United States v. Edell Jackson ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2870
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Edell Jackson,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: May 11, 2023
Filed: June 2, 2023
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Edell Jackson appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as
a previously convicted felon. He argues that the district court1 erred when it
instructed the jury on the elements of the offense, and when it responded to two
1
The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
questions from the jury during deliberations. He also contends that he had a
constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted
felon. We affirm the judgment.
I.
In January 2021, police officers responded to a report of “shots fired” in
Brooklyn Center, Minnesota. The officers were informed that a suspect was located
in a parking lot in nearby Minneapolis. When the officers arrived at the parking lot,
they observed Jackson sitting in a parked vehicle, next to a snowbank. Two law
enforcement vehicles drove forward and pinned Jackson’s vehicle against the
snowbank. Jackson fled his vehicle, shed his jacket while he ran from the officers,
but eventually was apprehended. The officers later found a Bersa Thunder nine
millimeter handgun in Jackson’s jacket pocket.
Before this arrest, Jackson had sustained two convictions in Minnesota for sale
of a controlled substance in the second degree in 2011 and 2012, respectively. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.022.1(1). Jackson was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment for
the first conviction, and 144 months for the second, and was released from state
prison in 2017. After the incident in Minneapolis where a handgun was found in
Jackson’s pocket, a federal grand jury charged him with unlawful possession of a
firearm as a previously convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The case proceeded to trial. Jackson testified that after he was released from
state prison, he was on parole for three years until he was discharged in August 2020.
He testified that when he was discharged, his parole officer brought him discharge
papers to sign. According to Jackson, the parole officer told him that his rights had
been restored, and that he was able to register to vote and “do everything else as a
productive citizen of society.” Jackson also testified that his parole officer did not
give him specific instructions on whether he could possess firearms. Jackson claimed
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that he believed based on these communications that his right to possess firearms had
been restored.
The government introduced a copy of Jackson’s discharge papers, entitled
“Notice of Sentence Expiration and Restoration of Civil Rights.” The document
provides that “your civil rights have been restored,” which “includes a restoration of
your right to vote in Minnesota.” But the document also states that “if you have been
convicted of a Crime of Violence under Minn. Statute § 624.712 subd. 5, you cannot
ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm for the remainder of your lifetime.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Before sentencing, Jackson moved to
dismiss the indictment based on the Second Amendment in light of New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). He argued that the felon-
in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
him. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Jackson to a term of 108
months’ imprisonment.
II.
Jackson first argues that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on
the elements required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We review the
district court’s formulation of the jury instructions for abuse of discretion, and its
interpretation of the law de novo. United States v. Haynie, 8 F.4th 801, 804 (8th Cir.
2021).
A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that (1) the
defendant sustained a previous conviction for a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year, (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) he
knew that he belonged to a category of persons prohibited from possessing a firearm,
and (4) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. See Rehaif v. United
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States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019); United States v. Coleman, 961 F.3d 1024, 1027
(8th Cir. 2020).
The district court instructed the jury that the government must prove the
following elements:
One, the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year;
Two, after that, the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, that is a
Bersa model Thunder 9mm semi-automatic pistol bearing serial number
E17838;
Three, at the time the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, he
knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year; and
Four, the firearm was transported across a state line at some time during
or before the defendant’s possession of it.
The court instructed that under Minnesota law, the sale of a controlled substance in
the second degree is a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.022.1(1), (3). The court further explained that when an offender
is convicted of this drug offense, the State of Minnesota “does not permit the full
restoration of the defendant’s civil rights insofar as he was not permitted to ship,
transport, possess, or receive a firearm for the remainder of his lifetime.” See Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.165(1), 624.712(5). The court also instructed the jury as follows:
For you to find that element number three is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must unanimously agree that the defendant knew he had been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
at the time he knowingly possessed the firearm described in the
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Indictment. In making that determination, you may consider whether
the defendant reasonably believed that his civil rights had been
restored, including his right to possess a firearm.
R. Doc. 65, at 15 (emphasis added).
Jackson contends that the court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury
on the first element of the offense—that the defendant had been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. He relies on the fact that a prior
conviction does not qualify under § 922(g)(1) if the conviction “has been expunged,
or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored
. . . unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides
that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Id.
§ 921(a)(20).
Jackson contends that the court should have provided the jury with the
statutory language from § 921(a)(20), and allowed the jury to decide whether his right
to possess a firearm had been restored. Jackson’s argument is foreclosed by United
States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007), which held that whether a predicate
conviction satisfies the criteria under § 921(a)(20) is “a question of law for the court
rather than one of fact for the jury.” Id. at 412; see United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d
800, 805 (8th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it instructed the jury on the first element of the offense.
Jackson next challenges the district court’s instruction on the third element of
the offense regarding knowledge. Although the instructions permitted the jury to
consider whether Jackson reasonably believed his rights were restored, he maintains
that the language should have required the jury to do so by using the phrase “must
consider.” But Jackson himself proposed to instruct the jury that it “may consider”
whether he reasonably believed his rights had been restored. The court incorporated
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his suggestion into the final instructions. Because Jackson requested the precise
language about which he now complains, any error was invited, and his objection is
waived. United States v. Defoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir. 2016).
Even if Jackson’s objection were not waived, the claim of error was forfeited,
and we would review at most for plain error. United States v. Reed, 636 F.3d 966,
970 (8th Cir. 2011). Jackson cannot meet this standard, because the instruction on
the third element was not obviously wrong. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 734 (1993). Rehaif held that in a prosecution under § 922(g), “the Government
must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he
belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139
S. Ct. at 2200. Jackson was barred because he had been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
921(a)(20), and his right to possess had not been restored. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.165(1),
624.712(5).
Consistent with Rehaif, the jury instructions required the government to prove
that Jackson “knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.” Jackson contends that the instruction was flawed because it did
not require the jury to find that he knew he was still a prohibited person at the time
of the charged offense, despite a possible restoration of rights. But the instructions
further provided that in making the determination about knowledge, the jury may
consider whether Jackson reasonably believed that his right to possess a firearm had
been restored. The instruction thus allowed Jackson to argue, and a jury to find, that
he lacked the requisite knowledge due to a belief that his rights had been restored.
Jackson cites no authority that the instruction as formulated was plainly erroneous.
Jackson also argues that the district court erred when it responded to two
questions from the jury during its deliberations. We review a district court’s decision
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on whether to supplement jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v.
White, 794 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1986).
The jury first inquired about the court’s instruction on the third element of the
offense. The question asked for “clarification” on a sentence in the instructions that
stated: “In making that determination, you may consider whether the defendant
reasonably believed that his civil rights had been restored, including his right to
possess a firearm.” The court responded: “It is one issue that you may consider in
evaluating whether the government has proven element #3 beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson agreed to the response, telling the court that “I don’t have any
objection.” Jackson therefore waived his objection to the court’s supplemental
instruction. See United States v. Davis, 826 F.3d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir. 2016).
The jury asked a second question: “Does the defendant believing that his civil
rights had been restored, AND knowing that he had been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year translate to having proven”
element three of the offense. The court responded that “[t]his is a question that you
must decide based on the evidence before you and my instructions.” Jackson
objected to the court’s response, and urged the court to answer “no.”
Jackson argues that the jury’s question suggests that it did not understand the
instructions, and may have convicted him despite his asserted belief that his right to
possess a firearm had been restored. He contends that the court abused its discretion
by not supplementing the instructions to “cure the jury’s misdirection.” A district
court has broad discretion to decide what amplification of the instructions, if any, is
necessary. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 536 (1947). “The trial judge in the
light of the whole trial and with the jury before him may feel that to repeat the same
words would make them no more clear, and to indulge in variations of statement
might well confuse.” Id. Here, the jury’s question effectively asked the court to
direct the jury whether a particular element of the offense had been proved under a
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hypothetical set of assumptions. The question, moreover, did not align with the
original instructions, because it referred to the defendant “believing that his civil
rights had been restored” without the qualification that the belief was “reasonable.”
The district court permissibly declined to answer the jury’s hypothetical and instead
properly referred them back to the original instructions. There was no abuse of
discretion.
III.
Jackson also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
indictment. He argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him, because
his drug offenses were “non-violent” and do not show that he is more dangerous than
the typical law-abiding citizen.
We conclude that the district court was correct that § 922(g)(1) is not
unconstitutional as applied to Jackson based on his particular felony convictions. The
Supreme Court has said that nothing in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570(2008), which recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, “should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”
Id. at 626; see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality
opinion). The decision in Bruen, which reaffirmed that the right is “subject to certain
reasonable, well-defined restrictions,” 142 S. Ct. at 2156, did not disturb those
statements or cast doubt on the prohibitions. See id. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring);
id. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2189 (Breyer,
J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.). Given these assurances by the
Supreme Court, and the history that supports them, we conclude that there is no need
for felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).2
2
According to published data, a rule declaring the statute unconstitutional as
applied to all but those who have committed “violent” felonies would substantially
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History shows that the right to keep and bear arms was subject to restrictions
that included prohibitions on possession by certain groups of people. There appear
to be two schools of thought on the basis for these regulations. A panel of the Third
Circuit recently surveyed the history in light of Bruen and concluded that legislatures
have longstanding authority and discretion to disarm citizens who are not “law-
abiding”—i.e., those who are “unwilling to obey the government and its laws,
whether or not they had demonstrated a propensity for violence.” Range v. Att’y
Gen., 53 F.4th 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2022) (per curiam), vacated, reh’g en banc granted,
56 F.4th 992 (3d Cir. 2023). Jackson contends that a legislature’s traditional
authority is narrower and limited to prohibiting possession of firearms by those who
are deemed more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. While the better
interpretation of the history may be debatable, we conclude that either reading
supports the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to Jackson and other convicted
felons, because the law “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130.
Restrictions on the possession of firearms date to England in the late 1600s,
when the government disarmed non-Anglican Protestants who refused to participate
in the Church of England, Joyce Lee Malcom, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins
of an Anglo-American Right 45 (1994), and those who were “dangerous to the Peace
of the Kingdom,” Militia Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13. Parliament later
forbade ownership of firearms by Catholics who refused to renounce their faith. An
Act for the Better Securing the Government by Disarming Papists and Reputed
invalidate the provision enacted by Congress. The most recent available annual data
show that only 18.2 percent of felony convictions in state courts and 3.7 percent of
federal felony convictions were for “violent offenses.” Sean Rosenmerkel et al.,
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables 3 tbl.1.1 (revised Nov.
2010), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; Mark Motivans, Federal
Justice Statistics, 2021, at 12 tbl.7 (Dec. 2022), https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/
xyckuh236/files/media/document/fjs21.pdf.
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Papists, 1 W. & M., Sess. 1, c. 15 (1688). The English Bill of Rights established
Parliament’s authority to determine which citizens could “have arms . . . by Law.”
An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession
of the Crown, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2, § 7 (1689)); see Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2141-42.
In colonial America, legislatures prohibited Native Americans from owning
firearms. Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of
Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 Law & Hist. Rev. 567, 578-79 (1998); see also
Act of Aug. 4, 1675, 5 Records of the Colony of New Plymouth 173 (1856); Act of
July 1, 1656, Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland 234-35 (1868). Religious
minorities, such as Catholics in Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, were subject
to disarmament. Bellesiles, supra, at 574; Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical
Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L.
Rev. 249, 263 (2020). In the era of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress,
Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New
Jersey prohibited possession of firearms by people who refused to declare an oath of
loyalty. See 4 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, at 205 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906); Act of Mar. 14, 1776, ch. 21, 1775-76 Mass. Acts 479;
Act of May 1777, ch. III, 9 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws
of Virginia 281-82 (1821); Act of June 13, 1777, ch. 756 §§ 2-4, 1777 Pa. Laws 110,
111-13; Act of June 1776, 7 Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations in New England 567 (1862); Act of Nov. 15, 1777, ch. 6, 1777 N.C. Sess.
Laws 231; Act of Sept. 20, 1777, ch. XL, 1777 N.J. Laws 90; see also Joseph Blocher
& Caitlan Carberry, Historical Gun Laws Targeting “Dangerous” Groups and
Outsiders 5 & nn. 38-41 (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series No. 2020-80),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3702696.
The influential “Dissent of the Minority,” see Heller, 554 U.S. at 604,
published by Anti-Federalist delegates in Pennsylvania, proposed that the people
should have a right to bear arms “unless for crimes committed, or real danger of
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public injury from individuals.” 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A
Documentary History 665 (1971). Early legislatures also ordered forfeiture of
firearms by persons who committed non-violent hunting offenses, see Act of Oct. 9,
1652, Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland 138 (1868); Act of Apr. 20, 1745, ch.
III, 23 The State Records of North Carolina 218-19 (1904); and they authorized
punishments that subsumed disarmament—death or forfeiture of a perpetrator’s entire
estate—for non-violent offenses involving deceit and wrongful taking of property.
See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Pub. L.
No. 1-9, § 14, 1 Stat. 112, 115 (1790); Act of Feb. 21, 1788, ch. 37, 1788 N.Y. Laws
664-65; Act of May 1777, ch. XI, 9 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all
the Laws of Virginia 302-03 (1821); A Digest of the Laws of Maryland 255-56
(1799); Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 3, 18, 23 (2002);
John D. Bessler, Cruel & Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders’
Eighth Amendment 56-57 (2012); Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American
Colonies: An Overview, 26 Am. J. Legal Hist. 326, 330-32, 342, 344-47 (1982).
While some of these categorical prohibitions of course would be impermissible today
under other constitutional provisions, they are relevant here in determining the
historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms.
Based on this historical record, the Third Circuit panel in Range concluded that
legislatures traditionally possessed discretion to disqualify categories of people from
possessing firearms to address a threat purportedly posed by these people “to an
orderly society and compliance with its legal norms,” not merely to address a person’s
demonstrated propensity for violence. 54 F.4th at 281-82. This conclusion was
bolstered by the Supreme Court’s repeated statements in Bruen that the Second
Amendment protects the right of a “law-abiding citizen” to keep and bear arms. See
142 S. Ct. at 2122, 2125, 2131, 2133-34, 2135 n.8, 2138, 2150, 2156. As stated by
the D.C. Circuit, “it is difficult to conclude that the public, in 1791, would have
understood someone facing death and estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those
entitled to possess arms.” Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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On this view, for which there is considerable support in the historical record,
Congress did not violate Jackson’s rights by enacting § 922(g)(1). He is not a law-
abiding citizen, and history supports the authority of Congress to prohibit possession
of firearms by persons who have demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society.
See also United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Adams, 914 F.3d 602, 610-11 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J., concurring in the
judgment).
If the historical regulation of firearms possession is viewed instead as an effort
to address a risk of dangerousness, then the prohibition on possession by convicted
felons still passes muster under historical analysis. Not all persons disarmed under
historical precedents—not all Protestants or Catholics in England, not all Native
Americans, not all Catholics in Maryland, not all early Americans who declined to
swear an oath of loyalty—were violent or dangerous persons. The Third Circuit
panel understood this fact to mean that the historical justification for regulation was
not limited to dangerousness. Range, 53 F.4th at 275, 282. But if dangerousness is
considered the traditional sine qua non for dispossession, then history demonstrates
that there is no requirement for an individualized determination of dangerousness as
to each person in a class of prohibited persons. Legislatures historically prohibited
possession by categories of persons based on a conclusion that the category as a
whole presented an unacceptable risk of danger if armed. In reasoning by analogy
from that history, “the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond
those the Founders specifically anticipated.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132; see Blocher
& Carberry, supra, at 11-12.
Congress enacted an analogous prohibition in § 922(g)(1) to address modern
conditions. In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress
found that there was “widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce,” and that “the ease with which any person can acquire
firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including criminals . . ., narcotics addicts,
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mental defectives, . . . and others whose possession of such weapons is similarly
contrary to the public interest) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness
and violent crime in the United States.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(1), (2), 82 Stat.
225, 225. Congress found that “only through adequate Federal control over interstate
and foreign commerce in these weapons” could “this grave problem be properly dealt
with.” Id. § 901(a)(3). By prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons and
others, Congress intended to further this purpose without placing “any undue or
unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens.” Id. § 901(b).
In the Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress also
tailored the prohibition on possession of firearms by exempting those convicted of
felony offenses “pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of
trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices as the
Secretary may by regulation designate.” Id. § 902 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3));
Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1216 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)).
The Supreme Court has observed that the purpose of the Safe Streets Act, as
amended by the Gun Control Act, was to curb “lawlessness and violent crime.”
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974). The “very structure of the
Gun Control Act demonstrates that Congress . . . sought broadly to keep firearms
away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and
dangerous.” Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976). Congress prohibited
“categories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting or receiving
firearms,” Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980), because they “pose[d] an
unacceptable risk of dangerousness.” Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S.
103, 120 (1983). “Congress obviously determined that firearms must be kept away
from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected to
misuse them.” Id. at 119. That determination was not unreasonable.
To be sure, the historical understanding that legislatures have discretion to
prohibit possession of firearms by a category of persons such as felons who pose an
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unacceptable risk of dangerousness may allow greater regulation than would an
approach that employs means-end scrutiny with respect to each individual person who
is regulated. But that result is a product of the method of constitutional interpretation
endorsed by Bruen:
Indeed, governments appear to have more flexibility and power to
impose gun regulations under a test based on text, history, and tradition
than they would under strict scrutiny. After all, history and tradition
show that a variety of gun regulations have co-existed with the Second
Amendment right and are consistent with that right, as the Court said in
Heller. By contrast, if courts applied strict scrutiny, then presumably
very few gun regulations would be upheld.
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting). Cf. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 465 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting) (concluding before Bruen that Congress cannot dispossess felons based
solely on status, and that “a very strong public-interest justification and a close
means-end fit” is required before a felon may be subject to a dispossession statute
based on dangerousness) (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th
Cir. 2017)).3
3
A footnote in Heller referred to “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”
that forbid the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, prohibit the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools or government buildings, and
impose conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. The Court said
that it identified these measures “only as examples,” and that the list was not
exhaustive. 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. Some have taken the phrase “presumptively
lawful” to mean that the Court was suggesting a presumption of constitutionality that
could be rebutted on a case-by-case basis. That is an unlikely reading, for it would
serve to cast doubt on the constitutionality of these regulations in a range of cases
despite the Court’s simultaneous statement that “nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt” on the regulations. Id. at 626; see supra n.2. We think it more
likely that the Court presumed that the regulations are constitutional because they are
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In sum, we conclude that legislatures traditionally employed status-based
restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms. Whether
those actions are best characterized as restrictions on persons who deviated from legal
norms or persons who presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, Congress
acted within the historical tradition when it enacted § 922(g)(1) and the prohibition
on possession of firearms by felons. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s assurances
that recent decisions on the Second Amendment cast no doubt on the constitutionality
of laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons, we conclude that the statute
is constitutional as applied to Jackson. The district court properly denied the motion
to dismiss the indictment.4
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
constitutional, but termed the conclusion presumptive because the specific regulations
were not at issue in Heller.
4
In United States v. Adams, we said that a defendant raising an as-applied
challenge to § 922(g)(1) must show “(1) that the Second Amendment protects his
particular conduct, and (2) that his prior felony conviction is insufficient to justify the
challenged regulation of Second Amendment rights.” 914 F.3d at 605. Jackson
argues that his particular conduct of carrying a concealed weapon was
constitutionally protected. We need not address that question, because we conclude
that the prohibition is constitutional as applied to Jackson regardless of his particular
conduct.
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SMITH, Chief Judge, joining in Parts I and II, and concurring in part in Part III and
in the judgment.
I concur fully in Parts I and II of the opinion. I concur as to the judgment in
Part III and agree that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Jackson and
that Heller remains the relevant precedent we are bound to apply.
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