Jane G. Garcia v. Daniel Muniz Garcia ( 2021 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-19-00796-CV
Jane G. GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
Daniel Muñiz GARCIA,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 2, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017FLB001496-C3
Honorable Victor Villarreal, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 23, 2021
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
In this appeal from a final decree of divorce after a bench trial, Appellant argues the trial
court abused its discretion by characterizing her separate property as community property and
dividing it unfairly. For the reasons given below, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s decree
that divides the marital estate. We remand the cause to the trial court for it to receive evidence
necessary to find what property comprises the marital estate and render a just and right division of
the community property. We affirm the remainder of the decree.
04-19-00796-CV
BACKGROUND
Jane G. Garcia and Daniel Muñiz Garcia were married in 1989, and they ceased living
together in 2015. In 2017, Daniel petitioned for divorce, and Jane filed a counter-petition. In a
one-day bench trial, Daniel was represented by counsel and Jane represented herself. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court found the entire marital estate consisted of one piece of real
property, a house located at 1810 South Arkansas, Laredo, Texas (the Arkansas property). It
ordered the marital estate divided evenly, and it granted the divorce.
On appeal, Jane presents thirteen issues, the majority of which criticize the trial court’s
finding on the composition of the community estate and its division. 1 We summarize her
complaints as follows:
(1) the trial court ignored sworn inventories,
(2) the trial court erred in sustaining Daniel’s evidentiary objections,
(3) the trial court materially mischaracterized separate property as community property
and its division was not just and right,
(4) Daniel’s sworn inventory did not disclose some community personal property,
(5) Daniel’s sworn inventory did not disclose some community real property,
(6) Daniel’s sworn inventory did not disclose overdue property tax payments or
impending Sheriff’s sale of Arkansas property,
(7) Daniel’s sworn inventory did not disclose income streams from the Arkansas
property,
(8) Daniel divested some community property without Jane’s permission,
(9) the trial court failed to recognize all community property,
(10) Daniel did not serve the final decree of divorce on Jane,
(11) Daniel did not give Jane notice of the hearing to enter the final decree,
(12) the trial court’s final decree did not recognize all the community property, and
(13) the trial court found the community estate consisted of only the Arkansas property.
1
Daniel did not file a brief.
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MISCHARACTERIZING SEPARATE PROPERTY
Because our disposition of Jane’s third issue disposes of all her other issues, we address
her third issue first.
In her third issue, Jane argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the
Arkansas property was 100% community property and dividing it equally between her and Daniel.
Jane insists that her mother’s 1998 Deed of Gift of all her interest in the Arkansas property to Jane
and Daniel created a 25% separate property interest for each of them. She also contends that when
Jane’s father died, his 50% interest passed to Jane’s mother as her separate property. Thus, she
argues, the trial court abused its discretion by mischaracterizing her mother’s, Daniel’s, and Jane’s
separate property as community property.
Before we address her arguments’ merits, we briefly recite the standard of review and
applicable law.
A. Standard of Review
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any
guiding rules or principles . . . .” Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per
curiam); accord Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). “A trial court has no discretion in
determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.” King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v.
Tamez, 443 S.W.3d 838, 850 (Tex. 2014); accord Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543
(Tex. 2018). “[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute
an abuse of discretion.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992); accord Iliff, 339
S.W.3d at 78.
B. Applicable Law
“All property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and
that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse
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. . . .” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; accord Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.
1977); Roberts v. Roberts, 402 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.)
(“Separate property includes property . . . acquired by a spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or
descent.”).
“The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and
convincing evidence.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b); accord Pearson v. Fillingim, 332
S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011); see Roberts, 402 S.W.3d at 838.
“When a trial court mischaracterizes separate property as community property, the error
requires reversal because the subsequent division divests a spouse of his or her separate property.”
Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (citing
Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140; McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)). “Once reversible error affecting the ‘just and right’ division of the
community estate is found, the court of appeals must remand the entire community estate for a
new division.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); accord Scott v. Scott, No. 04-
17-00155-CV, 2018 WL 2694817, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 858 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
C. Additional Background
In her brief, Jane states she is the daughter of Marcelo Barrientos and Guadalupe Barrientos
Soliz, Marcelo and Guadalupe jointly owned the Arkansas property in 1998 when Guadalupe
executed a Deed of Gift for the Arkansas property, and Marcelo died in 2013.
At trial, Daniel called Guadalupe to authenticate Guadalupe’s Deed of Gift, dated May 29,
1998, which she did, and the Deed of Gift was admitted into evidence without objection. We note,
however, that no evidence was presented at trial regarding who owned the Arkansas property when
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04-19-00796-CV
Guadalupe executed the Deed of Gift in 1998. Further, there is nothing in the appellate record
which conclusively establishes the Arkansas property’s ownership in 1998.
D. Dividing Separate Property
The Deed of Gift purports to convey the Arkansas property in its entirety to Daniel and
Jane equally.
Under Texas law, when Guadalupe executed the Deed of Gift, Daniel and Jane each
received an undivided one-half—of whatever Guadalupe’s interest was in the Arkansas property
at that time—as their separate property. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.001; Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472, 478 (1883) (“[A] gift jointly to the husband and wife . . .
result[s] in each having an undivided half interest in the land as separate property.”); In re
Marriage of Royal, 107 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (“Texas courts
consistently hold that gifts to spouses jointly are not community property, rather, each spouse takes
half of the gift as their separate property.”); Dutton v. Dutton, 18 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (“A joint gift to a husband and wife is not community property; rather,
each gets a one-half undivided separate interest in the gift.”). Unless Guadalupe was the sole
owner of the Arkansas property at the time she executed the Deed of Gift, then at that time, Daniel
and Jane each received only a 50% interest of whatever interest Guadalupe then owned.
Nevertheless, the Deed of Gift is conclusive evidence that Jane and Daniel each had
separate property interests in the Arkansas property. See Bradley, 60 Tex. at 478; In re Marriage
of Royal, 107 S.W.3d at 851. The trial court’s finding “that the marital estate that was acquired
during the marriage consisted of [the Arkansas property],” or in other words, that the Arkansas
property was 100% community property, was error. See Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d at 780 (citing
Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140; McElwee, 911 S.W.2d at 187).
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E. Abuse of Discretion
In its finding deciding what property the marital estate included, the trial court failed to
apply the law correctly. See Bradley, 60 Tex. at 478; In re Marriage of Royal, 107 S.W.3d at 851.
It mischaracterized separate property as community property, which was error. See Sheshtawy,
150 S.W.3d at 780 (citing Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140; McElwee, 911 S.W.2d at 187). Given
reversible error which affected the just and right division of the community estate, we “must
remand the entire community estate for a new division.” See Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 733; Scott,
2018 WL 2694817, at *3; Slicker, 464 S.W.3d at 858. We sustain Jane’s third issue.
PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION, DIVISION ISSUES
Jane’s other issues complain about procedures and decisions underlying the trial court’s
finding that the marital estate consisted of only the Arkansas property and the trial court’s division
of the marital estate.
Because we have concluded that the trial court mischaracterized separate property as
community property, and there was no direct evidence of the ownership of the Arkansas property
at the time of the Deed of Gift, we are remanding the cause to the trial court for it to receive
evidence necessary to find what property comprises the community estate and render a just and
right division of the community property.
Assuming without deciding that Jane preserved her claims of error and properly briefed
each issue, 2 Jane’s other issues (which seek reversal of the property characterization and division)
are nevertheless moot.
2
We recognize that Jane represented herself at trial and is representing herself on appeal. “[Self-represented] litigants
are generally held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable rules, including the
rules governing appellate briefs.” Briggs v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 04-16-00087-CV, 2017 WL 685764, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Feb. 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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CONCLUSION
In this appeal, Jane did not present a legal argument that the divorce was improperly
granted. Instead, she complains only that the trial court abused its discretion in determining and
dividing the marital estate.
Under Texas law, the 1998 Deed of Gift conclusively establishes that Daniel and Jane had
separate property interests in the Arkansas property. Therefore, when the trial court found the
Arkansas property was 100% community property, it misapplied the law—which was an abuse of
discretion. We reverse the portion of the final decree of divorce that determines and divides the
marital estate, and we remand the cause to the trial court for it to receive evidence necessary to
find what property comprises the marital estate and render a just and right division of the
community property. We affirm the remainder of the final decree of divorce.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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