Gregg Geerdes v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3305
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Gregg Geerdes, Individually and as Administrator Estate of John Matthew
Geerdes; Mary Murphy
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
West Bend Mutual Insurance Company
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: April 13, 2023
Filed: June 20, 2023
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Gregg Geerdes (“Geerdes”), Mary Murphy (“Murphy”), and the estate of John
Geerdes (“John”) brought this action against West Bend Mutual Insurance Company
(“West Bend”) after West Bend refused to pay claims for uninsured/underinsured
(“UM/UIM”) benefits under an insurance policy that insured Geerdes, Murphy, and
John. The district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of West Bend. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The district court accepted the parties’ stipulation of facts giving rise to this
action. In 2018, Iowa residents Geerdes and Murphy purchased a home and
automobile insurance policy issued by West Bend (“Policy”). Their son, John,
tragically died in 2019 from injuries sustained while a passenger on a charter bus
that crashed in British Columbia, Canada. The bus driver’s negligence caused the
accident. The bus driver and the bus company had liability coverage under a policy
issued by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (“Bus Insurer”). The Bus
Insurer paid all the no-fault motorist insurance benefits it was legally obligated to
pay under the policy. Geerdes, Murphy, and John’s estate (“plaintiffs”) have not
sued the bus driver or the bus company, recognizing jurisdiction for any such action
lies in British Columbia.
The parties have stipulated that, under British Columbia law, the no-fault
insurance benefits paid by the Bus Insurer are the only damages available to
plaintiffs other than the costs of John’s funeral. West Bend paid for John’s funeral
expenses and denied plaintiffs’ claim for non-economic damages. Plaintiffs
commenced this action, asserting breach of contract claims against West Bend.
Plaintiffs seek UM/UIM benefits (and additional umbrella coverage) under
the Policy. It is undisputed that the Policy covers accidents in Canada. The Policy’s
UM/UIM coverage provisions provide for payment of compensatory damages for
bodily injury caused by an accident that an insured is “legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator” of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. The
disputed narrow legal issue is whether the damages plaintiffs are “legally entitled to
1
The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.
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recover” under the Policy are those that would be recoverable where the insurance
contract was formed (governed by Iowa law) or where the accident occurred
(governed by British Columbia law).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of West Bend,
concluding that under Hall v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 158 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa
1968), the phrase “legally entitled to recover” from an uninsured or underinsured
motorist prevents plaintiffs from recovering non-economic damages under the
Policy because they could not recover such damages from the bus driver or the bus
company in a tort action in British Columbia. Plaintiffs appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
“In insurance coverage actions involving diversity of citizenship, state law
controls our analysis of the insurance policy.” Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. W & G, Inc.,
439 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The interpretation of an
insurance policy and whether it provides coverage in a particular situation are
questions of law that we review de novo. See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co.,
260 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in concluding that British Columbia
law rather than Iowa law determines the extent of plaintiffs’ recoverable damages
under the Policy. The parties agree that the underlying insurance contract is properly
construed under Iowa law. Iowa law requires that an insurance policy be “construed
as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary, not technical, meaning to achieve
a practical and fair interpretation.” Gracey v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d
372, 373 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). If a policy is ambiguous, the court is to
construe the policy in a light most favorable to the insured. Id. (citation omitted).
In Hall, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “legally entitled to
recover” in the context of UM coverage. 158 N.W.2d at 109. The court concluded
the policy limited the benefits the plaintiff was entitled to receive to the amount
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recoverable in a tort action against the tortfeasors where the accident occurred or in
the tortfeasors’ home state rather than in Iowa, where the insureds resided and the
policy was underwritten. Id. at 108-11. The crux of the court’s reasoning was that
the plaintiff could not have sued the tortfeasors in Iowa because they had no relevant
contacts there. See id. at 109-11.
The district court applied British Columbia law, the only court with personal
jurisdiction over the bus driver or the bus company, which limited recovery to
economic damages only. Applying Hall, as we must, plaintiffs are not “legally
entitled to recover” non-economic damages from the bus driver or the bus company
and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to West Bend.
While plaintiffs assert contract conflict of laws principles set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) require that Iowa law
determine the extent of their recovery, Hall specifically held that no conflict of laws
problem exists when the tortfeasor is only subject to personal jurisdiction in courts
that would apply identical law. See id. at 110-11. But cf. Cole v. State Auto. & Cas.
Underwriters, 296 N.W.2d 779, 780-82 (Iowa 1980) (applying a conflict of laws
analysis when Minnesota law and Iowa law differed and where the negligent
motorist was unidentifiable). Because, under Hall, the only law that could be applied
to the tortfeasors in this case is the law of British Columbia, whether Iowa has
adopted the Restatement is immaterial as the Restatement cannot apply in the
absence of a conflict of laws. 2
2
Although plaintiffs invite us to find Fuhrmann v. Majors, 756 N.W.2d 48(Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished table decision), overruled or otherwise abrogated
Hall, we decline to do so, as that is the role of the Iowa Supreme Court. For the
same reason, we decline to rely on decisions of other state supreme courts that have
reached decisions contrary to Hall. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wisc. 2002); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Est. of
Braun, 793 P.2d 253 (Mont. 1990).
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Plaintiffs also assert the enactment of Iowa Code § 516A.1, Iowa’s
Underinsured Motorist Statute, effectively abrogated Hall. Section 516A.1 requires
that an automobile insurance provider offer coverage for certain damages the insured
would be “legally entitled to recover” from uninsured or underinsured motorists.
Iowa Code § 516A.1(1). However, § 516A.1 only requires that insurance companies
offer the type of coverage at issue in this case. The statute does not define what it
means for an insured to be “legally entitled to recover” damages from an uninsured
or underinsured motorist such that it could abrogate Hall.
Plaintiffs also contend that, consistent with Iowa law, we must interpret the
phrase “legally entitled to recover” liberally, not literally. See Hagenow v. Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). On a few
occasions, the Iowa Supreme Court has liberally interpreted the phrase and found
plaintiffs “legally entitled to recover” damages from tortfeasors even though the
plaintiffs could not recover from the tortfeasors in an action. The common thread in
these cases is that they were exceptional and involved circumstances in which
procedural rules rather than substantive law operated to preclude the plaintiffs’
recovery. See, e.g., Waits v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 572 N.W.2d 565, 571-74 (Iowa
1997) (finding the insured’s release of the right to recover from the uninsured
motorists did not prohibit an action against the insurance company); Wetherbee v.
Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 657, 658-61 (Iowa 1993) (finding the fact that
only the decedent’s estate could have had capacity to maintain an action against the
tortfeasor did not prevent the insured decedent’s wife from bringing a suit against
the insurance company). On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme Court has not held
that a plaintiff would be “legally entitled to recover” from a tortfeasor who was not
liable or who had a defense under substantive law with respect to the requested
amount of damages. See Wetherbee, 508 N.W.2d at 661 (stating an insured may
recover only if the insured has “suffered damages caused by the fault of the
underinsured motorist and [is] entitled to receive those damages”); see, e.g.,
Hagenow, 846 N.W.2d at 378-79 (finding plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery
when a jury found the alleged tortfeasor was not negligent); Otterberg v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 28-31 (Iowa 2005) (finding a plaintiff was
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not entitled to recovery when a workers’ compensation statute precluded recovery
from the tortfeasors). Here, as a matter of substantive British Columbia law, neither
the bus driver nor the bus company could be liable to plaintiffs for non-economic
damages.
Finally, plaintiffs assert the “Available Insurance Provision” within the Policy
entitles them to recover non-economic damages. Plaintiffs reason this provision
allows West Bend to reduce its coverage only by amounts plaintiffs can actually
receive, and plaintiffs assert that if they cannot recover non-economic damages
under British Columbia law, they cannot actually receive these damages. The text
of the provision does not support plaintiffs’ position. The plain language of this
provision provides only that West Bend may “reduce” its otherwise applicable
coverage by certain other amounts available. Where, as here, the insurer has no
liability under the Policy’s coverage provisions, the Available Insurance Provision
does not operate as an affirmative grant of coverage extending to what are otherwise
uncovered losses.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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