Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Communications, LLC , 696 F.3d 766 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •               United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 12-1287
    ___________________________
    Retro Television Network, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Luken Communications, LLC; Retro Television, Inc., formerly known as Retro
    Programming Services, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ___________________________
    No. 12-1838
    ___________________________
    Retro Television Network, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Luken Communications, LLC; Retro Television, Inc., formerly known as Retro
    Programming Services, Inc.
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
    ____________
    Submitted: September 20, 2012
    Filed: October 17, 2012
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Retro Television Network, Inc., appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of its
    claims against Luken Communications, LLC and Retro Television, Inc. (collectively
    Appellees) under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Retro
    Television Network, Inc. appeals also the district court’s adverse award of attorneys’
    fees. We affirm.
    I.
    In December 2005, Equity Broadcasting Corporation (Equity) entered into an
    intellectual property agreement (IPA) with Retro Television Network, Inc. The IPA’s
    recitals explained that Equity desired to acquire Retro Television Network, Inc.’s
    noncreative rights in Retro Television Network for the purpose of developing a
    national broadcast network. To accomplish this, Retro Television Network, Inc.
    agreed to transfer its noncreative rights in Retro Television Network to one of
    Equity’s subsidiaries. In exchange for this transfer, Equity agreed to pay Retro
    Television Network, Inc. royalty payments in the amount of ten percent of the net
    revenue of Retro Television Network.
    The terms of the IPA established additional covenants, including (1) that Retro
    Television Network, Inc. and Equity would handle jointly the marketing of Retro
    Television Network; (2) that Equity would pay for the development of Retro
    1
    The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    Television Network; (3) that Retro Television Network, Inc. could audit Equity’s
    accounts maintained pursuant to the IPA; (4) that Equity could assign the IPA to any
    of its wholly owned subsidiaries provided that Equity guaranteed the performance of
    the IPA in writing; and (5) that disputes between Equity and Retro Television
    Network, Inc. would be settled by arbitration. Finally, paragraph 13 of the IPA
    stated:
    This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
    parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, and permitted
    assigns. No person or entity that is not a party to this agreement may
    claim any right or benefit hereunder.
    In 2008, Luken Communications, LLC (Luken) purchased 100% of the stock
    of Equity’s subsidiary, to which the IPA had transferred Retro Television Network’s
    noncreative rights.2 Thereafter, Equity’s subsidiary merged with one of Luken’s
    subsidiaries and became known as Retro Television, Inc.
    In 2011, Retro Television Network, Inc. sued Luken and Retro Television, Inc.,
    seeking royalty payments and an accounting under the IPA. Although neither Luken
    nor Retro Television, Inc. was in existence at the time the IPA was executed, Retro
    Television Network, Inc.’s amended complaint asserted that Retro Television, Inc.
    was a third party beneficiary to the IPA and that Luken had acquired Retro
    Television, Inc. “including its assets and liabilities.” Appellees filed a motion to
    dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that they were not parties to the IPA and
    therefore had no obligations under it. The district court granted Appellees’ motion
    2
    Prior to this stock purchase, Equity merged with Coconut Palm Acquisition
    Corporation (Coconut) to form Equity Media Holdings Corporation and amended the
    IPA to reflect a change in Equity’s subsidiary’s name. For sake of clarity and because
    these facts do not bear upon the outcome of this case, we continue to refer to Equity
    Media Holdings Corporation as “Equity” and Equity’s subsidiary as simply
    “subsidiary.”
    -3-
    to dismiss, holding that the language of the IPA made clear that neither Retro
    Television, Inc. nor its predecessors were third party beneficiaries of the IPA. The
    district court ruled further that Retro Television Network, Inc. had failed to allege any
    facts that would make Luken liable under the IPA. In a subsequent order, the district
    court awarded Appellees $46,795.00 in attorneys’ fees.
    II.
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(6), construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. E-
    Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 
    678 F.3d 659
    , 662 (8th Cir. 2012). To
    withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough facts to “state a
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). “[C]onclusory statements” and “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
    factual enhancement” are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts must accept a plaintiff’s
    factual allegations as true but need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions. 
    Id.
    Additionally, “documents attached to or incorporated within a complaint are
    considered part of the pleadings, and courts may look at such documents for all
    purposes, including to determine whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim[.]”
    Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 
    628 F.3d 451
    , 459-60 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    It is undisputed that neither Retro Television, Inc. nor Luken is a party to the
    IPA. As a general rule, a contract’s obligations do not extend to nonparties to the
    contract. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 
    534 U.S. 279
    , 294 (2002) (“It goes without
    saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”). Retro Television Network, Inc.,
    however, alleges that Retro Television, Inc. is a third party beneficiary of the IPA.
    The parties agree that Arkansas law governs interpretation of the IPA. In Arkansas,
    “[a] contract is actionable by a third party when there is substantial evidence of a
    clear intention to benefit that third party.” Simmons Foods, Inc. v. H. Mahmood J.
    -4-
    Al-Bunnia & Sons Co., 
    634 F.3d 466
    , 469-70 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Perry v.
    Baptist Health, 
    189 S.W.3d 54
    , 58 (Ark. 2004)). “[T]he presumption is that parties
    contract only for themselves and a contract will not be construed as having been made
    for the benefit of a third party unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of
    the parties.” Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree
    with the district court that the IPA between Retro Television Network, Inc. and
    Equity did not express an intent to make Retro Television, Inc. or any of its
    predecessors a third party beneficiary. Not only do the IPA’s recitals make clear that
    the transfer of rights was for Equity’s benefit, but paragraph 13 of the IPA explicitly
    denies an intention to create a third party beneficiary, stating that “[n]o person or
    entity that is not a party to this agreement may claim any right or benefit hereunder.”
    Even if Retro Television, Inc. or one of its predecessors were a third party
    beneficiary of the IPA, the IPA does not impose any obligations on these parties.
    Instead, the terms of the IPA make clear that Equity was to provide all of the
    consideration for the transfer of rights and be the only obligor for such consideration.3
    Because Retro Television Network, Inc. has provided no basis for concluding that
    either Retro Television, Inc. or any of its predecessors are responsible for Equity’s
    obligations under the IPA, the district court correctly held that Retro Television
    Network, Inc. failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief against Retro
    Television, Inc. that is plausible on its face.
    Retro Television Network, Inc.’s argument that the district court erred in
    dismissing its claim against Luken is likewise without merit. In its amended
    3
    Retro Television Network, Inc. acknowledged as much before the district
    court, arguing that when Equity merged with Coconut, the surviving corporation
    “became the party responsible for any and all obligations under the IPA, including but
    not limited to, the royalty payment of ten percent (10%) of the net revenue to [Retro
    Television Network, Inc.] for the transfer of its rights, other than creative rights, in
    and to Retro Television Network to [Equity’s subsidiary].”
    -5-
    complaint, Retro Television Network, Inc. alleges that Luken “acquired [Equity’s
    subsidiary], including its assets and liabilities,” but does not plead any additional
    facts to support this conclusory statement. In its brief and at oral argument, Retro
    Television Network, Inc. asserted that by virtue of purchasing the stock of Equity’s
    subsidiary, Luken became a “successor” as that term is used in paragraph 13 of the
    IPA and is therefore liable for Equity’s subsidiary’s obligations under the IPA. As
    explained above, however, neither Retro Television, Inc. nor any of its predecessors
    are liable for Equity’s obligations under the IPA. Further, even if one of Equity’s
    subsidiaries were liable, Luken does not automatically inherit the subsidiary’s
    obligations solely by virtue of purchasing the subsidiary’s stock.4 In Arkansas, a
    shareholder is generally not liable for the obligations of a corporation in which the
    shareholder owns stock, see 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 4-27-622
    (b) (“Unless otherwise
    provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not
    personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
    personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.”); Scott v. Cent. Ark. Nursing
    Ctrs., Inc., 
    278 S.W.3d 587
    , 595 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (“Shareholders are not
    ordinarily liable for the acts of their corporation or LLC.” (citing 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 4
    -
    27-622(b)), and Retro Television Network, Inc. has not explained why this rule
    should not apply here. Because Retro Television Network, Inc. failed to allege any
    facts that would make Luken liable for Equity’s obligations under the IPA, the district
    court properly dismissed Retro Television Network, Inc.’s claim against Luken.
    III.
    Retro Television Network, Inc. asserts that the district court’s award of
    attorneys’ fees was excessive given the “early stage of the litigation.” “We will
    4
    The district court correctly did not consider whether Luken accepted the
    subsidiary’s obligations through the terms of the stock purchase agreement because
    Retro Television Network, Inc. neither attached the stock purchase agreement to, nor
    incorporated the agreement within, its amended complaint.
    -6-
    disturb a district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees only if we find an abuse of
    discretion.” Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 
    217 F.3d 612
    , 619 (8th Cir. 2000).
    In Arkansas, a prevailing party in a contract suit “may be allowed a reasonable
    attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court[.]” 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308
    . Relying
    on the appropriate factors under Arkansas law, see Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 
    800 S.W.2d 717
    , 718-19 (Ark. 1990), the district court concluded that Appellees were
    entitled to $46,795.00 in attorneys’ fees. In reaching this conclusion, the district
    court found that a proper defense of Retro Television Network, Inc.’s claims required
    a significant time commitment and that defense counsels’ hourly billing rates were
    reasonable. The district court then used the lodestar method to arrive at the amount
    of the fee.
    The district court’s calculation of this amount is supported by the detailed
    affidavits and time sheets attached to Appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees. Although
    Retro Television Network, Inc. contends that defense counsels’ expenditure of time
    on this case was unjustified, the record indicates otherwise. As the district court
    correctly noted, this case involved a complicated factual background, the potential for
    millions of dollars in liability, and a ten-count initial complaint that included 555
    pages of exhibits. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees.5
    5
    Retro Television Network, Inc. argues also that it should have been permitted
    to conduct discovery on the attorneys’ fees issue. As the Supreme Court has
    explained, however, “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second
    major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 437 (1983). Here, the district
    court properly relied on defense counsels’ affidavits and time records to calculate the
    attorneys’ fees, and thus discovery on this issue was unnecessary.
    -7-
    IV.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -8-