Aspro, Inc. v. CIR ( 2022 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 21-1996
    ___________________________
    Aspro, Inc.
    Appellant
    v.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue
    Appellee
    ____________
    United States Tax Court
    ____________
    Submitted: December 14, 2021
    Filed: April 26, 2022
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
    Aspro, Inc., an asphalt-paving company, claimed tax deductions for
    management fees paid to its shareholders.        The tax court affirmed the
    Commissioner’s denial of the claimed deductions and granted the Commissioner’s
    motion in limine to exclude Aspro’s proffered expert witness testimony. 1 Aspro
    appeals, and we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Cary Douglas Pugh, United States Tax Court.
    I.
    Aspro, Inc. is an asphalt-paving company in Waterloo, Iowa. It is
    incorporated under Iowa law and treated as a subchapter C corporation for federal
    income-tax purposes. Between 2012 and 2014, the relevant years, Aspro stock was
    held by: Milton Dakovich, the president of Aspro; Jackson Enterprises Corp.; and
    Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd. Aspro has not paid dividends since the 1970s but, except
    for one year,2 has paid its shareholders “management fees” for at least twenty years.
    In addition to receiving management fees, Dakovich received a salary, director fees,
    and bonuses for each of the relevant years. There were no written agreements
    between Aspro and its three shareholders regarding fees paid for management
    services, nor was there an employment contract between Aspro and Dakovich.
    Aspro claimed deductions on its tax returns for management fees for tax years 2012
    through 2014. The Commissioner denied these deductions on the ground that Aspro
    failed to establish that it had incurred or paid the management fees for ordinary and
    necessary business purposes. At the resulting tax-court proceeding, each party
    proffered expert witnesses. The tax court excluded the testimony of Aspro’s experts
    and sustained the Commissioner’s decision denying Aspro’s claimed deductions on
    the ground that the fees were not paid as compensation for services but were instead
    disguised distributions of corporate earnings. Aspro appeals.
    II.
    We begin with Aspro’s claim that the tax court abused its discretion in
    excluding the testimony of its experts, Gale Peterson, Jr. and William Kenedy.
    Peterson is a contractor in the highway-construction industry, and Kenedy is a
    certified public accountant who specializes in business valuation. They each opined
    that the management fees were paid for valuable services that were actually
    performed. We review the tax court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for an
    2
    The exception is 2010, the year Aspro invested $4 million to buy a new
    asphalt plant. Because of this, “in order to help Aspro with her cash flow,” no
    management fees were paid.
    -2-
    abuse of discretion. See Polack v. Comm’r, 
    366 F.3d 608
    , 612 (8th Cir. 2004).
    Expert testimony is admissible only when the expert’s specialized knowledge
    “help[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
    Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). The expert’s specialized knowledge must be “based on
    sufficient facts or data,” be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and
    demonstrate that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
    facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(d). “Speculative testimony should not be
    admitted.” Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 
    628 F.3d 439
    , 448 (8th Cir. 2010).
    The tax court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of
    Peterson. His expert testimony would not help the trier of fact understand the
    evidence or determine a fact in issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). The tax court
    correctly found that Peterson’s “report does not offer an opinion as to the value of
    the various services at issue in this case nor does he apply scientific principles and
    methods.” Instead, as the tax court found, Peterson relied only on his personal
    “experience working for Aspro and his knowledge of [the] shareholders’ reputation
    in the industry[] [in concluding] that the services [the shareholders] provided to
    [Aspro] were valuable.” This does not demonstrate that Peterson “employ[ed] in the
    courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
    expert in the relevant field.” See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
    526 U.S. 137
    ,
    152 (1999). The tax court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Peterson’s
    testimony. See United States v. Strong, 
    826 F.3d 1109
    , 1115 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding
    that “expert-witness testimony was properly excluded” because “it was not helpful
    as required by Rule 702”).
    Nor did the tax court abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of
    Kenedy. As the tax court noted, Kenedy did not “articulate what principles and
    methods he used, if any, to conclude that ‘valuable services’ were provided.” We
    agree with the tax court that Kenedy’s report “merely summarizes the facts in a light
    favorable to [Aspro], advocates for [Aspro’s] position, criticizes [the
    Commissioner’s] position, and makes statements regarding the law.” Revealingly,
    Kenedy admitted that his findings were “[b]ased on [a] lack of documentation and
    -3-
    lack of a scientific method to assess the value” of the services. As the tax court
    suggests, this is an indication that his conclusions are based on personal belief rather
    than an expert analysis. See Long v. Cottrell, Inc., 
    265 F.3d 663
    , 669 (8th Cir. 2001).
    Therefore, the tax court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Kenedy’s testimony.
    See Ackerman v. U-Park, Inc., 
    951 F.3d 929
    , 933 (8th Cir. 2020) (“In the absence of
    any record evidence that [the expert] used reliable principles and methods or applied
    them reasonably to the facts of this case to form his opinion . . . [, t]he district court
    did not abuse its considerable discretion in excluding [the] expert opinion.”).
    III.
    Next, we consider Aspro’s challenge to the tax court’s holding that none of
    the management fees paid by Aspro was deductible because they were instead
    disguised distributions of profits. See United States v. Ellefsen, 
    655 F.3d 769
    , 779
    (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that distributions of profits are not deductible). Whether
    payments made to shareholders are distributions of profits rather than compensation
    for services is a factual determination. Heil Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    199 F.2d 193
    , 194-95 (8th Cir. 1952). We review the tax court’s factual determinations
    for clear error and “must affirm unless left with a conviction that the tax court has
    committed a mistake.” Keating v. Comm’r, 
    544 F.3d 900
    , 903 (8th Cir. 2008). We
    consider all the facts and circumstances when determining whether the
    compensation paid to a corporation’s shareholders is actually a distribution of
    profits. See Heil Beauty Supplies, 
    199 F.2d at 195
    ; Charles Schneider & Co. v.
    Comm’r, 
    500 F.2d 148
    , 151 (8th Cir. 1974). Aspro bore the burden of proving its
    entitlement to the deductions. See T.C.R. 142(a)(1).
    Corporations must pay federal income tax on their taxable income, 26 I.R.C.
    § 11(a), which is gross income less allowable deductions, § 63(a). Under
    § 162(a)(1), deductions are allowed for expenses that are “ordinary and necessary”
    in carrying on a trade or business, including “reasonable allowance for salaries or
    other compensation for personal services actually rendered.” “Ordinary has the
    connotation of normal, usual, or customary,” and describes expenses arising from
    -4-
    transactions “of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.”
    Deputy v. du Pont, 
    308 U.S. 488
    , 495 (1940). Necessary means appropriate and
    helpful to the development of the business. See Comm’r v. Heininger, 
    320 U.S. 467
    ,
    471 (1943); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. 111
    , 113 (1933).
    “As the language of § 162(a)(1) suggests, a deduction may be made if salary
    is both (1) ‘reasonable’ and (2) ‘in fact payments purely for services.’” David E.
    Watson, P.C. v. United States, 
    668 F.3d 1008
    , 1018 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162
    –7(a)); see also Wy’East Color Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2501
    ,
    
    1996 WL 119492
    , at *6 (1996) (“A taxpayer may deduct payments for management
    services under section 162 if the payments are for services actually rendered and are
    reasonable in amount.”). “Usually, courts only need to examine the first prong,”
    although “in the rare case where there is evidence that an otherwise reasonable
    compensation payment contains a disguised dividend, the inquiry may expand into
    compensatory intent apart from reasonableness.” David E. Watson, 
    668 F.3d. at 1018
     (brackets omitted). However, “[t]he inquiry into reasonableness is a broad one
    and will, in effect, subsume the inquiry into compensatory intent in most cases.” 
    Id.
    In general, reasonable compensation is limited to “such amount as would ordinarily
    be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.” 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7
    (b)(3); see also Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    73 T.C. 1142
    ,
    1155-56 (1980).
    “[C]orporations are not allowed a deduction for dividends paid to the
    shareholders,” Ellefsen, 
    655 F.3d at 779
    , including distributions that are disguised
    as compensation. 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7
    (b)(1); Charles Schneider, 
    500 F.2d at
    152-
    53. Compensation paid by the corporation to shareholders is closely scrutinized to
    make sure the payments are not disguised distributions. Heil Beauty Supplies, 
    199 F.2d at 194
     (“Any payment arrangement between a corporation and a
    stockholder . . . is always subject to close scrutiny for income tax purposes, so that
    deduction will not be made, as purported salary, rental or the like, of that which is
    in the realities of the situation an actual distribution of profits.”).
    -5-
    A.
    Here, even though Aspro argued that at least a portion of the management fees
    it paid were reasonable, we conclude that the tax court did not clearly err in finding
    that Aspro failed to meet its burden to show that any of the management fees paid to
    Jackson Enterprises Corp. and Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd. were reasonable. See
    T.C.R. 142(a)(1); Home Interiors, 73 T.C. at 1155-56. Aspro did not present
    evidence showing what “like enterprises under like circumstances” would ordinarily
    pay for like management services. See 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7
    (b)(3). It also did not
    quantify the value of the management services provided, nor did it show that similar
    companies would pay that amount for similar services. Contrary to Aspro’s
    assertion, the Commissioner’s expert Ken Nunes did not concede that “Jackson
    Enterprises and Manatt’s Enterprises provided valuable services to Aspro to support
    Aspro’s management fee payments.” Nunes’s conclusion that the services had some
    value was based upon testimony claiming that Jackson Enterprises and Manatt’s
    Enterprises actually provided services to Aspro; he conducted no analysis on
    whether the services were actually provided. As the tax court noted, Aspro produced
    no written management-services agreement or other documentation of a service
    relationship between Aspro and either entity, no evidence of how Aspro determined
    the amount of the management fees, and no evidence that either entity billed Aspro
    or sent invoices for any services performed for Aspro. See ASAT, Inc., v. Comm’r,
    
    108 T.C. 147
     (1997) (holding that the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct consulting
    fees where there were no written agreements, no documentation providing how the
    management fees were calculated, and billing invoices containing almost no details);
    Fuhrman v. Comm’r, 
    102 T.C.M. (CCH) 347
     2011-236, 
    2011 WL 4502290
    , at *2-3
    (same).3
    3
    Although closely held companies “often act informally, with decisions not
    being documented in writing,” see Int’l Cap. Holding Corp. v. Comm’r, 
    83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1586
    , 
    2002 WL 826553
    , at *10 (2002), taxpayers claiming deductions should
    keep records “sufficient to establish” whether such person is liable for a deduction,
    see 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1
    (a); I.R.C. § 6001; Erickson v. Comm’r, 
    937 F.2d 1548
    ,
    1552 (10th Cir. 1991) (“It is well established that taxpayers are required to keep
    -6-
    Further, we agree with the tax court that the management fees paid by Aspro
    to Jackson Enterprises Corp. and Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd. were not purely for
    services rendered and were instead disguised distributions of profits. See David E.
    Watson, 
    668 F.3d. at 1019
    . Aspro has made no dividend distributions since the
    1970s but has paid management fees every year but one for twenty years. See Paul
    E. Kummer Realty Co. v. Comm’r, 
    511 F.2d 313
    , 315 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he absence
    of dividends to stockholders out of available profits justifies an inference that some
    of the purported compensation really represented a distribution of profits as
    dividends.”); Charles Schneider, 
    500 F.2d at 153
     (“Perhaps most important [in
    identifying disguised distributions] is the fact that no dividends were ever paid by
    any of these companies during [this time], even though they enjoyed consistent
    profits and immense success in the industry.”). And Aspro has also paid
    management fees in amounts roughly proportional to the ownership interests of the
    stockholders. Jackson Enterprises Corp. and Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd. each owned
    forty percent of Aspro’s stock, and each received forty-three percent of the total
    management fees paid in 2012, forty-six percent in 2013, and forty-four percent in
    2014. See Paul E. Kummer, 
    511 F.2d at 316
     (suggesting that payments to
    shareholders that were “almost identical” to their ownership interest indicated
    disguised distributions); 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7
    (b)(1) (stating that a disguised
    distribution is likely where “excessive payments correspond or bear a close
    relationship” to ownership interests); RTS Inv. Corp. v. Comm’r, 
    53 T.C.M. (CCH) 171
    , aff’d, 
    877 F.2d 647
     (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The district court correctly
    found that Aspro had a “process of setting management fees [that] was unstructured
    and had little if any relation to the services performed” and “had relatively little
    taxable income after deducting the management fees,” and Aspro does not dispute
    that it paid the management fees as lump sums at the end of the tax year even though
    many of the services that Aspro claims justified the management fees were
    performed throughout the year. See Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm’r, 
    503 F.2d 359
    ,
    362-63 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming in a disguised-distribution context the tax court’s
    adequate records or books from which their correct tax liability may be
    determined.”).
    -7-
    reliance on factors including an unstructured process of setting shareholder
    compensation, consistently negligible taxable income, and lump-sum payments to
    shareholders). Therefore, the tax court did not clearly err in concluding that the
    management fees paid to Jackson Enterprises Corp. and Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd.
    were nondeductible because Aspro failed to carry its burden of showing that the fees
    were reasonable and purely for services.
    B.
    Next we turn to whether the management fees paid by Aspro to Dakovich
    were deductible, which requires that the fees be reasonable and in fact payments
    purely for services.4 See David E. Watson, 
    668 F.3d at 1018
    . We conclude that the
    tax court did not clearly err in finding that Aspro failed to meet its burden to show
    that the management fees paid to Dakovich “would ordinarily be paid for like
    services by like enterprises under like circumstances.” See 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.162
    -
    7(b)(3); Home Interiors, 73 T.C. at 1155-56. Aspro did not present evidence
    showing what similar companies under like circumstances would pay as
    management fees (over and above salary and bonuses) to an employee like Dakovich
    for the same type of management services. It also did not quantify the value of the
    management services he provided, nor did it show that like enterprises would pay
    that amount for them. In fact, the Commissioner’s expert said the exact opposite.
    Nunes, an expert in valuing compensation arrangements, reviewed deposition
    transcripts about the services Dakovich provided to Aspro and determined the
    amount of reasonable compensation that a comparable enterprise would have to pay
    in the marketplace for the services described in the depositions. He concluded that
    Dakovich’s salary and bonus exceeded the industry average and median by a
    substantial margin and that management fees in addition to the salary and bonus
    4
    Aspro also paid Dakovich a salary, director fees, and bonuses in the relevant
    years. Only the deductibility of the management fees is at issue here.
    -8-
    were not reasonable.5 When Nunes added Dakovich’s excess compensation per year
    to his management fees, his share of the total management fees over the three years
    at issue was twenty-two percent, closely aligning with his twenty-percent ownership
    interest in Aspro; the other two shareholders each received thirty-nine percent, which
    closely aligned with their approximately forty-percent-each ownership interest in
    Aspro.
    To determine whether compensation paid to a shareholder-employee is
    reasonable, courts consider factors enumerated in Charles Schneider, 
    500 F.2d at 151-52
    .6 No single factor is dispositive; rather, the court is to base its decision on a
    careful consideration of applicable factors in light of the relevant facts. See Mayson
    Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 
    178 F.2d 115
    , 119 (6th Cir. 1949). Because the factors in
    isolation offer insufficient guidance on their application, we view them in the context
    of the list as a whole. Factors discussed in Charles Schneider strengthen our
    conclusion that the tax court did not clearly err, including “the absence of profits
    5
    Aspro argues that Dakovich’s compensation should be calculated as an
    estimate of his annual hours multiplied by the Commissioner’s “concession” that
    Dakovich’s time was worth $200 per hour. However, Aspro’s argument
    misinterprets Nunes’s testimony. The $200-per-hour figure represents the market
    rate a company would have to pay a professional firm to purchase equivalent senior
    level services. It includes direct compensation and benefits for the executive; the
    overhead costs of the firm, such as its costs of recruiting temporary staff; and its
    profits. Because of this, the figure includes a fifty-eight percent markup from what
    Nunes considered reasonable compensation for a senior-level professional
    comparable to Dakovich. Nunes testified that if Aspro planned to hire a similar
    person directly as an employee, which Dakovich was, the compensation paid would
    be $128 per hour.
    6
    Contrary to Aspro’s argument, the tax court properly did not consider these
    factors with regard to the management fees paid to Jackson Enterprises Corp. and
    Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd. because the factors apply to the reasonableness of an
    employee’s compensation. Charles Schneider, 
    500 F.2d at 151-52
    . We have never
    applied the Charles Schneider factors to a nonemployee. See, e.g., David E. Watson,
    
    668 F.3d at 1016-1017
    ; Paul E. Kummer, 
    511 F.2d at 314-15
    ; RTS Inv. Corp., 
    877 F.2d at 348-49
    .
    -9-
    paid back to the shareholders as dividends”; “the nature, extent and scope of the
    employee’s work”; and “a most significant factor,” “the prevailing rates of
    compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns.” See Charles
    Schneider, 
    500 F.2d at 152-54
    .
    Aspro has not paid any dividends to stockholders since the 1970s, but
    regularly pays management fees. This “justifies an inference that . . . the purported
    compensation really represents a distribution of profits.” See 
    id. at 153
    . To the
    extent that it exists in the record, Aspro’s explanation is vague as to the “nature,
    extent and scope” of Dakovich’s work for which he earned management fees, as
    opposed to the work he performed to earn his salary and bonus. See 
    id. at 152
    .
    Explanations for why Dakovich earned the management fees included that it was “to
    compensate [him] for a job well done, basically” and that he is an “influential
    contractor” in the industry. A director of Aspro during the relevant time period was
    not “aware of a separation of duties that would relate [Dakovich’s] salary versus
    management fees.” In fact, not even Dakovich was able to explain what he did to
    earn the management fees. As stated above, Nunes concluded that Dakovich’s
    compensation exceeded the prevailing rates of compensation paid to those in similar
    positions in comparable companies within the same industry. True, as the tax court
    acknowledged, Dakovich’s qualifications (decades of experience, wide-ranging
    management duties, long hours worked) may have weighed in favor of the
    reasonableness of his compensation. See Wagner Constr., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-160
    , 
    2001 WL 739234
    , at *22 (2001) (stating that an employee’s
    superior qualifications may justify high compensation for his services).
    Nonetheless, in light of the countervailing factors, we conclude that the tax court did
    not clearly err in finding that Aspro had not met its burden of showing that
    management fees paid to Dakovich were reasonable.
    Furthermore, the payments made to Dakovich were a disguised distribution
    and were not purely for services. See David E. Watson, 
    668 F.3d. at 1019
    . As with
    Jackson Enterprises Corp. and Manatt’s Enterprises, Ltd., Aspro paid the
    management fees as lump sums at the end of the tax year even though the purported
    -10-
    services were performed throughout the year, had an unstructured process of setting
    the management fees that did not relate to the services performed, and had a
    relatively small amount of taxable income after deducting the management fees. See
    Nor-Cal Adjusters, 
    503 F.2d at 362-63
    . Therefore, the tax court did not clearly err
    in finding that Aspro failed to carry its burden of showing that the management fees
    were reasonable and purely for services actually performed.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the tax court.
    ___________________________
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