number 71 times over a six-day period.
    Sanders entered a conditional guilty plea to being a prohibited person in
    possession of a firearm. The court determined Sanders’ advisory Guidelines range
    was 77–96 months. The court varied upward from the Guidelines range based on
    Sanders’ violent criminal history and risk to the public, and sentenced him to the
    statutory maximum term of 120 months’ imprisonment.
    -4-
    II.   Discussion
    A.     Suppression Motion
    A mixed standard of review applies to the denial of a motion to suppress
    evidence. We review the factual determinations underlying the district court’s
    decision for clear error and the district court’s denial of the suppression motion de
    novo. United States v. Harris, 
    747 F.3d 1013
    , 1016 (8th Cir. 2014).
    At the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands ‘the right of a man to
    retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government
    intrusion.’” Florida v. Jardines, 
    569 U.S. 1
    , 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United
    States, 
    365 U.S. 505
    , 511 (1961)). The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,
    however, is subject to certain exceptions. One such exception applies to law
    enforcement officers engaging in a community caretaking function. United States v.
    Smith, 
    820 F.3d 356
    , 360 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 
    413 U.S. 433
    ,
    441 (1973)). This exception allows a police officer to “enter a residence without a
    warrant as a community caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an
    emergency exists requiring his or her attention.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v.
    Quezada, 
    448 F.3d 1005
    , 1007 (8th Cir. 2006)). This court has determined that “[a]
    search or seizure under the community caretaking function is reasonable if the
    government interest in law enforcement’s exercise of that function, based on specific
    and articulable facts, outweighs the individual’s interest in freedom from government
    intrusion.” 
    Id.
     (citing Harris, 747 F.3d at 1017).
    When examining whether the officers had a reasonable belief such that their
    entry into LaFrancois’ home2 was a justifiable exercise of their community caretaking
    2
    For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that Sanders
    has standing to challenge the search of the residence and decline to resolve the
    -5-
    function, we look to the facts known to the officers at the time they made the decision
    to enter. Smith, 820 F.3d at 360. The specific, articulable facts known to the officers
    at the time they entered the residence include the information received from dispatch,
    observations of the officers, and information obtained by talking to LaFrancois. The
    officers were dispatched to the scene of a domestic disturbance. The first responding
    officer observed a child in an upstairs window acting excited and gesturing at him.
    LaFrancois exited the residence and closed the door behind her to speak to the
    officers. Although LaFrancois said everything was okay, the officers observed
    LaFrancois had visible injuries in the form of red marks on her face and neck and she
    was acting emotionally and unstable. LaFrancois directed the officers to not tell
    Sanders that her daughter had called for help. LaFrancois was so adamant about
    keeping the officers outside and away from any other witnesses or evidence that
    might be inside the house that she volunteered to get Sanders and bring him outside.
    When the officers heard crying coming from inside the house, they decided to enter
    to make sure everyone was safe.
    We are satisfied that the officers acted in their community caretaking function
    when they entered LaFrancois’ house. The officers were dispatched to the scene of
    a domestic disturbance. Once at the scene, the officers learned further details
    indicating a serious concern for the safety of LaFrancois and the children who were
    inside the house. LaFrancois had visible injuries consistent with a physical
    altercation. LaFrancois expressed concern for her daughter and directed the officers
    not to tell Sanders that her daughter was the one that reported the disturbance. A
    child was seen in an upstairs window acting excited and gesturing at the first
    responding officer. The record establishes that the officers had reason to believe that
    a domestic violence suspect was inside the home with children. When LaFrancois
    government’s standing argument. See United States v. Long, 
    906 F.3d 720
    , 724 (8th
    Cir. 2018) (assuming, without deciding, the defendant has standing to challenge the
    search of a rental vehicle).
    -6-
    opened the door to get that suspect, the officers heard crying coming from inside.
    The justification for the officers’ warrantless entry arises from their obligation to help
    a child or children that could be injured inside or to ensure the safety of the children.
    We conclude that the officers reasonably believed an emergency situation existed that
    required their immediate attention in the form of entering LaFrancois’ home to ensure
    that no one inside was injured or in danger. The officers’ warrantless entry was
    permissible under the community caretaker exception.
    We further conclude that the scope of the encounter was carefully tailored to
    satisfy the officers’ purpose for entry. Once they entered, the officers separated
    Sanders and LaFrancois, with LaFrancois stepping outside. Officer Cross located
    N.R., who told him that during the altercation she could hear her mother yelling “Put
    the gun down! Put the gun down!” A warrant is not needed to search areas that may
    conceal a threat if officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe an
    immediate act is required to preserve the safety of others or themselves. United
    States v. Quarterman, 
    877 F.3d 794
    , 800 (8th Cir. 2017).
    Here, Officer Cross had an objectively reasonable belief that a gun was inside
    the house. The search was conducted out of the officers’ legitimate concern for safety
    and was limited to two places in the house: (1) where N.R. thought the gun might
    have been placed, and (2) where LaFrancois believed the gun could be located.
    Officer Cross found the gun in the second place. Exigent circumstances justified the
    officers’ efforts to locate and secure the gun. United States v. Henderson, 
    553 F.3d 1163
    , 1165 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[B]ecause domestic disturbances are highly volatile and
    involve large risks and because the police officers had reason to believe that a loaded
    gun was in the bedroom, we think it is plain that exigent circumstances justified their
    effort to secure the weapon.”).
    -7-
    B.     Obstruction of Justice
    Sanders argues the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for
    obstruction of justice, which led to the denial of acceptance of responsibility. We
    review a district court’s findings underlying an obstruction of justice enhancement
    and acceptance of responsibility reduction for clear error. United States v. Jones, 
    612 F.3d 1040
    , 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Calderon-Avila, 
    322 F.3d 505
    , 507 (8th Cir. 2003)). We review the court’s construction and application of the
    Guidelines de novo. United States v. Belfrey, 
    928 F.3d 746
    , 750 (8th Cir. 2019)
    (citation omitted).
    At sentencing, Sanders argued that his comment to LaFrancois that her
    statements from the domestic “need to go away” was neither an attempt to influence
    her testimony, nor was it related to the instant offense of conviction. He contends on
    appeal that the comment was “a minuscule portion of a nearly ten-minute
    conversation” and was “far too ambiguous to warrant” an obstruction of justice
    enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We give “great deference” to a district court
    when it applies an enhancement for obstruction of justice or denies a reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility. Calderon-Avila, 
    322 F.3d at 507
     (per curiam).
    The district court found that Sanders intended to influence a witness or
    attempted to do so when he told LaFrancois that her statements from the domestic
    “need to go away.” The court has “broad discretion to apply section 3C1.1 to a wide
    range of conduct.” United States v. Jensen, 
    834 F.3d 895
    , 900 (8th Cir. 2016)
    (quoting United States v. Collins, 
    754 F.3d 626
    , 629 (8th Cir. 2014)). “[T]hreatening,
    intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a . . . witness . . . directly or
    indirectly, or attempting to do so” is an example of conduct covered under § 3C1.1.
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4.
    -8-
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err
    in its factual finding that Sanders’ statement was, at a minimum, an attempt to
    influence a witness. Section 3C1.1 applies to conduct involving “cases closely
    related to the defendant’s case.” Jensen, 834 F.3d at 900. The firearm in question
    was alleged to have been used during a domestic assault, which was the event that
    brought law enforcement officers to the residence. We affirm the district court’s
    decision to increase Sanders’ offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    An obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1 “ordinarily indicates that
    the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct” as required for
    a § 3E1.1 reduction. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 4; United States v. Brown, 
    539 F.3d 835
    , 841 (8th Cir. 2008). Although there are “extraordinary” cases in which
    adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply, United States v. Adejumo,
    
    772 F.3d 513
    , 537 (8th Cir. 2014), we do not find this particular case to be
    extraordinary. See United States v. Honken, 
    184 F.3d 961
    , 970 (8th Cir. 1999)
    (noting that an obstructive defendant must “do more than merely cease obstructive
    conduct and plead guilty to the underlying offense to earn a downward adjustment for
    acceptance of responsibility”). The district court did not err in refusing to reduce
    Sanders’ applicable Guidelines range to account for acceptance of responsibility.
    III.   Decision
    We affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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