United States v. Jorge Beltran-Estrada ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-3773
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Jorge Beltran-Estrada
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
    ____________
    Submitted: November 16, 2020
    Filed: March 12, 2021
    [Published]
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    In 2013, after pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to
    distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(A)(viii), Jorge Beltran-Estrada was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment.
    This sentence was at the bottom of the range indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines
    in effect in 2013. In 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission “approved
    Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced most base offense levels in the drug
    quantity tables by two levels.” United States v. Lewis, 
    827 F.3d 787
    , 789 (8th Cir.
    2016). Beltran-Estrada moved under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) for a reduction in his
    sentence, citing both Amendment 782 and his good conduct while incarcerated. In
    response, the United States Probation Office filed a memorandum in which it
    calculated Beltran-Estrada’s new Guidelines range as 188 to 210 months,1 listed eight
    alleged conduct violations Beltran-Estrada incurred while in custody, and recomm-
    ended a reduced sentence of 199 months’ imprisonment.
    The district court2 granted Beltran-Estrada’s motion and reduced his term of
    imprisonment from 235 months to 199 months. Beltran-Estrada filed a motion for
    reconsideration, requesting a further reduction to 188 months and an evidentiary
    hearing to address the alleged conduct violations. The court denied his motion for
    reconsideration, and this appeal followed.
    Beltran-Estrada contends that the district court denied him the opportunity to
    be heard during resentencing, violating his right to procedural due process. Though
    we generally review a district court’s decision to modify a sentence under
    § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion, we review constitutional and statutory
    challenges de novo. See United States v. Johnson, 
    703 F.3d 464
    , 466-67 (8th Cir.
    2013).
    1
    The Probation Office based this calculation on Beltran-Estrada’s criminal
    history category of II and total offense level of 35. We note, however, that the
    Guidelines range for someone with this criminal history category and total offense
    level is 188 to 235 months.
    2
    The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    -2-
    “There is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in a discretionary
    sentence reduction, so the Due Process Clause does not afford procedural protections
    to those who seek one.” United States v. Alaniz, 
    961 F.3d 998
    , 999 (8th Cir. 2020)
    (per curiam) (cleaned up). Even so, a defendant requesting a reduction does have
    “the basic right to be apprised of information on which the court will rest its
    decision.” United States v. Foster, 
    575 F.3d 861
    , 863 (8th Cir. 2009). In this case,
    Beltran-Estrada was apprised of the information on which the district court rested its
    decision. He does not dispute that he was informed of and had access to the
    Probation Office’s memorandum, which formed a primary basis for the court’s
    sentence. He also had the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence and to rebut the
    allegations prior to the court’s order reducing his sentence. The district court did not
    violate Beltran-Estrada’s rights as recognized in United States v. Foster.
    Beltran-Estrada also argues that § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines required the district
    court to provide him with “an adequate opportunity to present information to the
    court regarding” “any factor important to the sentencing determination [that] is
    reasonably in dispute.” USSG § 6A1.3(a). Even if we assume that § 6A1.3 applies
    to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, see United States v. Neal, 
    611 F.3d 399
    , 402 (7th Cir.
    2010) (applying § 6A1.3(a) to § 3582 proceedings); United States v. Ramirez, 807 F.
    App’x 591, 592 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (same); but see United States v.
    Mercado-Moreno, 
    869 F.3d 942
    , 956 (9th Cir. 2017) (declining to extend § 6A1.3 to
    § 3582 proceedings), nothing in the Guidelines requires that the “opportunity to
    present information” take the form of the type of hearing Beltran-Estrada requested.
    See USSG § 6A1.3(a). To the extent Beltran-Estrada’s rights were implicated by the
    district court’s decision to reduce his sentence, the court provided him with adequate
    notice and an opportunity to be heard.
    Beltran-Estrada further argues that the district court provided an inadequate
    explanation for its reduced sentence, rendering that sentence procedurally
    unreasonable. See United States v. Burrell, 
    622 F.3d 961
    , 964 (2010) (reviewing a
    -3-
    sentence reduction for abuse of discretion). In granting a motion for sentence
    reduction, a district court must offer “some explanation in the record of [its]
    reasoning.” 
    Id. at 964-65
    . But assuming the court provides this explanation, it “need
    not give lengthy explanations of the § 3553(a) factors or categorically rehearse the
    relevant factors in a § 3582 proceeding.” Id. at 964 (cleaned up).
    In selecting its sentence, the district court here specifically referenced Beltran-
    Estrada’s alleged conduct violations while in custody, and in denying the motion to
    reconsider, it adopted the government’s reasons why a 199-month sentence was
    warranted. Cf. id. (suggesting that a district court’s statement that it was adopting
    one of the party’s arguments would suffice as an explanation). The court’s
    explanation of its reasoning was brief, but it provided enough information to “allow
    us to discern how [it] exercised its discretion.” Burrell, 
    622 F.3d at 964
    ; see also
    Alaniz, 961 F.3d at 1000 (“What matters for us is having enough information for
    meaningful appellate review.”). While the district court “could have said more,”
    Alaniz, 961 F.3d at 1000, we discern no abuse of discretion.
    We affirm.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-3773

Filed Date: 3/12/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/12/2021