Spencer Knapp v. FAG Bearings, LLC ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-1506
___________________________
Spencer Knapp and Elizabeth Ygartua
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
FAG Bearings, LLC
Defendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
____________
Submitted: November 15, 2022
Filed: June 5, 2023
____________
Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
Spencer Knapp suffers from multiple sclerosis. Nearly four years after his
diagnosis, he and his wife sued FAG Bearings, LLC, alleging the company caused
his condition by improperly disposing of trichloroethylene at a bearing
manufacturing facility near his childhood home in Missouri. The district court1
entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings after concluding the suit
originated in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred under
Texas law. We affirm.
I. Background
Knapp alleges he developed multiple sclerosis (“MS”) as a result of his
prenatal and childhood exposure to trichloroethylene (“TCE”). He claims the FAG
Bearings facility near Silver Creek, Missouri, where he grew up, improperly
disposed of TCE from approximately 1975 to 1981. When Knapp was a child, his
parents participated in a class-action lawsuit against FAG Bearings related to the
alleged contamination.
Knapp moved to Texas in 2013. In April 2017, he experienced increasing
numbness that spread throughout his body, which prompted a trip to the emergency
room in Texas. The following month, a neurologist in Texas diagnosed Knapp with
MS.
In December 2017, while Knapp was in Texas, Knapp’s brother emailed him
an electronic link to an article. That article described a woman who grew up in
Silver Creek and developed an autoimmune disease, potentially as a result of
exposure to TCE. After reading the article, Knapp thought his childhood exposure
to TCE “potentially” caused his MS. He also “found other articles that had described
a correlation between TCE exposure and autoimmune disease development later in
life.” From Knapp’s perspective, “it seemed logical” after reading these articles that
his MS “may have been” caused by TCE. That same winter, because of the article
his brother sent him, Knapp spoke with a family friend who was an attorney. Upon
the friend’s recommendation, Knapp soon retained another attorney to consider
1
The Honorable Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
-2-
filing a lawsuit. In August 2018, Knapp received another email from his brother
with the subject line “I think you should sue FAG bearings”; the email contained
electronic links to more articles.
In November 2019, Dr. Norbert Belz evaluated Knapp in Missouri. The same
day as the evaluation, Dr. Belz concluded Knapp’s exposure to TCE caused his MS.
This was the first time a doctor told Knapp there was a connection between his
exposure to TCE and his MS.
In February 2021, Knapp and his wife sued FAG Bearings and other related
entities in state court for damages under theories of negligence and strict liability.2
After the case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, the district court dismissed the strict liability theory. Later, the
district court entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings. The district
court concluded Knapp’s remaining claim for negligence “originated” in Texas
under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred by Texas’s two-year statute
of limitations. Knapp timely appealed.
II. Analysis
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis
that a claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Spradling v. Hastings, 912 F.3d
1114, 1119 (8th Cir. 2019). We view the facts in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Id. A district “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2
Only Knapp’s claim against FAG Bearings is before us in this appeal.
-3-
A. Missouri’s Borrowing Statute
Knapp first argues the district court erred by concluding his claims
“originated” in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute. “A federal court sitting
in diversity applies the statute-of-limitations rules of the forum.” Great Plains Tr.
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2007). Missouri is the forum
state, so Missouri’s statute-of-limitations rules apply. We review de novo a district
court’s interpretation of state law while sitting in diversity. Sports v. Top Rank, Inc.,
954 F.3d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 2020).
The dispute centers on Missouri’s borrowing statute, so we begin with the
text. “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state . . .
in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon,
brought in any of the courts of [Missouri].” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190. “The critical
issue” under Missouri’s borrowing statute “is determining where a cause of action
originated.” Nettles v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 1358, 1362 (8th Cir. 1995).
Knapp argues his claim “originated” in Missouri, whereas FAG Bearings agrees with
the district court that Knapp’s claim “originated” in Texas.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted “originated” under Missouri’s
borrowing statute to mean “accrued.” Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868, 871
(Mo. banc 1992). Generally, a claim accrues when the damage “is sustained and is
capable of ascertainment.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100; see also State ex rel. Heart of
Am. Council v. McKenzie, 484 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Mo. banc 2016) (applying Missouri
Revised Statute § 516.100 to a negligence claim). “Capable of ascertainment” is an
objective standard that is “determined by when the evidence was such to place a
reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury.” Burdess v.
Cottrell, Inc., 53 F.4th 442, 448 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Powel v. Chaminade Coll.
Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Mo. banc 2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In short, the standard is inquiry notice. See Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 578,
583.
-4-
The district court correctly held that Knapp’s claim “originated” in Texas. In
April 2017, Knapp experienced increasing numbness that spread throughout his
body. The next month, he was diagnosed with MS. In December 2017, Knapp’s
brother emailed him a link to an article discussing a woman who developed an
autoimmune disease after exposure to TCE in Silver Creek. As a result, Knapp
thought his MS was “potentially” caused by his TCE exposure. All of these events
occurred in Texas. At this point, in December 2017 at the latest, a reasonably
prudent person would have been placed on notice of a potentially actionable injury.
Our conclusion is more than theoretical: Knapp spoke with an attorney and was
familiar with FAG Bearings’ involvement in TCE litigation.
Knapp nonetheless insists his claim “originated” in Missouri. He highlights
his meeting with Dr. Belz in Missouri in November 2019, arguing any connection
between MS and TCE was “mere speculation” until Dr. Belz told him otherwise.
Dr. Belz was the first doctor who told Knapp his MS was connected to his childhood
exposure to TCE. Under Missouri law, however, the inquiry is not when a “plaintiff
subjectively learned of the wrongful conduct and that it caused his or her injury.”
Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 584; see also Bldg. Erection Servs., Inc. v. JLG, Inc., 376 F.3d
800, 803 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an argument that the cause of action began to
accrue under Missouri law when the plaintiff obtained “an expert’s report addressing
the potential cause of damage”).3 Instead, the standard is objective: the claim
“originates” when a reasonably prudent person would have been on notice of a
potentially actionable injury. See Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 583–85. Under this
objective standard, as we have explained, a reasonably prudent person in Knapp’s
position would have been on notice of a potentially actionable injury in Texas no
later than December 2017. And while Knapp points to the alleged wrongful conduct
and his exposure to TCE in Missouri, Missouri law specifically precludes sole
3
We disagree with Knapp’s interpretation of Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. banc 1984), to the extent he uses it to urge us to apply a
subjective standard. A subjective standard is irreconcilable with Powel.
-5-
reliance on “when the wrong is done” for the purpose of deciding the accrual date. 4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100; Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 581–82.
In sum, we conclude Knapp’s claim “originated” in Texas. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 516.190.
B. Timeliness under Texas Law
Our inquiry does not end after determining where the claim “originated.”
Missouri’s borrowing statute also asks whether a claim “has been fully barred by the
laws of the state . . . in which it originated.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190. If so, “said
bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts
of [Missouri].” Id. To decide whether a claim is fully barred by the law of the state
in which the cause of action originated, we examine Texas law. See Great Plains,
492 F.3d at 993; Nettles, 55 F.3d at 1364.
Under Texas law, Knapp’s negligence claim is subject to a two-year statute of
limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a). And under Texas’s legal
injury rule, a claim generally accrues “when ‘a wrongful act causes a legal injury[.]’”
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Sw.
Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 721 (Tex. 2016)). Knapp,
however, relies on the discovery rule, which is an exception to the legal injury rule.
When applicable, “[t]he discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff ‘knew or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and the
resulting injury.’” Id. (quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)).
Even assuming the discovery rule applies, Knapp’s claim is untimely. Knapp
proposes an accrual date of November 2019, which is when Dr. Belz made a
connection between the MS diagnosis and exposure to TCE. But the inquiry under
4
Knapp’s argument that his claim did not “originate” in Texas because a Texas
court does not have personal jurisdiction conflicts with our interpretation of Missouri
law. See Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 515–17 (8th Cir. 2017).
-6-
the discovery rule is objective, not subjective. Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 524
(Tex. 2022). And “the discovery rule does not linger until a claimant learns of actual
causes and possible cures.” Marcus & Millichap Real Est. Inv. Servs. of Nev., Inc.
v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. 2023) (quoting PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. 2004)).
Under these standards, an individual exercising reasonable diligence should have
known of the wrongful act and resulting injury no later than December 2017. See
Schlumberger Tech., 544 S.W.3d at 834. Knapp filed his lawsuit in February 2021,
so his negligence claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 5 See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
Because Knapp’s claim is barred by the laws of the state in which his claim
“originated,” that bar is “a complete defense” to this case brought in Missouri. See
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190. Thus, the district court properly awarded summary
judgment in favor of FAG Bearings.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________
5
Knapp argues 42 U.S.C. § 9658 applies. Under this federal statute, an action
for personal injury “caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous
substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility”
may be brought in accordance with the “federally required commencement date” if
the state’s limitations period is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). However, December
2017 is the latest “date the plaintiff . . . reasonably should have known . . . that the
personal injury . . . damages . . . were caused or contributed to by” TCE. Id.§ 9658(b)(4)(A). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Texas does not
provide a commencement date that is earlier than the federal commencement date.
-7-