United States v. Dayon Fips ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-1260
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Dayon J. Fips, also known as Dayon Ballard
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: December 14, 2020
    Filed: January 25, 2021
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In this direct appeal following entry of a guilty plea and judgment of
    conviction, Dayon Fips argues that he received constitutionally ineffective
    assistance from prior counsel, who represented him before the district court 1 for a
    1
    The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    short time. With the assistance of different counsel before the district court,
    however, Fips entered into a plea agreement, which the district court accepted, that
    included a “Waiver of Appeal and Post-Conviction Rights” provision (“Waiver
    Provision”). We find this appeal waiver applicable and enforceable, so we dismiss
    this appeal.
    We consider de novo “issues concerning the interpretation and enforcement
    of a plea agreement and the application of appeal waivers.” United States v.
    Dallman, 
    886 F.3d 1277
    , 1280 (8th Cir. 2018). We will enforce an appeal waiver
    and dismiss the appeal if: (1) the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver; (2) the
    plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily; and
    (3) enforcing the waiver will not cause a miscarriage of justice. 
    Id. at 1279-80
    ;
    United States v. Boroughf, 
    649 F.3d 887
    , 890 (8th Cir. 2011). These conditions are
    satisfied here.
    First, Fips’s ineffective-assistance claim falls within the scope of his appeal
    waiver. “We interpret plea agreements according to their plain language,” United
    States v. Manzano-Huerta, 
    809 F.3d 440
    , 444 (8th Cir. 2016), and “we apply general
    contract principles and try to discern the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain
    language of the agreement when viewed as a whole,” United States v. Lara-Ruiz,
    
    681 F.3d 914
    , 919 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the direct-
    appeal subsection of the Waiver Provision, Fips waived his right to raise on direct
    appeal “all non jurisdictional . . . issues,” and no exception was made in this
    subsection for ineffective-assistance claims. By comparison, in the habeas corpus
    subsection of the Waiver Provision, Fips waived “all rights to contest the conviction
    or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding . . . except for claims of . . . ineffective
    assistance of counsel.” Particularly in light of the absence of a carveout for
    ineffective-assistance claims in the direct-appeal subsection despite the inclusion of
    such a carveout in the habeas corpus subsection, we have no trouble concluding that,
    by the expansive plain language of the direct-appeal subsection, Fips waived the
    right to bring an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal unless it somehow
    implicated a jurisdictional issue. Fips claims only that his prior counsel’s ineffective
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    assistance compromised his ability to litigate the merits of his defense, which does
    not implicate a jurisdictional issue, so his ineffective-assistance claim is within the
    scope of the appeal waiver.
    Second, Fips knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appeal waiver. During
    the plea colloquy, the district court specifically discussed, and asked Fips under oath
    if he understood, various provisions of the plea agreement, including the Waiver
    Provision. Fips explicitly acknowledged he understood. The district court also
    asked Fips under oath if he entered into the plea agreement voluntarily, and Fips
    confirmed he did. “[Fips’s] sworn testimony at the plea hearing shows that he
    entered into the plea agreement, and the appeal waiver, knowingly and voluntarily.”
    United States v. Sohl, 632 F. App’x 302, 302 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also
    Boroughf, 
    649 F.3d at 890
     (“[O]ur review of the transcript from the change-of-plea
    hearing shows the plea agreement and appeal waiver were entered into knowingly
    and voluntarily.”).
    Third, enforcing the appeal waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice,
    which is a “very narrow exception to the general rule that waivers of appellate rights
    are enforceable.” See United States v. Blue Coat, 
    340 F.3d 539
    , 542 (8th Cir. 2003).
    “[O]rdinarily, we do not address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
    appeal” anyway, but instead we require such claims to be raised in postconviction
    proceedings. United States v. Adkins, 
    636 F.3d 432
    , 434 (8th Cir. 2011). The plea
    agreement leaves that option open to Fips, so he is not without recourse to pursue
    his ineffective-assistance claim if we follow our usual rule and refuse to consider
    this claim now. See United States v. Vondal, 394 F. App’x 336, 337 (8th Cir. 2010)
    (per curiam) (enforcing an appeal waiver and declining to consider an ineffective-
    assistance claim within the scope of that waiver because, inter alia, “ineffective-
    assistance claims are more properly raised in a proceeding under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    ,
    and [the defendant] reserved her right to do so” (citation omitted)).
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    Granted, we have suggested that, under this miscarriage-of-justice exception,
    we may consider on direct appeal an ineffective-assistance claim otherwise within
    the scope of an appeal waiver when the claim is that “the plea agreement itself is the
    result of advice outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
    cases.” DeRoo v. United States, 
    223 F.3d 919
    , 923-24 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Andis, 
    333 F.3d 886
    , 891 (8th
    Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing DeRoo as an example of when the miscarriage-of-justice
    exception may apply). But Fips’s claim, based on conduct of prior counsel who did
    not represent him when he entered into the plea agreement, is not this kind of
    ineffective-assistance claim.
    Therefore, we enforce Fips’s appeal waiver and dismiss this appeal.
    ______________________________
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