Akira Edmonds v. Dana Meyer ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 21-1093
    ___________________________
    Akira Edmonds
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Dana Meyer; T. Bredeman; Aschok Chada, Licensed Physician; Joule N.
    Stevenson, MD, Licensed Physician; T. Crouch, Nurse Practitioner; Michele
    Buckner, Warden of the South Central Correctional Center; Dr. Unknown Lovelace
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: March 2, 2021
    Filed: April 5, 2021
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before BENTON, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) inmate Akira Edmonds appeals
    the 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint for
    failure to state a claim. We grant Edmonds leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
    appeal; and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
    Edmonds claimed Eighth Amendment violations based on the medical
    management of a painful inguinal hernia, which he alleged was first diagnosed at
    South Central Correctional Center (SCCC) in May 2019, and was then treated at
    Northeast Correctional Center, where he was transferred in August 2019. He stated
    that in August 2020, following an assessment by a nonparty, it was determined that
    hernia surgery was required, and a surgery referral was initiated. He sought damages
    against Corizon Medical Services (Corizon) and its doctors Aschok Chada and Joule
    Stevenson, Nurse Practitioner (NP) Tamra Crouch, and officials T. Bredeman and
    Dana Meyer; MDOC Dr. Lovelace; and SCCC Warden Michele Buckner. Initially,
    we conclude that Edmonds sufficiently named the individual defendants in their
    individual and official capacities, given that he checked boxes provided on the form
    complaint for both individual and official capacity, and he named all defendants in
    their individual and official capacities in his original complaint. See Moore v. Sims,
    
    200 F.3d 1170
    , 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also Topchian v. JPMorgan
    Chase Bank, N.A., 
    760 F.3d 843
    , 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that courts should
    construe pro se complaints liberally, meaning that “if the essence of an allegation is
    discernible,” even if not “pleaded with legal nicety,” the complaint should be
    construed “in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the
    proper legal framework” (cleaned up)).
    We conclude that the claims against the Corizon, MDOC, and SCCC
    officials—Bredeman, Meyer, Dr. Lovelace, and Buckner—were properly dismissed
    before service of process. Specifically, it was clear from the complaint that Edmonds
    did not know who was responsible for the initial denial of a truss that was requested
    by his SCCC medical providers; and he merely alleged that he wrote Buckner a letter
    after the denial, but did not allege she was directly involved in his care. See Dahl v.
    Weber, 
    580 F.3d 730
    , 733-34 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that § 1983 liability requires
    -2-
    personal involvement and that a warden’s general responsibility for supervising
    prison operations is insufficient to show personal responsibility).
    However, we conclude that Edmonds stated a claim against the remaining
    individual defendants: Drs. Chada and Stevenson, and NP Crouch. His inguinal
    hernia is an objectively serious medical need, see Grayson v. Ross, 
    454 F.3d 802
    , 809
    (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n objectively serious medical need or a deprivation of that need
    . . . must be either obvious to [a] layperson or supported by medical evidence, like a
    physician’s diagnosis.” (cleaned up)), and he sufficiently alleged that the medical
    defendants were deliberately indifferent to this need. At the pleading stage, where
    the defendants have not been served and the parties have not had the opportunity to
    conduct discovery, it is unknown whether the alleged failures of the medical
    defendants—not conducting a proper examination, prescribing only ibuprofen and a
    truss, ignoring his complaints that the truss and ibuprofen were not relieving his
    severe pain, and not referring him for surgery for a year—rose to the level of criminal
    recklessness, or whether any delay had an adverse effect. See Jackson v. Riebold,
    
    815 F.3d 1114
    , 1119-20 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that when deliberate indifference
    claim is based on treatment delay, inmate must offer verifying medical evidence
    showing detrimental effect of delay); Topchian, 760 F.3d at 848 (“A claim has facial
    plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (cleaned
    up)); McRaven v. Sanders, 
    577 F.3d 974
    , 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that
    “[a]lthough medical negligence does not violate” the Eighth Amendment—which
    proscribes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”—“medical treatment may so
    deviate from the applicable standard of care as to evidence . . . deliberate
    indifference” (cleaned up)).
    Finally, we conclude that the claims against Corizon—including the official-
    capacity claims against the medical defendants, who were Corizon employees—were
    improperly dismissed pre-service. See Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp.,
    -3-
    
    388 F.3d 588
    , 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004) (where private party acts under color of state
    law, the test for corporate liability is whether an official policy, custom, or action
    inflicts injury actionable under § 1983). Specifically, construing Edmonds’s
    complaint liberally, he sufficiently alleged that Corizon had a policy, custom, or
    practice of managing inguinal hernias with only ibuprofen and a truss, and of
    delaying surgery even when a hernia is worsening.
    Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against officials Meyer,
    Bredeman, Dr. Lovelace, and Buckner; we reverse the dismissal of the claims against
    Corizon, and against Dr. Chada, Dr. Stevenson, and NP Crouch in their individual
    and official capacities; and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    ______________________________
    -4-