Robert Kubiak v. County of Ravalli ( 2022 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERT EDWARD KUBIAK,                              No. 21-35542
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                           9:20-cv-00036-
    DWM
    COUNTY OF RAVALLI; STEPHEN
    HOLTON; DARYL PETZ,
    Defendants-Appellants.                    OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 18, 2022
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Filed May 3, 2022
    Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, D. Michael Fisher, * and
    Mark J. Bennett, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Fisher
    *
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2               KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    SUMMARY **
    Civil Rights/Civil Procedure
    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor
    of plaintiff, entered in accordance with defendants’ Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment, in an action
    brought pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     challenging plaintiff’s
    arrest and detention.
    After plaintiff brought his civil rights suit against the
    County of Ravalli and others, the County filed a motion for
    summary judgment on all claims. Several weeks later, while
    its motion was still pending, the County made plaintiff a
    Rule 68 offer of judgment for $50,000 plus costs and
    attorney’s fees. Before Rule 68’s fourteen-day window had
    closed, the district court—which did not know the County
    had made the offer—granted the summary judgment motion.
    But the court did not enter final judgment. Rather, it said that
    judgment would be entered “in due course” after it issued a
    reasoned opinion. Within an hour of the entry of this order,
    plaintiff accepted the County’s offer of judgment. The
    district court held that, under Rule 68, it was bound by the
    offer of judgment and entered judgment for plaintiff in the
    amount of $50,000 plus costs and fees.
    The panel held that under the plain text of Rule 68, the
    district court properly entered judgment according to the
    County’s offer of judgment. The panel’s review of the rule
    showed that it was designed to function in a mechanical
    manner. A Rule 68 offer, once made, is non-negotiable; it is
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                     3
    either accepted, in which case it is automatically entered by
    the clerk of court, or rejected, in which case it stands as the
    marker by which the plaintiff’s results are ultimately
    measured. Nor does the text of the rule admit of exceptions
    to the fourteen-day period during which an offer of judgment
    remains open.
    COUNSEL
    Maureen H. Lennon (argued) and Mitchell A. Young,
    MACo Defense Services, Helena, Montana, for Defendants-
    Appellants.
    Shandor S. Badaruddin (argued), Shandor S. Badaruddin
    PC, Missoula, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    D.M. FISHER, Circuit Judge:
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, a defendant
    may make an offer of judgment to a plaintiff. An offer of
    judgment is essentially a settlement offer, but by virtue of
    the rule, it has unique features: the plaintiff may accept it at
    any time within fourteen days after receiving it, and if he
    does, the district court must enter judgment accordingly.
    Robert Kubiak brought a civil rights suit against the
    County of Ravalli, the Ravalli County Sheriff’s Office, and
    others. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on
    all claims. Several weeks later, while its motion was still
    pending, the County made Kubiak a Rule 68 offer of
    judgment for $50,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees. Before
    4             KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    Rule 68’s fourteen-day window had closed, the District
    Court—which did not know the County had made the
    offer—granted the summary judgment motion. But the
    Court did not enter final judgment. Rather, it said that
    judgment would be entered “in due course” after it issued a
    reasoned opinion. Within an hour of the entry of this order,
    Kubiak accepted the County’s offer of judgment. The
    District Court held that, under Rule 68, it was bound by the
    offer of judgment. Judgment was thus entered for Kubiak in
    the amount of $50,000 plus costs and fees. The County
    appeals. We affirm.
    I.
    The genesis of this case was a Temporary Order of
    Protection entered against Robert Kubiak. A sheriff’s deputy
    concluded that Kubiak violated the terms of the Order when
    he served a motion, by mail, on the woman who had sought
    protection. Kubiak was arrested and held overnight in the
    Ravalli County Detention Center.
    In March 2020, Kubiak sued the county, its sheriff, and
    the sheriff’s deputy (to whom we refer, collectively, as “the
    County”) under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . “Section 1983 creates a
    ‘species of tort liability’ for ‘the deprivation of any rights,
    privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’”
    Manuel v. City of Joliet, 
    137 S. Ct. 911
    , 916 (2017) (quoting
    first Imbler v. Pachtman, 
    424 U.S. 409
    , 417 (1976), then
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ). Kubiak claimed, among other things, that
    his arrest and detention violated his First, Fourth, and
    Fourteenth Amendment rights.
    On April 20, 2021, the County filed a motion for
    summary judgment. On June 3, 2021, the County made
    Kubiak a Rule 68 offer: judgment would be entered against
    the defendants for $50,000 plus costs, including reasonable
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                     5
    attorney’s fees. The offer stated that if it was “not accepted
    within the time prescribed by Rule 68(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., it
    [would be] deemed withdrawn pursuant to Rule 68(b).” Rule
    68(a) provides a fourteen-day window for acceptance of an
    offer of judgment.
    Less than a week after the offer, on June 9 at 4:09 p.m.,
    the District Court entered an order stating that Kubiak’s
    claims failed and that “Defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment . . . is GRANTED.” The order further provided,
    “A reasoned decision will follow in due course. Judgment
    will be entered at that time.” When the District Court entered
    this order, it did not know about the County’s outstanding
    Rule 68 offer. This comports with Rule 68 procedures: the
    defendant serves its offer on the plaintiff but does not file it
    with the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). The offer is filed
    only upon acceptance. 
    Id.
    Six minutes after the District Court entered its non-final
    order granting summary judgment, the County’s counsel
    emailed Kubiak’s counsel: “Given the Court’s ruling
    granting our Motion for Summary Judgment, the Offer of
    Judgment is hereby withdrawn.” Within an hour, Kubiak
    filed with the Court a notice of acceptance of the offer of
    judgment.
    The County objected to the entry of judgment and
    requested that the District Court “deem the Offer a nullity as
    of the issuance of its Order granting summary judgment to
    Defendants.” The District Court overruled the County’s
    objection, relying on two cases we will discuss further.
    Citing Collar v. Abalux, Inc., 
    895 F.3d 1278
    , 1284 (11th Cir.
    2018), the District Court said that the County’s Rule 68 offer
    would have been mooted only “if judgment had been entered
    in [the County’s] favor.” Then, citing Perkins v. U S West
    Communications, 
    138 F.3d 336
    , 339 (8th Cir. 1998), the
    6             KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    Court reasoned that, because the summary judgment order
    said that judgment would be entered sometime in the future,
    the offer of judgment was required to remain open for the
    full fourteen-day period provided by Rule 68. The Court
    ordered that, “[p]ursuant to Rule 68, the Clerk will enter
    judgment for Kubiak.” The clerk did so.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     (federal questions) and 1343 (civil rights actions).
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (final decisions
    of district courts). We review de novo both the construction
    of a Rule 68 offer and the interpretation of the Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure. Erdman v. Cochise County, 
    926 F.2d 877
    , 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Cal. Scents v. Surco Prods., Inc.,
    
    406 F.3d 1102
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2005).
    III.
    “We employ the ‘traditional tools of statutory
    construction’ to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure.” Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 
    844 F.3d 1121
    ,
    1125 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “[O]ur first step is
    thus determining whether the language at issue has a plain
    meaning.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks, alteration, and
    citation omitted). We read words and phrases “not . . . in
    isolation, but with an eye toward the purpose and context of
    the statute.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). “An interpretation that gives effect to every clause
    is generally preferable to one that does not.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted).
    The parameters of an offer of judgment are as follows:
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                           7
    At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a
    party defending against a claim may serve on
    an opposing party an offer to allow judgment
    on specified terms, with the costs then
    accrued. If, within 14 days 1 after being
    served, the opposing party serves written
    notice accepting the offer, either party may
    then file the offer and notice of acceptance,
    plus proof of service. The clerk must then
    enter judgment.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). The rule goes on to say that that “[a]n
    unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    68(b). A Rule 68 offer is more consequential than a run-of-
    the-mill settlement offer: “If the judgment that the offeree
    finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted
    offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer
    was made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
    Thus, “a plaintiff who receives a Rule 68 offer is in a
    difficult position, because a Rule 68 offer has a binding
    effect when refused as well as when accepted; this results
    from the Rule’s cost-shifting mechanism, which becomes
    operative upon failure to accept.” Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co.,
    
    858 F.2d 397
    , 402 (8th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). The stakes for a plaintiff receiving a
    Rule 68 offer are “especially high in civil rights cases.”
    Erdman, 
    926 F.2d at 880
    . Because a prevailing § 1983
    plaintiff may ordinarily receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee
    1
    “Until amendment in 2009, the rule allowed ten days to decide
    whether to accept an offer of judgment. In 2009, Rule 68(a) was amended
    as part of an overall review of timing provisions in the Civil Rules to
    extend the 10-day period to 14 days.” 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
    Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3004 n.1 (3d ed. 2014).
    8             KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    as part of the costs,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    (b), attorney’s fees in
    a § 1983 suit “are subject to the cost-shifting provision of
    Rule 68.” Marek v. Chesny, 
    473 U.S. 1
    , 9 (1985). So if a
    § 1983 plaintiff turns down a Rule 68 offer, goes to trial, and
    wins a judgment less favorable than the rejected offer, he
    loses his entitlement to attorney’s fees as of the date of the
    offer. See id. at 12.
    Rule 68 can be a high-stakes proposition for defendants,
    too. “It is widely accepted that ‘[t]he [Rule 68] offer, once
    made, is non-negotiable. . . .’” Beauchamp v. Anaheim
    Union High Sch. Dist., 
    816 F.3d 1216
    , 1223 (9th Cir. 2016)
    (quoting Nusom v. Comh Woodburn, Inc., 
    122 F.3d 830
    , 834
    (9th Cir. 1997)). In addition, we have “repeatedly
    emphasized that Rule 68 offers of judgment are ‘analyzed in
    the same manner as any contract,’” so “‘any ambiguities are
    construed against the drafter.’” Miller v. City of Portland,
    
    868 F.3d 846
    , 851 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Erdman,
    
    926 F.2d at 880
    ).
    Rule 68 allows no discretion on the part of the district
    court. If the plaintiff accepts a Rule 68 offer, “it is
    automatically entered by the clerk of court.” Beauchamp,
    816 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Nusom, 
    122 F.3d at 834
    ). There is
    broad agreement on this aspect of the rule. See, e.g., Mei
    Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 
    944 F.3d 395
    , 400 (2d Cir.
    2019) (“Rule 68(a)’s command that the clerk must enter
    judgment is mandatory and absolute.”); Ramming v. Nat.
    Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 
    390 F.3d 366
    , 371 (5th Cir. 2004)
    (“the district court did not have the discretion to refuse to
    enter the Offer of Judgment” or change its terms); Mallory
    v. Eyrich, 
    922 F.2d 1273
    , 1279 (6th Cir. 1991) (the district
    court’s function is “ministerial rather than discretionary”).
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                     9
    A.
    Under the plain text of Rule 68, the District Court
    properly entered judgment according to the County’s offer
    of judgment. Our review of the rule, above, shows that it was
    designed to function in a mechanical manner. A Rule 68
    “offer, once made, is non-negotiable; it is either accepted, in
    which case it is automatically entered by the clerk of court,
    or rejected, in which case it stands as the marker by which
    the plaintiff’s results are ultimately measured.” Nusom,
    
    122 F.3d at 834
    . Nor does the text of the rule admit of
    exceptions to the fourteen-day period during which an offer
    of judgment remains open. Rule 68 simply provides that
    “[i]f, within 14 days after being served, the [plaintiff] serves
    written notice accepting the offer,” the acceptance may be
    filed and judgment must be entered, Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a);
    “[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn,” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 68(b).
    According to the rule’s text, then, an offer must remain
    open for fourteen days, and it may be either accepted or
    rejected. No other outcome (such as negotiation or
    revocation) is contemplated. If the parties file a notice that
    the plaintiff has accepted the offer, the clerk “must then enter
    judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). The rule contains no
    exception for the entry of a non-final order granting
    summary judgment on all claims, and we decline to create
    one. Hillis v. Heineman, 
    626 F.3d 1014
    , 1017 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (“Only the most compelling of reasons will persuade us to
    imply an exception” when “interpreting the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure.”).
    The County argues that, under the plain language of the
    rule, it is “a party defending against a claim” that “may serve
    on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 68(a). After the grant of summary judgment, the
    10            KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    County asserts, there was nothing left to defend—so it and
    its co-defendants were no longer “part[ies] defending against
    a claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
    The County certainly was “defending against a claim”
    when it made the offer of judgment, before summary
    judgment had been granted, and the rule does not state or
    imply that the defendant must be in the same position during
    the entire pendency of the offer. Nor can it be said that a
    defendant is no longer “defending” after winning summary
    judgment, since much can go wrong for the defendant
    between a summary judgment decision and a final judgment.
    In sum, under the plain text of Rule 68, the District Court
    properly entered judgment for Kubiak.
    B.
    Our conclusion is supported by other Circuits’ uniform
    interpretations of the rule.
    Kubiak relies on the Eighth Circuit’s 1998 decision in
    Perkins v. U S West Communications, 
    138 F.3d 336
    , while
    the County relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s 2018 decision in
    Collar v. Abalux, Inc., 
    895 F.3d 1278
    . Perkins and Collar
    are distinguishable because in those cases, the district courts
    both granted summary judgment and entered final judgment
    while Rule 68 offers were outstanding. Perkins, 
    138 F.3d at
    337–38; Collar, 895 F.3d at 1280–81. Thus, the plaintiffs
    in those cases accepted the Rule 68 offers not only after
    summary judgment was granted, but after final judgment
    was entered. Here, of course, despite the grant of summary
    judgment, the District Court had not yet entered final
    judgment when Kubiak accepted the Rule 68 offer. Despite
    this key distinction, the reasoning of Collar and Perkins is
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                     11
    helpful. And, though the cases arrive at opposite
    conclusions, both support affirmance here.
    In Perkins, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff could
    accept the offer of judgment within the rule’s acceptance
    period, despite the entry of final judgment. “Rule 68,” the
    Court said, “leaves no discretion in the district court to do
    anything other than enter judgment once an offer of
    judgment has been accepted.” Perkins, 
    138 F.3d at 338
    . The
    Court held that “[b]y directing that the clerk shall enter
    judgment after proof of offer and acceptance has been filed,”
    the rule’s plain language “indicates that the district court
    possesses no discretion to alter or modify the parties’
    agreement.” 
    Id.
     The Eighth Circuit concluded that “the plain
    language of Rule 68 mandates that an offer of judgment
    remain valid and open for acceptance for the full ten-day
    period outlined in the Rule despite an intervening grant of
    summary judgment,” i.e., final judgment. 
    Id. at 339
    .
    The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, held that Rule 68
    offers do not survive the entry of final judgment because
    “Rule 68(a) provides a method of pretrial dispute resolution
    where no judgment has yet been entered.” Collar, 895 F.3d
    at 1283. The rule “does not direct the clerk to vacate or
    amend an earlier final judgment.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit
    concluded that “[a] defendant is no longer ‘defending against
    a claim’ after a district court enters a final judgment in its
    favor. . . . [T]he entry of a final judgment ends the operation
    of Rule 68(a).” Id. at 1284 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a)).
    Notably, though, the Court stated that, in general—absent
    the entry of final judgment—if a Rule 68 offer “is timely
    accepted by the plaintiff, . . . . the clerk of court performs the
    ministerial act of entering a judgment.” Id. at 1283 (quoting
    Marek, 
    473 U.S. at 6
    ). In other words, in the usual case, the
    entry of judgment under Rule 68 is mandatory.
    12            KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    A D.C. Circuit case also supports affirmance. There, the
    defendant made a Rule 68 offer of judgment and then learned
    that the plaintiff’s medical claims might be unfounded.
    Richardson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
    49 F.3d 760
    , 762
    (D.C. Cir. 1995). The defendant attempted to withdraw the
    offer. 
    Id.
     The D.C. Circuit, citing Rule 68’s “rather finely
    tuned procedure,” noted that an offer of judgment imposes
    potentially costly consequences on the plaintiff and, “[i]n
    return, the plaintiff . . . is guaranteed 10 days to ponder the
    matter (as though the plaintiff had paid for a 10-day option).”
    
    Id. at 765
    . Therefore, the Court held, “a Rule 68 offer is
    simply not revocable during the 10-day period.” 
    Id.
    We agree with all of our sister Circuits to have
    considered the questions posed by this case: an offer of
    judgment must remain open for the full period provided by
    Rule 68 and, when a notice of acceptance is filed, the clerk
    must enter judgment accordingly. Perkins, 
    138 F.3d at
    338–
    39; Collar, 895 F.3d at 1283; Richardson, 
    49 F.3d at 765
    .
    And our decision is in line with several other Circuits who,
    while not specifically considering whether a Rule 68 offer
    must remain open for the full acceptance period, have
    uniformly agreed with us that a district court must enter
    judgment when acceptance of a Rule 68 offer is filed.
    Beauchamp, 816 F.3d at 1223 (Ninth Circuit); Mei Xing Yu,
    944 F.3d at 400–01 (Second Circuit); Ramming, 
    390 F.3d at 371
     (Fifth Circuit); Mallory, 
    922 F.2d at 1279
     (Sixth
    Circuit). We need not weigh in on the split between Perkins
    (Eighth Circuit) and Collar (Eleventh Circuit) over whether
    Rule 68 continues to operate after final judgment, because
    we are not presented with that circumstance.
    The Eighth Circuit, in concluding that the plaintiff could
    accept the Rule 68 offer after the entry of final judgment,
    emphasized the fact that the defendant landed where it did
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                    13
    through its own litigation choices. Perkins, 
    138 F.3d at
    339–
    40. By making a Rule 68 offer, the defendant “assumed the
    risk that the District Court would rule favorably on [the]
    summary judgment motion during the . . . period for
    acceptance of its Rule 68 offer. [The defendant] took the
    chance that it could bring an end to this litigation” for the
    amount of its offer and “was unpleasantly surprised to find
    that, had it waited . . . , it could have brought an end to this
    litigation for much less.” 
    Id.
     The same thing happened here.
    While the sequence of events that played out in the District
    Court leads to a harsh result for the County, we agree with
    other Circuits that the language of Rule 68 must control.
    C.
    The County offers three other arguments for reversal.
    Each fails to overcome the plain text of Rule 68.
    1.
    First, the County argues that the District Court’s grant of
    summary judgment fully and finally disposed of the case, so
    there was nothing left to defend. For the purposes of the Rule
    68 analysis, the County contends, the summary judgment
    order amounted to a final order.
    The County is correct that “the primary purpose of Rule
    68 is to encourage settlements, and it should be construed
    with this objective in mind.” Lang v. Gates, 
    36 F.3d 73
    , 76
    (9th Cir. 1994). And we agree that Kubiak got an opportunity
    that does not seem to be envisioned by Rule 68: because of
    flukes in timing and in the District Court’s handling of the
    summary judgment motion, he was able to make a
    knowledgeable choice between the District Court’s ruling
    and the County’s offer of judgment. We decline, however,
    to extend Lang to the facts of this case.
    14            KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    In Lang, the defendants in a § 1983 civil rights action
    made a Rule 68 offer, which both plaintiffs did not accept.
    Id.at 74. Nine months later, the parties settled—not pursuant
    to Rule 68—for the same amount as the Rule 68 offer. Id. As
    part of the settlement, the plaintiffs dismissed their action
    with prejudice. Id. By its terms, Rule 68 shifts costs where
    “the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more
    favorable than the unaccepted offer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d)
    (emphasis added). The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
    suit, so they did not obtain a judgment. See Lang, 
    36 F.3d at 74
    . Even so, the district court applied Rule 68, and because
    the settlement was “not more favorable than the unaccepted
    [Rule 68] offer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d), the court awarded
    fees only up to the date of the offer, see Lang, 
    36 F.3d at 74
    .
    We affirmed, concluding that Rule 68(d) cost-shifting
    applied because “an order of dismissal with prejudice . . . , if
    not in form a judgment for defendants, is certainly one in
    substance.” 
    Id. at 76
    . The County argues that we should
    apply Lang and conclude that the District Court’s summary
    judgment order was, in substance, a final judgment for the
    defendants that nullified their outstanding Rule 68 offer.
    As we have explained at some length, though, the plain
    text of Rule 68 required the County’s offer of judgment to
    be open for fourteen days and required the District Court to
    enter judgment for Kubiak when the notice of acceptance
    was filed. See Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1125 (holding that federal
    rules are construed in accordance with their language); see
    also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 
    450 U.S. 346
    , 352–56
    (1981) (interpreting Rule 68 according to its plain language);
    Marek, 
    473 U.S. at
    5–7 (same). The County’s preferred
    outcome cannot be squared with Rule 68’s text. Lang held
    that a dismissal with prejudice is equivalent to a final
    judgment for Rule 68 purposes, but said nothing about a non-
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                          15
    final order that grants summary judgment. See 
    36 F.3d at 76
    .
    Therefore, Lang does not control.
    The Eleventh Circuit’s Collar decision, upon which the
    County relies, does not support the County’s interpretation
    of what constitutes a final judgment. Collar defined a final
    judgment as an appealable order that “ends the litigation on
    the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but
    execute the judgment.” 895 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Green
    Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 
    531 U.S. 79
    , 86 (2000)).
    Here, the County could not have appealed from the order
    granting summary judgment. By its own terms, that order
    was not a final judgment—the judgment was to be entered
    “in due course.” Unlike in Collar, there was more for the
    District Court to do: as the Court wrote in its order, it needed
    to issue “[a] reasoned decision.” And much can happen in
    the course of writing a reasoned decision; a judge may even
    change his or her mind about the correct outcome. Therefore,
    Collar does not support the argument that the summary
    judgment order was close enough to a final judgment.
    2.
    Second, the County argues that, as a matter of Montana
    contract law, the offer of judgment did not result in a valid
    contract and therefore should be deemed ineffective. The
    County reasons that Montana law requires consideration for
    the formation of a valid contract, but when the summary
    judgment order was entered, the consideration evaporated. 2
    2
    Minutes after the District Court granted summary judgment, the
    County’s counsel emailed Kubiak’s counsel: “Given the Court’s ruling
    granting our Motion for Summary Judgment, the Offer of Judgment is
    hereby withdrawn.” However, the County has been very clear, both in its
    brief and at oral argument, that it does not make a contract-law argument
    16             KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI
    The County is correct that “Rule 68 offers of judgment
    are ‘analyzed in the same manner as any contract.’” Miller,
    868 F.3d at 851 (quoting Erdman, 
    926 F.2d at 880
    ). And it
    is also correct that, under Montana law, there must be
    consideration—that is, each party to a contract must “confer
    some legal benefit and/or incur some detriment.” Mont. Pub.
    Emp.’s Ass’n v. Off. of Governor, 
    898 P.2d 675
    , 678 (Mont.
    1995); 
    Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-102
     (“It is essential to the
    existence of a contract that there be . . . a sufficient cause or
    consideration.”).
    But offers of judgment differ from ordinary contracts in
    key ways, so we do not import contract law wholesale into a
    Rule 68 analysis. To name one distinction, “‘Rule 68 offers
    differ from contracts with respect to attorney fees’; as to
    them, any waiver or limitation must be clear and
    unambiguous.” Nusom, 
    122 F.3d at 833
     (quoting Erdman,
    
    926 F.2d at 880
    ). Another distinction is that the district court
    clerk “must . . . enter judgment” when a party files an
    accepted Rule 68 offer—the court may not stop to decide
    whether there is consideration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (a); see
    also, e.g., Beauchamp, 816 F.3d at 1223 (entry of judgment
    by the clerk is automatic). Therefore, Montana contract law
    does not overcome the mandatory operation of Rule 68.
    3.
    Third, the County argues that it could not have drafted
    an offer that would have insulated it from an unexpected
    entry of summary judgment. Kubiak, on the other hand,
    contends that the County was the master of its offer and
    points to the Eighth Circuit’s statement implying that a
    that the offer of judgment could not be accepted because it was
    withdrawn.
    KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI                  17
    defendant may condition its Rule 68 offer “upon the District
    Court’s not granting [the] motion for summary judgment.”
    Perkins, 
    138 F.3d at 339
    .
    The County responds that, notwithstanding the Eighth
    Circuit’s comment in Perkins, it would have been futile to
    include such a condition in the offer. The County questions
    whether such a condition would be compatible with Rule 68.
    The answer to that is unclear. We have held that a Rule 68
    offer may be conditioned on acceptance by all plaintiffs.
    Lang, 
    36 F.3d at 75
    . But conditioning an offer on the district
    court not granting summary judgment could be incompatible
    with Rule 68 if its effect is to shorten the fourteen-day
    acceptance period.
    In any event, the County did not attempt to condition its
    offer on the non-grant of summary judgment, so the
    permissibility of such a condition cannot be decided now.
    D.
    We conclude with a brief note about what we do not
    decide today. First, as we have made clear, we express no
    view on whether an entry of final judgment would nullify an
    outstanding Rule 68 offer. And second, we do not decide the
    fate of Rule 68 offers in “exceptional factual situations,”
    such as when the plaintiff’s claim is fraudulent. Colonial
    Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 
    887 F.2d 1236
    , 1240 (4th Cir. 1989).
    This appeal does not present those issues, so we do not
    consider them.
    IV.
    For all these reasons, we AFFIRM.