STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RONALD M. IGLESIAS (14-04-0315, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1727-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RONALD M. IGLESIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued October 28, 2020 – Decided June 28, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Accusation No. 14-04-0315.
James H. Maynard argued the cause for appellant.
Tiffany M. Russo, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Acting Morris
County Prosecutor, attorney; Tiffany M. Russo, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ronald M. Iglesias appeals from a November 13, 2019 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. We conclude that, if proven, defendant's trial counsel's erroneous
advice that he was categorically ineligible for the Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI)
program was constitutionally deficient. We therefore reverse and remand for an
evidentiary hearing. If a hearing substantiates the allegation, defendant shall be
afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea and apply for PTI.
Defendant, then twenty-four years old, resided with his parents and sister
in Bayonne. Defendant, who graduated from New Jersey City University with
a bachelor's degree is a professional musician who travels nationally and
internationally to perform. Defendant has no history of substance abuse and no
significant prior adult or juvenile criminal record. 1 Defendant was also pursuing
a master's degree in music at New Jersey City University.
On May 12, 2013, an officer from the Chatham Township Police
Department found defendant, disrobed, in his car with a minor who was
attempting to hide in the backseat. Defendant was arrested, and the minor
provided a statement to police that he met defendant "who took him first to an
area where they engaged in some kissing," and then into defendant's vehicle in
1
Defendant only has three local ordinance violations spanning from 2009 to 2012.
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an "isolated area and engaged in sexual activity." Although the minor was
unable to consent to sexual contact, he characterized the encounter as
"consensual," and denied that defendant used any force or coercion.
On or about May 13, 2013, a complaint was issued for defendant’s arrest
stemming from this incident. Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual
assault of a victim between the ages of thirteen and sixteen when the actor was
four or more years older than the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4), and third-
degree endangering, abuse, neglect, or sexual act by a non-caretaker, N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(a). On or about May 21, 2013, another complaint was issued that
charged defendant with an additional count of second-degree sexual assault of a
victim between the ages of thirteen and sixteen when the actor was four or more
years older than the victim, and an additional count of third-degree endangering,
abuse, neglect, or sexual act by a non-caretaker.
On April 7, 2014, under Accusation No. 14-04-315,2 defendant pled guilty
to fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). In exchange, the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the complaints. The State also
agreed to recommend probation with up to 180 days in county jail, and
2
The accusation form is absent from the record.
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compliance with the requirements set forth in Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to
-23.
A sentencing hearing was conducted on May 23, 2014. Defendant made
the following statement:
I'm really and truly sorry for . . . any pain that I caused
for the victim and the victim's family.
I[t] was . . . beyond [a] stupid mistake on my part.
For everything I've cost my parents, my family, [the]
embarrassment, and just the pain.
I wish I could go back. I was just in a very bad
place and my judgment was completely off. I really and
truly am remorseful for what I did.
And there's not a day that goes by that I'm not
reminded of it in some way, that it's changed my life in
a very significant way, in a very bad way.
I really and truly am very remorseful for . . . what
I've done to the victim, and the victim's family, and my
family, anyone who is affected by it.
The victim wrote an email in support of defendant's character:
I was not hurt nor damaged by the events. I
wasn't . . . in the situation unwillingly, nor was I in the
situation unenthusiastically.
[Defendant] is not a danger to society, nor is he a
sexual predator. He isn't a criminal. Please take into
account the fact that . . . I was there completely at my
own . . . whim[.]
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Society is not in danger and the tax dollars should
not be wasted on incarcerating [defendant]. It is my
wish that [defendant] walks out of this whole situation
without having served any jail time or prison time.
I understand that [defendant's] record cannot
have the felony removed, but if there was a way for that
to happen, too, that would be the most preferred option.
The victim's mother also provided a statement expressing similar
sentiments:
From my perspective as [the victim's] parent, I
would not have pressed charges. And my son, [the
victim], is fine. No harm has come to him. I believe a
lesson has been learned by all parties.
I do not believe justice would be served for
[defendant] to spend time in jail or to have a felony
charge on his record. I don't believe additional
punishment is warranted. There is no benefit to be
gained.
The State conceded that there was "no allegation of force" and
acknowledged that "this was a one-time incident." The judge observed that
defendant expressed remorse for his actions and, in fact, the pre-sentence report
indicated his remorse was sincere. Indeed, the pre-sentence report highlighted
that defendant was "embarrassed" and "remorseful," and that it appeared
"extremely unlikely that this defendant will have future contact with the criminal
justice system."
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The judge proceeded to analyze the aggravating and mitigating factors
under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1. The judge applied aggravating factor nine because
"there ha[d] to be a strong message . . . that to, in effect, take advantage of youth
comes with consequence, significant consequence." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). As
to the mitigating factors, the judge applied mitigating factor seven because
defendant had no prior criminal activity. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The judge
also found mitigating factor eight because defendant's remorse was "sincere,"
and he reflected on his actions which made recurrence unlikely. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(8). The judge applied mitigating factor nine because defendant was
unlikely to commit an offense again. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9). The judge also
determined defendant would be responsive to probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -
1(b)(10). The judge concluded that the mitigating factors preponderated.
Defendant was sentenced, in accordance with the plea agreement, to 180
days in county jail and two years' probation. Defendant was also subject to
Megan's Law registration and ordered to have no contact with the victim.
Defendant did not file an appeal and successfully completed probation
with no violations or infractions. On May 22, 2019, defendant filed a PCR
petition arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective in
advising him that he was ineligible for admission into the PTI program.
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Defendant certified that, although his trial counsel initially told him that he
needed more discovery to decide whether he was eligible, he was later told that
he was "not eligible."
In additional support of his petition, defendant provided a report from
Peter N. DeNigris, Psy.D. DeNigris noted that defendant never missed or
cancelled his treatment sessions, and presented as "forthcoming, accountable,
and cooperative." DeNigris opined that defendant gained insight into the factors
that contributed to his arrest, which prevented such circumstances from
reoccurring.
The PCR judge assumed for the sake of argument that defendant's trial
counsel was deficient in misadvising him about his eligibility for PTI admission.
Nonetheless, the judge denied defendant's petition on the basis that "the nature
of the original charges" and the "compelling need to prosecute offenders who
target children" would have precluded him from admission to PTI. 3
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration:
3
For similar reasons, the PCR judge determined that, if defendant's application to
PTI was denied, his appeal would have ultimately been unsuccessful. (1T81:11-20).
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POINT I
PRIOR TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO
PETITIONER BY FAILING TO PROPERLY
REVIEW THE FACTORS FOR ADMISSION INTO
[PTI] AND BY FAILING TO RECOMMEND TO
PETITIONER THAT HE APPLY FOR ADMISSION
TO PTI.
A. Erroneous advice as to eligibility to apply for
pre-trial intervention may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.
B. Defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel, resulting in a plea that was neither
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, where defense
counsel erroneously advised defendant he was
ineligible for PTI based on the nature of the
offense.
C. PCR court's denial of petitioner's request for
an evidentiary hearing is entitled to no deference
on appeal as [the] court misapplied the law by
relying solely on the nature of petitioner's offense
in finding the State would likely not have agreed
to admit petitioner to PTI.
POINT II
PRIOR TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO
PETITIONER BY FAILING TO ADVISE
DEFENDANT OF OUT-OF-STATE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MEGAN'S LAW.
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A. Ineffective assistance of counsel based on
failure to advise client of consequences of plea
bargain.
B. Defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel, resulting in a plea that was neither
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, where defense
counsel failed to properly investigate or advise
defendant about the collateral consequences of
Megan's law on defendant's ability to travel, work
or reside outside of New Jersey.
C. The PCR court misapplied controlling state
precedent in holding that the review of the
supplemental plea forms by trial counsel and the
sentencing court adequately informed petitioner
of the consequences of his plea.
D. PCR court erred in its findings of fact and
law, and its order denying an evidentiary hearing
must be vacated.
POINT III
THE PCR COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S PCR REQUEST FOR
RELIEF.
When a PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing, our standard of
review is de novo as to both the factual inferences drawn by the judge from the
record and the judge's legal conclusions. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285,
294 (App. Div. 2016). When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish,
"by a preponderance of the credible evidence," entitlement to the requested
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relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129
N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and
articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which
to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984), later adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. . . . [And] [s]econd, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To meet the
first prong, a defendant must show "that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
Amendment." Ibid. To meet the second prong, a defendant must show that
counsel's errors created a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different if counsel had not made the errors. Id.
at 694.
The PCR judge should grant an evidentiary hearing and determine the
merits of the claim if the defendant has presented a prima facie claim of
ineffective assistance. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. In deciding whether to grant
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an evidentiary hearing, "courts should view the facts in the light most favorable
to a defendant to determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie
claim." Id. at 462-63. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel often warrant
an evidentiary hearing "because the facts often lie outside the trial record and
because the attorney's testimony may be required." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343,
354 (2013) (quoting Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462). The decision to proceed without
an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster,
429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.
89, 157-58 (1997)).
"While all defendants may apply for admission into PTI," State v.
Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 622 (2015) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)), persons
charged with first or second-degree crimes, which carry a presumption of
incarceration, are merely presumed to be ineligible for PTI. See State v. Nwobu,
139 N.J. 236, 252-53 (1995) (stating that persons charged with second-degree
crimes must demonstrate "extraordinary or unusual" facts to establish
"'compelling reasons' for admission into PTI"); see also Guidelines for
Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey, Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, Guideline 3(i) to R. 3:28 at 1169 (2015) ("A defendant charged
with a first or second degree offense . . . should ordinarily not be considered for
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enrollment in a PTI program except on joint application by the defendant and
the prosecutor.").
Here, defendant's argument is that he was affirmatively, and incorrectly,
advised that he was not eligible for admission to PTI. We are satisfied that,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, Preciose, 129 N.J. at
462-63, if this assertion is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it
constitutes mistaken legal advice requiring a remedy. See State v. Green, 407
N.J. Super. 95, 98 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that, even though a presumption
against eligibility was applicable, "this does not mean that such defendants can
be denied the opportunity to apply in the first place."). 4 We are satisfied that
the nature of this mistaken legal advice, if substantiated, would constitute
deficient performance. See State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139-40, 143
(2009) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel "provid[ed]
misleading, material information [to defendant] that result[ed] in an uninformed
plea").
4
We note that our Supreme Court granted certification and summarily remanded
that case to reconsider the expanded record. State v. Green, 200 N.J. 471 (2009).
On remand, this court stressed that "the court's PTI program must actually consider
the merits of the defendant's application." State v. Green, 413 N.J. Super. 556, 561
(App. Div. 2010). Adhering to the original determination, this court once again
remanded the case. Id. at 562.
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The PCR judge clearly recognized the potential constitutional issue
presented in this case. Rather than hold an evidentiary hearing, however, the
judge sidestepped the issue and conducted his own analysis of whether
defendant would have been accepted into the program. We question the
propriety of this procedure, whereby the judge stepped into the shoes of the
prosecutor and analyzed the likelihood of defendant's admission into the PTI
program pursuant to the factors enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). If "a
trial [court] does not have the authority in PTI matters to substitute [its]
discretion for that of the prosecutor," State v. Von Smith, 177 N.J. Super. 203,
208 (App. Div. 1980), then assuredly the PCR judge cannot subsume the role of
the prosecutor and, under these circumstances, decide that defendant would have
been denied admission when the prosecutor never passed judgment on this issue
in the first instance.
Akin to the facts in Green, defendant was purportedly deprived of his
"statutory right to apply for PTI" by not being afforded "the opportunity to make
his application." 407 N.J. Super. at 99. We note in passing that the present
matter is distinguishable from State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div.
2020). There, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to inform him of the deportation consequences of rejecting PTI,
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notwithstanding the fact that he discussed the program with his attorney on many
occasions and was correctly informed he was eligible to apply, but simply chose
not to do so. Id. at 361-62, 364. In this case, in contrast, defendant was told
that he could not apply to PTI.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing. 5 The
hearing will allow the parties to present evidence as to whether trial counsel
affirmatively misadvised defendant that he was ineligible for the PTI program.
If so, defendant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea to "permit [him] to submit his PTI application." Green, 407 N.J. Super. at
99. We intimate no views on the outcome of any future proceedings.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
5
We also conclude that the case should be assigned to a different judge on remand.
See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) (requiring
assignment of a new judge on remand "to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice
based upon the [original] judge's prior involvement with the matter"); see also
Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 349 (App. Div. 1999) (noting an appellate
court's authority to direct that a case be assigned to a new judge "may be exercised
when there is a concern that the trial judge has a potential commitment to his or her
prior findings." (citing New Jersey Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J.
591, 617 (1986))).
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