Ciaran Redmond v. United States ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CIARAN PAUL REDMOND, AKA Irish, No. 21-55142
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. Nos. 2:20-cv-05170-SVW
2:15-cr-00532-SVW-2
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON, BEA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Ciaran Redmond was imprisoned at the United States Penitentiary in
Victorville, California (“Victorville”) when he assaulted a fellow inmate with a
metal shank. The attack was caught on security footage, and Redmond was charged
and convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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113(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(6). Each charge required the government to prove, as an
element of conviction, that the offense took place “within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 113(a).
In United States v. Redmond, No. 17-50004, 748 F. App’x. 760, 761 (9th Cir.
2018) (“Redmond I ”), Redmond challenged his convictions on sufficiency of the
evidence grounds, arguing that, while the prosecution introduced evidence that the
assault occurred in a federal prison, there was no evidence at trial showing that the
assault took place within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. The prior panel affirmed the judgment of conviction and took judicial
notice of Victorville’s jurisdictional status.1 Id. at 761-62.
1
The panel took judicial notice of Victorville’s jurisdictional status by relying
on several documents produced by the government. The two most relevant
documents included a letter from the United States Department of War to the
California governor, dated September 29, 1944, which accepted jurisdiction over the
land underlying Victorville on behalf of the federal government, and a letter from
the California State Lands Commission, dated September 27, 2002, stating that,
while there was no information in the Commission’s files indicating that the War
Department letter was recorded with the San Bernardino County Recorder, the
Commission “presum[ed]” that it was. Redmond I, 748 F. App’x at 761.
These documents matter because, for the federal government to gain
jurisdiction over state land, it must comply with 40 U.S.C. § 3112, which requires
an “authorized officer” to “indicate acceptance of jurisdiction on behalf of the
Government by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in
another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.” In
1944, California Government Code § 120 required the governor to record that
federal acceptance of jurisdiction over the land with the county recorder’s office to
effectuate the transfer of jurisdiction. See People v. Brown, 69 Cal. App. 2d 602, 605
(Cal. App. 1945).
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In this habeas appeal (“Redmond II ”), Redmond challenges his conviction
again on two grounds: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when his trial attorney failed to
contest the jurisdictional element of the offense at trial, and (2) the government
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it suppressed evidence that
would tend to cast doubt on whether the federal government’s jurisdiction over
Victorville was legally effectuated.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas petition brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157, 1158
(9th Cir. 2000), as well as the district court’s Brady determinations, United States v.
Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2011). For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 685-86. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Redmond must
show: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
caused prejudice. Id. at 687. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test
obviates the need to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir.
2002).
Here, we need reach only the first prong of Redmond’s Strickland claim. To
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satisfy the deficiency prong, Redmond must show that his attorney’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Browning v. Baker, 875 F.3d
444, 471 (9th Cir. 2017). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential,” and “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689. Thus, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In United States v. Inoue, No. ED CR 09-380(A) VAP, 2010 WL 11537485,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010) (unpublished), aff’d on other grounds, 463 F. App’x
643 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished), a prisoner at the same prison at issue here
(Victorville) was charged under the same assault statute (18 U.S.C. § 113).2 There,
the district court took judicial notice of Victorville’s jurisdictional status based on
the same documents the prior panel had at its disposal in Redmond I. See
Inoue, 2010 WL 11537485, at *3-4. Although the district court decision in Inoue
was not binding precedent, it was not unreasonable for Redmond’s attorney to decide
not to argue Victorville’s jurisdictional status to the jury or in a motion for a
judgment of acquittal to the trial court, as there was reason to believe that either
2
The Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition affirming Inoue did not discuss the
question whether it was appropriate for the district court to take judicial notice of
Victorville’s jurisdictional status. Inoue, 463 F. App’x at 644-46.
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course would be unsuccessful given the outcome in Inoue. The Sixth Amendment
does not require attorneys to pursue arguments that have a low probability of
success. Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).
Finally, we agree that there could well be merit to the claim that the transfer
of jurisdiction from California to the federal government was not legally effectuated,
as there is a lack of proof that the 1944 War Department letter was recorded in San
Bernardino County. Still, Redmond’s “lawyer cannot be required to anticipate our
decision in this later case, because his conduct must be evaluated for purposes of the
performance standard of Strickland ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” Lowry,
21 F.3d at 346 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
2. The Brady Claim
A Brady violation has three elements: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to
the defendant, (2) the evidence was suppressed by the state, and (3) prejudice ensued.
Shelton v. Marshall, 796 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015).
Redmond claims that the War Department letter and the State Lands
Commission letter were suppressed in violation of Brady because they were not
made known to Redmond until after trial, during the direct appeal of his conviction.
But both letters were publicly filed with the district court in Inoue. See
Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, Ex. A, United
States v. Inoue, No. ED CR 09-380(A) VAP (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010). Given the
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similarities between Redmond’s case and Inoue, Redmond had “enough information
to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady material on his own,” meaning that “there
[was] no suppression by the government.” United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761,
764 (9th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED.
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