Maria Chocoyo-Concua v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA CHRISTINA CHOCOYO- No. 18-73314
CONCUA; et al.,
Agency Nos. A202-135-015
Petitioners, A202-135-014
A202-135-016
v. A202-135-017
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 14, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and R. NELSON and HUNSAKER, Circuit
Judges.
Maria Cristina Chocoyo-Concua,1 a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Chocoyo-Concua’s three children, who are also citizens of Guatemala, are
derivative beneficiaries of her application for asylum and related relief.
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) order dismissing her appeal from the
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review the
BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its “factual findings, including adverse
credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d
785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the
petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding. The BIA based its decision on relevant factors, including
inconsistencies in Chocoyo-Concua’s testimony, inconsistencies between her
testimony and documentary evidence, and her unresponsiveness to the IJ’s
questions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Chocoyo-Concua argues that any
inconsistencies in her statements are trivial and cannot support an adverse credibility
determination. We disagree. The BIA cited multiple inconsistencies concerning the
facts underlying her requests for relief. Because such inconsistencies reasonably
bear on Chocoyo-Concua’s veracity, the BIA did not err in relying on them to affirm
the IJ’s credibility finding. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044, 1046–47 (9th
Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that she
failed to rehabilitate her claim with sufficient corroborating evidence. Thus, the BIA
did not err in concluding that without credible testimony or sufficient corroborating
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evidence, Chocoyo-Concua failed to establish eligibility for asylum and withholding
of removal. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s decision regarding
Chocoyo-Concua’s CAT claim. A petitioner seeking protection under the CAT must
show that it is “more likely than not” she will be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c)(2). Chocoyo-Concua, however, cites only “generalized evidence of
violence and crime in [Guatemala],” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152
(9th Cir. 2010), and fails to show that she faces a “particularized threat of torture,”
Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). The BIA, therefore, did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of relief under
the CAT.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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