Cathy Reynolds v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 685 F. App'x 615 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 29 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CATHY A. REYNOLDS, 2008                          No.   15-15710
    REVOCABLE TRUST, et al.,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellants,              2:12-cv-00417-JAM-DAD
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
    CO.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 13, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and STATON,** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Josephine L. Staton, United States District Judge for
    the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    Page 2 of 3
    Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
    favor of Defendant declaring that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are pre-empted by
    ERISA. We affirm.
    An order granting summary judgment and the conclusion that a state-law
    claim is pre-empted by ERISA are reviewed de novo. See Greany v. Western Farm
    Bureau Life Ins. Co., 
    973 F.2d 812
    , 816 (9th Cir. 1992).
    ERISA contains a broad pre-emption provision that applies when a state law
    “relate[s] to” employee benefit plans. 
    29 U.S.C. § 1144
    (a); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
    Dedeaux, 
    481 U.S. 41
    , 45 (1987). “A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan . . .
    if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
    Inc., 
    463 U.S. 85
    , 96–97 (1983). A state law may be pre-empted “even if the law
    is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect.”
    Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
    498 U.S. 133
    , 139 (1990).
    Here, Plaintiffs claimed benefits under two life insurance policies held by
    the same individual. One was an ERISA-governed group life insurance policy
    (“ERISA Policy”), and the other was an individual life insurance policy obtained
    through a right to conversion provided by the ERISA Policy. The ERISA Policy
    contains a “One Payment Only” provision that applies when a policyholder holds
    both the ERISA Policy and a converted policy. Under the terms of the “One
    Page 3 of 3
    Payment Only” provision, the beneficiaries may recover benefits under the ERISA
    Policy only if the converted policy is returned to the insurer without any claim.
    When Plaintiffs filed claims under both policies, Defendant necessarily had to
    consider the “One Payment Only” provision in the ERISA Policy to decide
    whether to pay benefits under either policy. Thus, the converted policy relates to
    the ERISA Policy.
    Although Plaintiffs argue that Waks v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 
    263 F.3d 872
     (9th Cir. 2001), governs this case, Waks did not address situations in
    which a policyholder holds an ERISA policy and a converted policy
    simultaneously, and the ERISA policy contains provisions that affect interpretation
    of the converted policy. Such is the case here, and ERISA therefore preempts
    Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
    AFFIRMED.