United States v. Ronald Goldberg ( 2023 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-1317
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Ronald Goldberg
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
    ____________
    Submitted: January 9, 2023
    Filed: April 14, 2023
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    The district court 1 found Ronald Goldberg violated a condition of his
    supervised release by defrauding an innkeeper and revoked his supervision,
    sentencing him to a 36-month term of imprisonment followed by two years of
    1
    The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa.
    supervised release. Goldberg appeals, asserting: (1) the court erred when it found
    he defrauded an innkeeper; and (2) his revocation sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. We affirm.
    In 2015, Goldberg pled guilty to two counts of bank fraud and one count of
    wire fraud, and he subsequently received a sentence of time served and a term of
    supervised release of five years. While under supervision, Goldberg served as a
    wine distributor. In 2018, a marketing coordinator for Lamborghini Dallas
    purchased wine from Goldberg valued at $1,120. The marketing coordinator
    provided Goldberg the information related to a corporate credit card (“Lamborghini
    Card”) understanding Goldberg would run the card to receive payment for the wine.
    On January 5, 2019, Goldberg checked into a beachfront resort in Palm Beach
    Florida, the Tideline, along with an associate Mark Kolta. At check-in, Goldberg
    completed an authorization form with respect to the Lamborghini Card, authorizing
    Tideline to charge fees related to lodging to the Lamborghini Card. Tideline charged
    the initial room deposit of around $1,000 to the Lamborghini Card. Kolta provided
    his personal card (“Kolta Card”) to Tideline and authorized Goldberg to charge
    incidental expenses but not lodging fees to the Kolta Card.
    On January 8, 2019, Goldberg informed a receptionist that Emily Nichols,
    Tideline’s manager, had approved a waiver of his phone expenses. Accordingly, the
    receptionist noted on Goldberg’s account that he would not receive phone charges.
    Notwithstanding Goldberg’s representations, Nichols had never authorized waiver
    of phone charges. During his stay, Goldberg incurred thousands of dollars in phone
    charges.
    On January 31, 2019, Tideline attempted to run the Lamborghini Card and the
    Kolta Card, but they were declined. Nichols then received a call from a Lamborghini
    Dallas marketing coordinator informing Tideline the Lamborghini Card should not
    have been used at the property. A representative of Lamborghini Dallas also
    informed Goldberg that he could not use the Lamborghini Card for his personal
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    expenses. Goldberg stated that he was unaware he could not do so, and his probation
    officer testified that Goldberg regularly used corporate cards in this manner. Nichols
    instructed Goldberg to provide a new method of payment. On February 2, 2019,
    Goldberg left Tideline in the middle of the night without providing an alternative
    method of payment.
    The next day, Nichols emailed Goldberg and informed him that he had an
    unpaid balance of approximately $10,000. Goldberg disputed the amount, claiming
    that phone charges had been waived. He made no claim that he did not owe the
    remainder of the bill. In the following weeks, Goldberg twice told Nichols that he
    would return to Tideline to pay his balance but failed to follow through.
    On March 30, 2019, Nichols reported Goldberg to law enforcement. Only
    then did Goldberg take steps to pay the bill. On April 1, 2019, Tideline accepted
    from Goldberg a $2,000 payment via a Visa credit card. Thereafter, Goldberg made
    additional attempts to pay his balance, but Tideline refused to accept payment.
    Tideline later removed Goldberg’s phone charges from his account.
    Goldberg’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke, which, after
    amendment, proceeded to a three-day hearing before the district court. In response
    to the government’s evidence, Goldberg claimed that he had provided his personal
    Mastercard credit card (“Mastercard Card”) and not the Lamborghini Card at
    check-in. Goldberg further testified Kolta authorized Goldberg to charge lodging
    fees to the Kolta Card. Goldberg acknowledged he had authorized Tideline to charge
    the Lamborghini Card but claimed he had given limited authority only to the extent
    of the amount he believed Lamborghini Dallas owed him. Goldberg also testified
    that Tideline’s receptionist waived his phone charges and that his initial reluctance
    to pay was only because of the phone charges. Finally, Goldberg testified that
    Tideline never attempted to charge the Kolta Card and the MasterCard Card was
    declined because Tideline attempted to charge it in an amount exceeding its limit.
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    The district court found Goldberg’s testimony not credible based on its
    observation of Goldberg and his prior convictions for crimes of deceit. The district
    court discredited his testimony and credited the government’s evidence. Based on
    the credited evidence, the court found that Goldberg did not violate Florida law and
    his supervision conditions by using the Lamborghini Card without authority.
    Among other factors, the court considered that Goldberg only successfully charged
    the approximately $1,000 deposit to the Lamborghini Card—an amount less than
    what Lamborghini Dallas owed him—and that Goldberg has used corporate credit
    cards in a similar manner in the past.
    Even so, the court determined Goldberg violated Florida law and his terms of
    supervision by defrauding an innkeeper. Specifically, the court found that Goldberg
    did not provide the Mastercard Card at check-in. The court also found that Goldberg
    obtained lodging at Tideline with no ability to pay and with intent to defraud because
    Lamborghini Dallas only owed Goldberg $1,120, an amount dwarfed by the actual
    lodging fees he owed, and the Kolta Card was only authorized for incidental
    expenses.
    At sentencing, the court found a Sentencing Guidelines range of 6 to 12
    months but rejected the advisory range because of the seriousness of Goldberg’s
    offense, his numerous prior crimes of deceit, and the serious financial risk he poses
    to the community. On the mitigation side, the court found that Goldberg committed
    no violation while on supervised release between 2016 and 2019. After weighing
    all the relevant factors, the court sentenced Goldberg to a 36-month term of
    imprisonment to be followed by two years of supervised release.
    Goldberg claims the district court erroneously found he intentionally
    defrauded an innkeeper. “We review the district court’s decision to revoke
    supervised release for an abuse of discretion” and any “subsidiary factfinding as to
    whether or not a violation occurred . . . for clear error.” United States v. Black Bear,
    
    542 F.3d 249
    , 252 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “A defendant violates a
    mandatory condition of supervised release if he commits a federal, state, or local
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    crime.” United States v. Asalati, 
    615 F.3d 1001
    , 1005 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation
    omitted). A person commits the offense of defrauding an innkeeper if he “obtains
    food, lodging, or other accommodations . . . with intent to defraud.” 
    Fla. Stat. § 509.151
    (1).
    The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, when it found
    Goldberg defrauded an innkeeper. The court reasonably credited the government’s
    evidence suggesting Goldberg incurred thousands of dollars in hotel expenses after
    checking into Tideline using only the Lamborghini Card and the Kolta Card, neither
    of which were authorized to cover the full amount of Goldberg’s lodging fees. The
    court also reasonably credited the government’s evidence suggesting Goldberg
    furtively absconded from Tideline without providing a valid form of payment and
    subsequently made unfulfilled promises to pay. This evidence is more than
    sufficient to support a conclusion that Goldberg obtained lodging from Tideline
    without the ability to pay and with intent to defraud.
    Goldberg asserts the court unreasonably disregarded evidence that he
    provided the MasterCard Card at check-in. The court could reasonably discredit
    Goldberg’s self-serving testimony and find his proffered account statement
    unpersuasive considering the evidence that Tideline adjusted his account balance
    after he left Tideline. Goldberg also asserts the court’s conclusion that he defrauded
    an innkeeper conflicts with its conclusion that he did not use a credit card without
    authority. However, the court could reasonably find that Goldberg had authority to
    charge the Lamborghini Card in an amount up to $1,120 while also finding this
    amount was insufficient to cover his extensive lodging fees.
    As to Goldberg’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, we
    review the substantive reasonableness of revocation sentences for an abuse of
    discretion. See United States v. Cain, 
    976 F.3d 778
    , 779-80 (8th Cir. 2020) (per
    curiam) (citations omitted). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district
    court sentence––whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines
    range––as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    ,
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    464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). The district court’s consideration
    of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the seriousness of his offense, his
    extensive criminal history involving crimes of deceit, and the financial risk he
    presents to the community were all permissible sentencing factors. While Goldberg
    asserts the court should have more heavily weighed his prior successful performance
    on supervised release, the court acted within its wide sentencing discretion in finding
    this factor insignificant in comparison to the financial risk he poses to the public.
    See United States v. Anderson, 
    618 F.3d 873
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The district court
    may give some factors less weight than a defendant prefers or more to other factors
    [without] justify[ing] reversal.” (citation omitted)).         The sentence is not
    substantively unreasonable.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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