United States v. Jesse Neri ( 2023 )


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  •                 United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-2932
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Jesse Neri
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
    ____________
    Submitted: May 11, 2023
    Filed: July 19, 2023
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
    Following a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation, Jessi
    Neri pled guilty to three counts involving methamphetamine: possession,
    distribution, and conspiracy. The district court1 sentenced Neri to 210 months’
    1
    The Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nebraska.
    imprisonment on each count, all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Neri raises
    three claims of procedural error and argues that his sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I.
    On January 5, 2021, an undercover officer working with the DEA coordinated
    a purchase of methamphetamine from a known supplier believed to reside in
    Mexico. The plan was for the parties to meet at a business in Omaha, Nebraska, to
    conduct the exchange. After the undercover officer arrived at the proposed meeting
    location, he noticed two individuals waiting for him in a vehicle, which he later
    learned belonged to Neri. One was in the passenger seat and the other was in the
    driver’s seat. The undercover officer approached the vehicle and asked if they had
    “the stuff.” The individual in the passenger seat responded, “yeah,” and handed the
    undercover officer an open cardboard box containing approximately one pound of
    methamphetamine. The officer then paid the individual in the passenger seat $4,100
    in cash, the previously agreed-upon price, and the men went on their way.
    Following the controlled buy, investigators coordinated a traffic stop of the
    vehicle to verify the passengers’ identities. During the stop, the investigators
    confirmed that Neri was the individual in the passenger seat and his brother,
    Oswaldo, was in the driver’s seat. Based on Neri’s driver’s license photograph, the
    undercover officer positively identified Neri as the person who handed him the
    methamphetamine.
    Using this information, the investigators obtained a search warrant for Neri
    and Oswaldo’s shared residence. Approximately a week after the transaction,
    investigators executed the warrant. During their search, they discovered a digital
    scale and baggies, as well as approximately six pounds of methamphetamine in
    Oswaldo’s closet. Investigators arrested both Neri and Oswaldo.
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    On the morning Neri’s trial was scheduled to begin, he pled guilty to all
    counts, while Oswaldo proceeded to trial. The same district judge who sentenced
    Neri presided over Oswaldo’s trial, where “absolutely overwhelming” evidence
    convinced a jury to convict him on all counts. Soon after, the United States
    Probation Office released its initial Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) in
    preparation for Neri’s sentencing. Neri filed several objections. As relevant here,
    Neri objected to (1) the Probation Office’s attribution of the six pounds of
    methamphetamine discovered in Oswaldo’s closet to him, thereby increasing his
    base offense level; (2) the Probation Office’s suggested two-level enhancement for
    Neri’s knowledge that the methamphetamine was imported unlawfully; and (3) the
    Probation Office’s recommendation to deny him a downward adjustment for his
    minor role in the offense.
    At sentencing, Neri renewed his objections. The district court overruled them
    after hearing argument and considering the “evidence at [Oswaldo’s] trial and the
    unobjected-to allegations in the PSR.” As to Neri’s first objection, the district court
    overruled it on the grounds that, even though the methamphetamine was discovered
    in Oswaldo’s closet, the “entire weight of the meth [wa]s attributable to both
    defendants as relevant conduct” underlying Neri’s conspiracy conviction. Moving
    to Neri’s second objection, the district court ruled that the two-level enhancement
    for importing methamphetamine applied because “the unobjected-to allegations in
    the PSR show[ed] that the conspiracy involved knowing importation of
    methamphetamine from Mexico.” Finally, the district court determined that Neri
    was not entitled to a downward adjustment for a minor role in the offense because
    Neri “used his own truck to engage in a drug-trafficking transaction and he
    personally handed an undercover officer approximately [one] pound of
    methamphetamine which was sent from a Mexico-based supplier in exchange for
    $4100.”
    Having overruled all of Neri’s objections, the district court then determined
    Neri’s United States Sentencing Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months’
    imprisonment before moving on to its 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) analysis. The district
    -3-
    court considered all factors as required, emphasizing the nature and circumstances
    of the offense, specifically the quantity of methamphetamine involved and its origins
    in Mexico. The district court also highlighted Neri’s criminal history, focusing on
    Neri’s previous involvement with narcotics. Following its § 3553(a) analysis, the
    district court determined that a sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment on each count
    was “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” The district court was then careful
    to note that, “although I have overruled [Neri’s] objections, even if I had sustained
    some or all of them, I would have still imposed the same sentence . . . based on all
    the factors that I am required to consider under the law.” Similarly, the district court
    stated, “I would give the exact sentence [given] . . . even if I ignored everything that
    happened at [Oswaldo’s] trial.” Neri now appeals, arguing that the district court
    committed procedural error when it (1) attributed the six pounds of
    methamphetamine discovered in Oswaldo’s closet to him; (2) applied a two-level
    enhancement based on his knowledge that the methamphetamine was imported; and
    (3) refused to grant him a downward adjustment for his minor role in the offense.
    He also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
    II.
    “We review a district court’s sentence in two steps: first, we review for
    significant procedural error; and second, if there is no significant procedural error,
    we review for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Kistler, 
    70 F.4th 450
    ,
    452 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). We thus begin by analyzing Neri’s three
    claims of procedural error and then move to the substantive reasonableness of his
    sentence.
    A.
    “‘Procedural error’ includes ‘failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
    the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
    § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
    adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation
    -4-
    from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir.
    2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, we have repeatedly emphasized that
    “significant procedural error can be harmless.” See, e.g., United States v. Henson,
    
    550 F.3d 739
    , 741 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). And even when, as here, the
    government fails to raise harmless error, we may do so sua sponte, provided that we
    consider “the certainty of the harmlessness finding,” and “err on the side of the
    criminal defendant.” See United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 
    911 F.3d 931
    , 936 n.2 (8th
    Cir. 2018) (quoting Lufkins v. Leapley, 
    965 F.2d 1477
    , 1481 (8th Cir. 1992)).
    Because we are certain of the harmlessness of Neri’s claimed procedural errors, we
    choose to exercise this sua sponte authority in this case and do not reach the merits
    of his procedural challenges.
    Here, the district court specifically stated that, “even if I had sustained some
    or all of [Neri’s objections], I would have still imposed the same sentence . . . based
    on all the factors that I am required to consider under the law.” R. Doc. 170, at 35.
    It then undertook the requisite § 3553(a) analysis in which it highlighted the nature
    and circumstances of the offense and Neri’s criminal history in explaining its
    ultimate sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. We often consider alleged
    procedural errors harmless in such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
    Sanchez-Martinez, 
    633 F.3d 658
    , 660-61 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding harmless error
    where, at sentencing, the district court stated that regardless of its allegedly flawed
    calculation of the Guidelines range, it would have “end[ed] up at the same place,
    anyway”); United States v. Thibeaux, 
    784 F.3d 1221
    , 1227 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding
    district court’s alleged error in imposing sentencing enhancement harmless when
    district court said it would have imposed the same sentence anyway and otherwise
    adequately explained its sentence under § 3553(a)). Thus, we hold that any alleged
    procedural error was harmless.
    B.
    Next, we address Neri’s substantive reasonableness challenge. “We review
    the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States
    -5-
    v. Carnes, 
    22 F.4th 743
    , 750 (8th Cir. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion
    when it (1) ‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant
    weight’; (2) ‘gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3)
    ‘considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear
    error of judgment.’” Feemster, 
    572 F.3d at 461
     (citation omitted). Whether the
    sentence is outside or within the Guidelines range, our review is “highly deferential.”
    United States v. Ayres, 
    929 F.3d 581
    , 583 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
    “Sentences within the guideline range are presumed to be substantively reasonable.”
    United States v. Meadows, 
    866 F.3d 913
    , 920 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
    Here, Neri claims the district court imposed a sentence that is greater than
    necessary to achieve the purposes of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). In support, Neri argues
    that he accepted responsibility in pleading guilty instead of holding the government
    to its burden at trial 2; his criminal history “reflects more of a personal drug abuse
    problem” than selling drugs; he complied with the terms of his pretrial release; and
    he has a strong work ethic. In other words, Neri merely disagrees with how the
    district court chose to weigh the § 3553(a) factors. But this is not enough to
    demonstrate an abuse of discretion that justifies interfering with the district court’s
    “‘wide latitude’ to assign weight to give[n] factors,” and we refuse to do so here.
    Carnes, 22 F.4th at 751 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The district court
    thus did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    2
    We note that Neri received an acceptance-of-responsibility deduction for this
    decision despite (1) waiting to enter a guilty plea until “the morning of trial” and
    (2) “absolutely overwhelming” evidence of his guilt. R. Doc. 170, at 23.
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