Lihong Wang v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 20 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LIHONG WANG,                                    No.    19-73006
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A099-912-071
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted April 16, 2021**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Lihong Wang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board
    of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her application for asylum and withholding
    of removal after this court remanded with instructions to consider whether evidence
    in the record, aside from Wang’s non-credible testimony, was sufficient to establish
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    her eligibility for relief. See Wang v. Whitaker, 745 F. App’x 27, 28 (9th Cir. 2018).
    We review the agency’s “legal conclusions de novo . . . and its factual findings for
    substantial evidence,” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 
    850 F.3d 1051
    , 1059 (9th Cir.
    2017) (en banc) (citations omitted), and apply the standards governing adverse
    credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act, Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). Exercising jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , we
    deny the petition for review.
    We reject as unsupported by the record Wang’s contentions that the BIA failed
    to consider the documentary evidence or otherwise erred in its credibility analysis.
    When, as here, an applicant for asylum and withholding of removal is found not
    credible, the trier of fact considers whether the remaining record evidence is
    sufficient to meet the burden of proof. Al-Harbi v. INS, 
    242 F.3d 882
    , 890–94 (9th
    Cir. 2001). On remand, the BIA reviewed Wang’s documentary evidence and
    “adequately described [its] concerns regarding the provenance and reliability of
    those documents.” Wang v. Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). The BIA
    concluded that the firing decisions for Wang and her husband, punishment decision
    from the family planning committee giving notice of a fine, and the hospital
    certificate purporting to show that Wang was fitted with an intrauterine device (IUD)
    in China were “unreliable.” Specifically, the BIA referenced the IJ’s determination
    that the hospital certificate from China lacked “other information to support its
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    veracity” (such as the date of the procedure, the medical professional who performed
    it, and the individual who looked up the record), and pointed out numerous
    inconsistencies between Wang’s testimony, the firing decisions, and the punishment
    decision. See Garcia v. Holder, 
    749 F.3d 785
    , 791 (9th Cir. 2014).
    Based on these inconsistencies between the documentary evidence and
    Wang’s testimony, and the questioned veracity of Wang’s documentary evidence
    itself, the BIA ascertained that the only reliable evidence in the record was the
    country conditions evidence and medical records from the United States. But,
    setting aside Wang’s non-credible testimony, these documents only established that
    Wang was fitted with an IUD, which did not “rise to the level of harm required to
    establish persecution.” Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 633
    , 640 (BIA
    2008) (“[S]imply requiring a woman to use an IUD, and other more routine methods
    of China’s implementation of its family planning policy, do not generally rise to the
    level of harm required to establish persecution.”). As the record evidence does not
    compel the conclusion that Wang established past persecution or demonstrated a
    well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA’s conclusion that Wang failed to
    demonstrate eligibility for asylum is supported by substantial evidence.         See
    Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1059.
    Further, contrary to Wang’s assertions, “mere economic disadvantage alone
    does not rise to the level of persecution.” Gormley v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F. 3d 1172
    , 1178
    3
    (9th Cir. 2004). As the IJ found, Wang failed to present evidence of substantial
    economic disadvantage. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1186 (9th Cir.
    2006) (concluding that government seizure of the business owned by petitioner’s
    father did not rise to the level of substantial economic disadvantage necessary for a
    finding of persecution).
    Because Wang could not establish her eligibility for asylum, the BIA
    “properly concluded that she was not eligible for withholding of removal, which
    imposes a heavier burden of proof.” Zehatye, 
    453 F.3d at 1190
    .
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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