Rodgers v. United States ( 2021 )


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  • 20-2176-cv
    Rodgers v. United States
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed
    on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
    document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
    electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
    must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 30th day of June, two thousand twenty-one.
    PRESENT:             JON O. NEWMAN,
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    Circuit Judges.
    ARNOLD EUGENE RODGERS, AKA ARNOLD EUGENE ROGERS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,                  20-2176-cv
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT:                               Arnold E. Rodgers, pro se, Rahway, NJ.
    FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE:                                Daniel H. Wolf, Anna M. Skotko,
    Assistant United States Attorneys, for
    Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney,
    Southern District of New York, New
    York, NY.
    Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
    York (Kimba M. Wood, Judge).
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    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is
    AFFIRMED.
    Arnold Rodgers, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s June 2020 order
    denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. In 2012, he pleaded guilty to transporting and
    receiving a firearm and ammunition in interstate commerce based on his sale of a 9mm handgun and
    several rounds of ammunition to a cooperating witness, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (b). He was
    sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and 2 years’ supervised release. In 2018, two years after
    Rodgers concluded his term of supervised release, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis,
    seeking to vacate his conviction. He argued that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
    failing to argue that, based on an Arizona district court decision, United States v. Havelock, 
    560 F. Supp. 2d 828
     (D. Ariz. 2008), his offense conduct did not satisfy the “interstate” requirement of the
    crime. The District Court denied his petition, reasoning that his counsel’s performance was not
    constitutionally ineffective in not relying on that non-binding decision based on distinguishable
    facts. This appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
    procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
    When assessing a district court’s decision on a writ of error coram nobis, we review the legal
    standards the district court applied de novo but review the court’s decision to deny the writ for abuse
    of discretion. See Doe v. United States, 
    915 F.3d 905
    , 909 (2d Cir. 2019). An abuse of discretion is
    found “only where the trial judge ruled in an arbitrary or irrational fashion.” United States v. Kelley,
    
    551 F.3d 171
    , 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court has
    abused its discretion if it has: (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law; (2) made a clearly
    erroneous assessment of the evidence; or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the
    range of permissible decisions. Lynch v. City of New York, 
    589 F.3d 94
    , 99 (2d Cir. 2009). “The
    question of whether a defendant’s lawyer’s representation violates the Sixth Amendment right to
    effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo.” LoCascio
    v. United States, 
    395 F.3d 51
    , 54 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary remedy” that “issues only in extreme cases.”
    United States v. Denedo, 
    556 U.S. 904
    , 916 (2009). Thus, the writ serves as “a remedy of last resort,”
    Fleming v. United States, 
    146 F.3d 88
    , 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), and is “strictly limited to those
    cases in which errors . . . of the most fundamental character have rendered the proceeding itself
    irregular and invalid.” Foont v. United States, 
    93 F.3d 76
    , 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). To receive coram nobis relief, a petitioner must show “that 1)
    there are circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice[;] 2) sound reasons exist for failure
    to seek appropriate earlier relief[;] and 3) the petitioner continues to suffer legal consequences from
    his conviction that may be remedied by granting of the writ.” Kovacs v. United States, 
    744 F.3d 44
    , 49
    (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a petition for a writ of error coram
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    nobis, courts must “presume the proceedings were correct” and “[t]he burden of showing otherwise
    rests on the petitioner.” Fleming, 
    146 F.3d at 90
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-
    bargaining process.” Lafler v. Cooper, 
    566 U.S. 156
    , 162 (2012). “Thus, ineffective assistance of
    counsel” may constitute compelling circumstances, and “is one ground for granting a writ of coram
    nobis.” Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 49. A claim of ineffective assistance requires a defendant to show, first,
    “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and, second, that
    he suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 692 (1984). As to the first
    prong, “a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
    wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” United States v. Venturella, 
    391 F.3d 120
    , 135 (2d
    Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an
    ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
    insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 697
    . The defendant bears the burden of
    establishing that his attorney’s representation was constitutionally ineffective. 
    Id. at 694
    .
    Contrary to Rodgers’s assertion on appeal, the District Court both “laid out” and “applied”
    the correct coram nobis standards, citing United States v. Morgan, 
    346 U.S. 502
    , 511, 512 (1954), Nicks v.
    United States, 
    955 F.2d 161
    , 167 (2d Cir. 1992), and Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 49. Further, the District Court
    properly analyzed his petition for coram nobis relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, under
    the coram nobis factor that the petitioner show “circumstances compelling such [relief] to achieve
    justice,” and properly analyzed Rodgers’s ineffective assistance arguments under Strickland, which
    provides the governing standard. See Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    , 521 (2003) (Strickland
    “established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Although
    Rodgers broadly argues that counsel’s performance, rooted in “inattention and indifference,” was
    unreasonable, and the Court failed to assess “whether, and to what extent, certain pretrial
    investigation was conducted,” the District Court performed the analysis that Strickland and its
    progeny demand: an assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s representation. See
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 688
    .
    In applying that standard, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Rodgers’s coram nobis petition. Rodgers relied on Havelock to show that his counsel was
    constitutionally ineffective (i.e., failed to conduct a pretrial investigation) by not arguing that his
    conduct did not violate § 924(b). But the District Court properly rejected Rodgers’s ineffectiveness
    argument based on his reading of Havelock—an out-of-circuit case based on clearly distinguishable
    facts—and held that his counsel was objectively reasonable for not relying on it. Therefore,
    Rodgers’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to bring a Havelock-based argument
    to the Court’s attention, or to object to the Government’s description of § 924(b) based on Havelock,
    because doing so would have been meritless. See United States v. Regalado, 
    518 F.3d 143
    , 149 n.3 (2d
    Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[F]ailure to make a meritless argument does not amount to ineffective
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    assistance.”). The District Court’s denial of Rodgers’s petition for a writ of coram nobis on ineffective
    assistance of counsel grounds was not an abuse of discretion and was “located within the range of
    permissible decisions.” See Lynch, 
    589 F.3d at 99
    .
    CONCLUSION
    We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Rodgers on appeal and find them to be
    without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the June 11, 2020 order of the District
    Court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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