Yvonne Reed v. Cognizant Technology Solutions ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 1 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    YVONNE REED,                                    No. 20-16379
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00061-SMB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY
    SOLUTIONS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 18, 2021**
    Before:      CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    Yvonne Reed appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
    Title VII employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Doughtery v. City of Covina, 
    654 F.3d 892
    ,
    897 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6));
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 
    466 F.3d 1104
    , 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on the
    basis of the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Reed’s action as time-barred because
    Reed filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run and failed
    to show extraordinary circumstances beyond her control that justified equitable
    tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (setting forth 90-day period in which Title
    VII complainant may bring a civil action); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd.
    P’ship, 
    495 F.3d 1119
    , 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (90-day period operates as a
    limitations period; if a litigant does not file suit within 90 days of receipt of the
    notice of right to sue, the action is time-barred); Stoll v. Runyon, 
    165 F.3d 1238
    ,
    1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when
    extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to
    file a claim on time”).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                     20-16379