Joseph Mobley v. St. Luke's Health System, Inc. ( 2022 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 21-2417
    ___________________________
    Joseph Mobley
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    St. Luke’s Health System, Inc.
    Defendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
    ____________
    Submitted: June 16, 2022
    Filed: November 16, 2022
    ____________
    Before LOKEN and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and MENENDEZ, 1 District Judge.
    ____________
    MENENDEZ, District Judge.
    1
    The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States District Judge for
    the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    Appellant Mobley appeals the District Court’s2 grant of summary judgment
    in favor of Appellee St. Luke’s Health System, Inc. (“St. Luke’s”). For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    I.    Background
    Joseph Mobley worked in customer service for St. Luke’s 3 for more than six
    years, beginning in 2012. During his tenure, Mobley received two promotions, most
    recently in 2016, when he was named Patient Access Supervisor. In that role,
    Mobley was responsible for training and managing a team of approximately 20
    employees to assist patients over the phone in verifying insurance coverage and
    determining out-of-pocket healthcare costs. Most of Mobley’s direct-reports
    telecommuted full time, although the lowest-performing members on Mobley’s team
    worked in the office. St. Luke’s policy allowed managers to telecommute one day a
    week, and, as of 2018, two days per week. Mobley’s manager, Jessica Lillard,
    allowed her direct-reports additional teleworking days on a case-by-case basis.
    In 2016, Mobley was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (“MS”). As his MS
    progressed, Mobley began to have difficulty walking, standing, and breathing, and
    experienced fatigue and burning sensations in his eyes and hands, particularly when
    his MS flared. At times, St. Luke’s management team observed Mobley’s mobility
    challenges around the office. Mobley’s neurologist encouraged him to continue
    working, even when his condition flared.
    Mobley first requested an accommodation in December 2017, when he asked
    Lillard if he could telecommute when his MS flared. Lillard indicated that she would
    2
    The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    3
    Although neither party describes what St. Luke’s is, according to its website
    it “includes 16 hospitals and campuses across the Kansas City region.” About St.
    Luke’s, https://www.saintlukeskc.org/about-saint-lukes (last visited August 3,
    2022).
    -2-
    consider it and work with Mobley as the need arose. The following month, however,
    Lillard denied that accommodation, explaining to Mobley that allowing him to
    telecommute during a flare-up would be unfair to his co-supervisor. Instead,
    St. Luke’s suggested that Mobley use paid time off and Family Medical Leave Act
    leave on those occasions.
    In February 2018, Mobley again asked for permission to telecommute when
    his condition flared and supplied St. Luke’s a letter from his neurologist
    recommending as much. Subsequently, in March 2018, Lillard and St. Luke’s
    human-resources representative met with Mobley, and he renewed his request to
    telecommute when he experienced a flare-up of his MS. St. Luke’s denied the
    request, instructing Mobley that he could ask Lillard on a case-by-case basis to work
    from home during a flare-up. Lillard advised that St. Luke’s could not accommodate
    his request because he needed to supervise direct-reports in the office and because
    his flare-ups were unpredictable. Mobley asked Lillard to reconsider the decision,
    but she refused to do so. Despite this refusal, Mobley recalled only one instance
    when Lillard denied a request to telework during a flare-up and required him to take
    time off instead.
    Mobley voluntarily resigned in August 2018, as he feared that he was in
    danger of being discharged due to his condition. He did not communicate this
    concern to St. Luke’s either before he resigned or in his resignation letter.
    Mobley sued St. Luke’s pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act
    (“ADA”), the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights
    Act of 1964, and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    . Mobley alleged that St. Luke’s: discriminated
    against him on the basis of his disability, gender, and race; failed to accommodate
    him; and retaliated against him. St. Luke’s sought summary judgment on all issues,
    and the district court granted St. Luke’s motion. Mobley appealed the district court’s
    ruling regarding only his claims of disability discrimination under the MHRA and
    failure to accommodate under the ADA and the MHRA.
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    II.   Analysis
    A.     Standard of Review
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Whittington v. Tyson
    Foods, Inc., 
    21 F.4th 997
    , 1000 (8th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate
    “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    B.     Failure-to-Accommodate Claims
    Mobley alleges that St. Luke’s violated the ADA and MHRA in failing
    accommodate him. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims
    because Mobley failed to demonstrate that he could perform his essential job
    functions either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and because he did
    not demonstrate that St. Luke’s failed to engage in the interactive process in good
    faith regarding Mobley’s requested accommodations. Though we disagree with the
    district court on the first of its holdings, we agree with the second. Therefore
    summary judgment was appropriate and we affirm.
    “The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating ‘against a qualified
    individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
    hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
    training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Ehlers v.
    Univ. of Minnesota, 
    34 F.4th 655
    , 659 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 12112
    (a)).4 Failing to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes
    discrimination. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
    4
    Because the ADA and MHRA use the same modified burden-shifting
    framework, we evaluate Mobley’s state and federal failure-to-accommodate claims
    simultaneously. See Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prod., Inc., 
    165 F.3d 1212
    , 1216 (8th
    Cir. 1999).
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    To make a prima facie case for a failure to accommodate under the ADA, an
    employee must show that he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA,
    (2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment
    action due to his disability. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    486 F.3d 480
    , 482 (8th
    Cir. 2007). A “disability” under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that
    substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (1). Because there is no dispute that Mobley had a disability as defined by
    the ADA, Mobley satisfies the first element of his prima facie case.
    To meet the requirements of the second element, proving he is a qualified
    individual under the ADA, an employee must demonstrate that he: (1) possesses the
    skill, education, experience, and training the position requires, and (2) can perform
    the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. Hill v.
    Walker, 
    737 F.3d 1209
    , 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota
    & E. R. Co., 
    327 F.3d 707
    , 711 (8th Cir. 2003)). There is no dispute that Mobley had
    the skill, education, experience, and training necessary for the position. Therefore,
    we turn to whether Mobley could perform the position’s essential functions, “the
    fundamental job duties of [his] . . . position,” with or without a reasonable
    accommodation. 
    29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
    (n)(1). An employee must show that a desired
    accommodation is “reasonable on its face.” U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 
    535 U.S. 391
    , 401 (2002).
    The district court concluded that Mobley failed to demonstrate that he could
    perform his essential job functions with or without a reasonable accommodation.
    However, drawing all reasonable inferences in Mobley’s favor, we conclude that a
    genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether he was able to perform the
    essential functions of his job through his proposed accommodation of teleworking
    while he experienced a flare-up of his condition. By allowing Mobley to consistently
    work remotely aside from his medical condition, St. Luke’s implicitly demonstrated
    a belief that he could perform his essential job functions without being in the office
    all the time. Moreover, while working remotely, Mobley continued to receive
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    positive performance reviews, reflecting that he was able to effectively supervise his
    employees despite not being on site.
    In support of summary judgment, St. Luke’s emphasizes the opinions of its
    management team who preferred that he work in the office on all but his regularly
    scheduled teleworking days. St. Luke’s explained that “[o]ne of the reasons [it]
    rejected [Mobley]’s request to telecommute when his condition flared was
    because—as a Patient Access Supervisor—his duties required providing in-person
    supervision.” Appellee’s Br. 22 (emphasis in original). Yet nothing in the record
    indicates that had Mobley been permitted to telework for an additional unquantified
    number of days during flare-ups, his job performance would have been inadequate.
    Indeed, St. Luke’s points to no evidence to justify its stance, merely submitting brief,
    conclusory, and unsubstantiated opinions to the contrary. Additionally, St. Luke’s
    does not contend that Mobley had any performance issues.
    The legal authority St. Luke’s references in support of its argument does not
    support summary judgment here. Most critically, none of the decisions involve a
    case in which a disabled employee, much less nearly all employees in a department,
    regularly teleworked, yet the employer rejected that employee’s proposed
    accommodation to telework when his or her condition flared. See, e.g., Lane v. Ball,
    854 F. App’x 111, 112–13 (8th Cir. 2021) (employer denied employee’s proposed
    accommodation to telework because one of her job’s essential functions was
    “handling questions and requests from members of the public, which she could not
    do outside of business hours or from home”); Brunckhorst v. City of Oak Park
    Heights, 
    914 F.3d 1177
    , 1183 (8th Cir. 2019) (employee failed to make a facial
    showing that he could perform his essential job functions remotely, and admitted
    that there were certain functions of his job that he was unable to perform remotely).
    St. Luke’s argument that this case is analogous to Evans v. Coop. Response Ctr.,
    Inc., 
    996 F.3d 539
     (8th Cir. 2021), also misses the mark. In Evans, the plaintiff
    requested additional leave, which differs from Mobley’s request to telework and
    St. Luke’s ensuing instruction to take leave. 
    Id. at 546
    . Mobley wanted to work
    more, not less. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mobley, he has raised
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    a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he could perform the essential job
    functions with a reasonable accommodation.
    However, for a failure-to-accommodate claim to survive summary judgment,
    an employee must do more than establish a prima facie case—he must also show
    that his employer failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith. See
    Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 
    188 F.3d 944
    , 952 (8th Cir. 1999). “To establish
    that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process, an employee must
    demonstrate that the employer knew about his disability, and that the employee
    requested an accommodation for his disability.” Sharbono v. N. States Power Co.,
    
    902 F.3d 891
    , 894 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 
    561 F.3d 900
    , 902 (8th Cir. 2009)). In this case, there is no dispute as to either of these
    elements. However, the employee must then demonstrate that his employer “did not
    make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations.” 
    Id.
    (quoting Fjellestad, 
    188 F.3d at 952
    ); see Ehlers, 34 F.4th at 662. We agree with the
    district court that the record does not demonstrate a material dispute on this element,
    and that summary judgment was appropriate.
    The record demonstrates several steps that St. Luke’s took in response to
    Mobley’s request for accommodation. See Fjellestad, 
    188 F.3d at 954
     (“All the
    interactive process requires is that employers make a good faith effort to seek
    accommodations.”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that after
    Mobley made his initial accommodation request in December 2017, St. Luke’s
    approved permission for Mobley to work from home on a case-by-case basis. The
    evidence further shows that in February 2018, Mobley asked to work from home
    when his condition flared, and St. Luke’s again responded that he could reach out to
    his manager on a case-by-basis, but that St. Luke’s would not approve a blanket
    request to work from home during flare-ups. Additionally, St. Luke’s offered that
    Mobley could follow up if he had any questions or concerns. While Mobley sent an
    email indicating that he might need a follow-up conversation with management
    regarding this decision, he never requested one. Moreover, only one of Mobley’s
    requests to work from home was actually denied, and on that day he used paid time
    -7-
    off. These steps support a finding that St. Luke’s engaged in the interactive process
    and took action to accommodate Mobley. See Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 
    939 F.3d 937
    , 942 (8th Cir. 2019). Because there is no triable issue as to whether
    St. Luke’s acted in good faith, we need not reach the final step of the analysis, which
    is whether St. Luke’s could have reasonably accommodated Mobley. Summary
    judgment on Mobley’s failure-to-accommodate claim is affirmed.
    C.    Constructive-Discharge Claim
    Mobley also alleges that he was constructively discharged from his job at
    St. Luke’s. However, Mobley did not raise a constructive-discharge claim before the
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
    
    3 F.4th 1075
    , 1081 (8th Cir. 2021). Likewise, in opposing St. Luke’s motion for
    summary judgment before the district court, Mobley failed to argue his constructive-
    discharge claim. See Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 
    950 F.3d 535
    , 540 (8th
    Cir. 2020). Therefore, the claim is not properly before this Court, and the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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