Berthel Fisher & Company v. Craig Larmon , 695 F.3d 749 ( 2012 )


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  •                United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 11-2877
    ___________________________
    Berthel Fisher & Company Financial Services, Inc.;
    Thomas J. Berthel; Ronald O. Brendengen;
    Shelley Rae Davenport; Frederick P. Fisher;
    Richard M. Murphy; Leslie D. Smith; Daniel P.
    Wegmann; and Thomas R. Biesheuvel
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    Craig Larmon; Geneva OSWX XXII, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
    corporation; Earl Holasek; OSWX XXXVI, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
    corporation; Geneva FTCX I, LLC,a Delaware limited liability corporation;
    Geneva BCCX XVIII, LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation; Karen Lane;
    Geneva OSWX IX, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Declaration of
    Trust of Karen Lane dated April 24, 1996; Jack Hoopes; Lorna Hoopes; Geneva
    OSWX XIX, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Patrick Jordan; Geneva
    OSWX XXVII, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and Patrick J. Jordan
    Trust dated April 6, 1990
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
    ____________
    Submitted: June 12, 2012
    Filed: October 1, 2012
    ____________
    Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
    This case comes to us on appeal from the district court's1 grant of the plaintiffs'
    motion for a preliminary injunction and denial of the defendants' motion to compel
    arbitration. Because we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the
    defendants are not the plaintiffs' "customers" under the Financial Industry Regulatory
    Authority's (FINRA) Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (FINRA
    Code) we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I.
    This case arises out of securities2 issued by a group of Minnesota limited
    liability companies (collectively, Geneva) and purchased by defendants-appellants
    (the Investors) in 2007 and 2008. Plaintiff-appellee Berthel Fisher & Company
    Financial Services., Inc., et. al (collectively, Berthel), a licensed broker-dealer and
    member of FINRA, served as managing broker-dealer for the offering. As managing
    broker-dealer, Berthel assembled a group of FINRA-registered
    broker-dealers—Selling Group Members, or SGMs—who in turn offered the
    securities to their own customers, including the Investors.
    1
    The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    2
    The securities in question were tenancy-in-common interests in real estate
    located in Minnesota and Texas.
    -2-
    Although Geneva prepared the private placement memoranda (PPMs) to be
    provided to prospective purchasers of the securities, Berthel reviewed at least two of
    the PPMs, suggesting changes that Geneva adopted. Per the agreement between
    Berthel and the SGMs, Berthel collected investor payments from the SGMs and
    passed those payments along to Geneva. In addition, the contract between Berthel
    and Geneva obligated Berthel and the SGMs to determine each investor's eligibility
    to participate in the offering. Because of this, Berthel maintained a file on each
    investor that included the investors' names, dates of birth, and contact information.
    The securities did not perform as anticipated, leading the Investors to file
    FINRA arbitration claims against Berthel. The Investors alleged that Berthel
    performed insufficient due diligence on the offering, leading to critical omissions in
    the PPMs. After preliminary proceedings before FINRA, Berthel filed suit in the
    United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaratory
    judgment that the Investors were not Berthel's "customers" under the FINRA Code
    and that Berthel was therefore not obligated to arbitrate with the Investors. Further,
    Berthel moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the arbitrations, and the
    Investors cross-moved to compel arbitration.
    Relying on Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 
    264 F.3d 770
    (8th Cir. 2001), the district court held that the Investors did not qualify as
    Berthel's customers under the FINRA Code and that the Investors' claims against
    Berthel were therefore not arbitrable before FINRA. Accordingly, the court granted
    Berthel's motion to enjoin the pending arbitrations and denied the Investors'
    cross-motion to compel arbitration.
    II.
    "We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration as
    an interlocutory appeal within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)." McNamara v.
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    Yellow Transp., Inc., 
    570 F.3d 950
    , 954 (8th Cir. 2009). "We review de novo the
    denial of a motion to compel arbitration." CD Partners, LLC v. Grizzle, 
    424 F.3d 795
    , 798 (8th Cir. 2005). Likewise, we review de novo the district court's legal
    conclusions in granting a motion for a preliminary injunction. Sierra Club v. U.S.
    Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
    645 F.3d 978
    , 989 (8th Cir. 2011). "When reviewing the
    enforcement of an arbitration agreement, we determine only whether there is a valid
    arbitration agreement and whether the dispute at issue falls within the terms of that
    agreement." Franke v. Poly-America Med. & Dental Benefits Plan, 
    555 F.3d 656
    ,
    658 (8th Cir. 2009).
    "[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to
    determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Mitsubishi Motors
    Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 614
    , 626 (1985). The Investors do
    not allege that Berthel explicitly agreed to arbitrate; rather, they allege that they
    qualify as Berthel's "customers" under the FINRA Code. The FINRA Code, which
    Berthel has signed as a FINRA member, constitutes an agreement to arbitrate disputes
    between Berthel and its customers. See In re Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors Secs. Litig.,
    
    672 F.3d 113
    , 128 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Ameriprise does not dispute that, by virtue of its
    membership in FINRA, it has consented to arbitrate with its customers."); MONY
    Secs. Corp. v. Bornstein, 
    390 F.3d 1340
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2004) (the predecessor to
    the FINRA Code "itself constitutes the agreement" to arbitrate.). Rule 12200 of the
    FINRA Code, which is the successor to National Association of Securities Dealers
    Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10301,3 states:
    3
    Herbert J. Sims & Co., Inc. v. Roven, 
    548 F. Supp. 2d 759
    , 763 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
    2008) ("Rule 12200 of the Code is an amended version of former Rule 10301 that
    went into effect on April 16, 2007. The cases interpreting and applying Rule 10301
    apply with equal force to Rule 12200, as the amendment did not effect any
    substantive change to the rule.").
    -4-
    Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if:
    •      Arbitration under the Code is either:
    (1) Required by a written agreement, or
    (2) Requested by the customer;
    •      The dispute is between a customer and a member or associated
    person of a member; and
    •      The dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the
    member or the associated person, except disputes involving the
    insurance business activities of a member that is also an insurance
    company.
    Here, the Investors have requested arbitration by filing claims with FINRA.
    Further, the dispute "arises in connection with the business activities" of Berthel
    because the Investors claim that Berthel failed to conduct adequate due diligence.
    Accordingly, it is undisputed that the question of arbitrability in this case turns on
    whether the Investors are Berthel's customers under the FINRA Code.
    The FINRA Code defines "customer" in the negative, stating only that "[a]
    customer shall not include a broker or dealer." FINRA Rule 12100(i). In Fleet
    Boston, we rejected the argument that one may qualify as a customer merely be being
    neither a broker nor a dealer. Fleet 
    Boston, 264 F.3d at 772
    . Instead, we construed
    "customer" to "refer[] to one involved in a business relationship with [a FINRA]
    member that is related directly to investment or brokerage services." 
    Id. It is
    uncontested that the Investors had no contact with Berthel in the course of
    investing in the securities at issue. The Investors argue, however, that they qualify
    as Berthel's customers under Rule 12200 because Berthel
    provided "investment or brokerage services" to the investors in three
    ways. First, Berthel Fisher was responsible for conducting due diligence
    -5-
    on the TIC interests. Second, Berthel Fisher was obligated to conduct
    a reasonable-basis suitability analysis on the TIC interests. Third,
    Berthel Fisher maintained customer files on the investors and was
    responsible for protecting the investors' privacy.
    The provision of these services in this case failed to transform the Investors
    into Berthel's customers, because Berthel provided those services not to the Investors
    but instead to the SGMs and Genevea. If the provision of these services formed any
    customer relationships at all, it formed them between Berthel, Geneva, and the SGMs,
    not between Berthel and the Investors.
    According to the Investors, Vestax Securities Corp. v. McWood, 
    280 F.3d 1078
    (6th Cir. 2002), establishes that a customer relationship is possible "even in the
    absence of a direct transactional relationship with the firm." 
    Id. at 1081.
    Citation to
    Vestax, however, is misplaced. The investors in that case purchased securities from
    associated persons of the firm. 
    Id. at 1081–82.
    Arbitration was therefore required
    because Rule 12200 requires arbitration when "[t]he dispute is between a customer
    and a member or associated person of a member." Accordingly, that case stands for
    the unremarkable proposition that customers of associated persons of a firm may
    compel arbitration with the firm. It does not suggest that an investor who interacts
    with neither the firm nor its associated persons may nevertheless qualify as a
    customer of the firm. Neither party argues that the SGMs are associated persons of
    Berthel; accordingly, Vestax is inapposite.
    The Investors argue that Fleet Boston requires only "investment or brokerage
    related services." But again, the provision of "investment or brokerage related
    services" is only half of the picture—not only must the FINRA member firm provide
    those services, but also must it provide those services to the customer either directly
    or through its associated persons. In Fleet Boston, we observed that "[a]lthough other
    cases interpreting the term 'customer' have in some ways taken a broad view of the
    term, in all of these cases there existed some brokerage or investment relationship
    -6-
    between the parties." 
    Id. at 772
    (emphasis added). Simply put, there is no
    "relationship" between Berthel and the Investors as required by Fleet Boston.
    Because Berthel did not provide "investment or brokerage related services" to the
    Investors, the Investors are not Berthel's customers under FINRA Rule 12200. We
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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