Prentice Jones v. Gary Sandor , 588 F. App'x 618 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PRENTICE D. JONES, No. 12-55763
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:08-cv-01353-JHN-
FFM
v.
GARY SANDOR, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and submitted December 10, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, GOULD, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
On the federal claim certified for appeal to this court, Petitioner contends
that sufficient evidence did not support his second-degree robbery conviction on an
aiding and abetting theory. Reviewing the last reasoned state court decision, see
Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1001 (2014), we note that the California Court of Appeal rejected this federal
claim. We owe deference to the Court of Appeal’s decision under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), because it was not “contrary to,” and did not “involve[] an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,” nor did it “result[] in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Here, a car registered to Jones was parked adjacent to the gas station that
was robbed, and there was evidence from which a rational jury could infer that
Jones was in the car, poised for getaway, at the time of the robbery; that it was his
car and he provided it to aid the planned robbery; and that he intended that the
robbery succeed. Although he introduced some evidence he had sold the car to a
person who testified at trial and was impeached, the jury was not required to
believe her testimony. Further, a rational jury could infer that after the robbery
Jones showed consciousness of guilt by taking actions to distance himself from the
car. There was sufficient evidence to support Jones’s conviction for aiding and
abetting the robbery, because a rational jury could have found all elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
2
Moreover, in this context of a state prisoner challenge by habeas corpus petition,
we owe the state court “double deference.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964
(9th Cir. 2011); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005). We
cannot say that the state court determination of sufficient evidence was objectively
unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
3
FILED
Jones v. Sandor, No. 12-55763 DEC 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent.
I recognize that we owe "double deference" to the state court’s decision.
Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, in my
view, the state court’s decision here involved an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent and was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the record evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The evidence
showed that the perpetrator left in Jones’ car after robbing the store, that the car
was backed into its parking place in a nearby lot, that the car was parked in a way
that did not allow Jones to see that the store was being robbed, and that Jones was
sitting in the passenger seat during the robbery and when the robber drove away.
Certainly Jones was present during the getaway. But even seen through our very
deferential lens, the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational jury to find that
Jones knew of the robbery and intended to assist in its successful commission.