Cynthia S. Mahoney v. RHI, Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, and Second Injury Fund of Iowa ( 2021 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 20-0868
    Filed June 30, 2021
    CYNTHIA S. MAHONEY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    vs.
    ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL, INSURANCE CO. OF THE STATE OF
    PENNSYLVANIA, and SECOND INJURY FUND OF IOWA,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher L. Bruns,
    Judge.
    Petitioner appeals the district court ruling affirming the workers’
    compensation commissioner’s decision denying her petition seeking workers’
    compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
    Thomas Wertz of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Abigail A. Wenninghoff and Kalli P. Gloudemans of Larson, Kuper &
    Wenninghoff, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellees Robert Half International and
    Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jonathan D. Bergman, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee Second Injury Fund of Iowa.
    Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    SCHUMACHER, Judge.
    Cynthia Mahoney appeals the district court ruling affirming the workers’
    compensation commissioner’s decision denying her petition for workers’
    compensation benefits. The commissioner properly determined the weight to be
    given to an expert medical opinion. The commissioner’s factual findings were
    supported by substantial evidence. The commissioner’s application of the law to
    the facts was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. We affirm the district
    court’s decision that affirmed the ruling of the workers’ compensation
    commissioner denying Mahoney’s claim of a cumulative injury to her right arm and
    wrist.
    I.    Background Facts & Proceedings
    Mahoney was in an automobile accident in 2006 and received injuries to
    her right arm and wrist. She had surgery to repair the injuries, with plates and
    screws placed in her right arm and wrist. Mahoney was unable to continue with
    certain activities, such as volleyball and bowling. She did not have any work
    restrictions. She had some complaints of pain through 2012 and 2013.
    In 2014, Mahoney began working for Robert Half International (RHI), which
    places employees in temporary positions. In January 2015, Mahoney was placed
    at Tax Act, where she responded to consumers’ telephone calls regarding a
    software program used to prepare taxes.1 Mahoney testified her position at Tax
    Act was faster-paced than previous positions and required more use of a computer
    1Mahoney has a master’s degree in accounting and a law degree. She also has
    many years of experience working as an accountant.
    3
    keyboard and ten-key calculator. She stated she began to experience new pain
    and numbness in her right hand.
    In March, Mahoney saw Dr. Timothy Loth, who diagnosed tendonitis.
    Mahoney had physical therapy and cortisone or steroid shots into her wrist, but her
    condition did not improve.       She also had an ergonomic evaluation of her
    workstation. In addition, she met with a vocational consultant. She quit her
    position at the end of March. Mahoney obtained a different position through RHI
    that did not have the same level of keyboarding.
    On July 5, 2016, Mahoney filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits,
    claiming she received a cumulative injury to her right arm.2 She saw Dr. Robin
    Sassman for a second opinion in February 2017. Dr. Sassman assigned a three
    percent impairment rating for Mahoney’s right arm for tenosynovitis, which was
    attributed to a new, repetitive motion injury. Gina Carson, a representative of RHI,
    testified at the administrative hearing that Mahoney’s job at Tax Act did not require
    constant typing, but involved “more scrolling and clicking.”
    The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found:
    [C]laimant has failed to meet her burden of proof that she suffered a
    new cumulative injury which manifested in March 2015. While the
    claimant did suffer some new symptoms during that timeframe, I do
    not find the quality of evidence in this record to qualify these
    symptoms as a new, distinct work injury. The claim was not worked
    up independently. Other than Dr. Sassman, no physician has opined
    that she suffered a new work injury. Ms. Mahoney had consistently
    2 Mahoney filed a separate claim for benefits based on a fall at work. The deputy
    commissioner found Mahoney carried her burden of proof that an injury to her right
    upper extremity in October 2006 was a qualifying first injury entitling her to benefits
    from the second injury fund. The deputy commissioner further found Mahoney
    sustained a twelve percent loss of function of her left upper extremity and the
    effects of the two injuries combined resulted in a thirty percent industrial disability.
    These findings are not disputed on appeal.
    4
    experienced symptoms and difficulties in her right wrist from the auto
    accident as late as 2012 and 2013. It appears that, at most, she
    suffered a temporary aggravation of her other impairments set forth
    above. Moreover, I find that, even if she did suffer a new work injury,
    it did not substantially increase her loss of function in her right arm.
    The deputy concluded Mahoney was not entitled to workers’ compensation
    benefits based on her claim of a cumulative injury to her right arm and wrist.
    Mahoney appealed to the workers’ compensation commissioner.                The
    commissioner affirmed the deputy’s finding that Mahoney failed to prove she
    sustained a cumulative injury to her right arm and wrist arising out of and in the
    course of her employment.
    Mahoney filed a petition for judicial review. The district court determined
    there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s
    decision.    The court noted the commissioner considered all of the relevant
    evidence and determined Mahoney had not established a permanent, cumulative
    injury to her right arm and wrist. The court stated the commissioner could have
    concluded Dr. Sassman’s opinion was not persuasive on the ground Dr. Sassman
    had been provided with inaccurate facts. The court affirmed the commissioner’s
    decision. Mahoney now appeals the decision of the district court.
    II.    Standard of Review
    “When reviewing the decision of the district court’s judicial review ruling, we
    determine if we would reach the same result as the district court in our application
    of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act.” Sladek v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 
    939 N.W.2d 632
    , 637 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.,
    
    728 N.W.2d 781
    , 787 (Iowa 2007)). The commissioner’s factual findings are
    upheld on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence when the record is
    5
    viewed as a whole. Evenson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 
    881 N.W.2d 360
    , 366
    (Iowa 2016). We consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the
    findings made by the commissioner, not whether the evidence could support
    different findings. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 
    763 N.W.2d 842
    , 850 (Iowa 2009).
    III.   Expert Medical Opinion
    Mahoney claims the commissioner improperly disregarded the medical
    opinion of Dr. Sassman. She states that the employer did not present medical
    evidence to support its position that she had not sustained a cumulative injury to
    her right arm and wrist. She asserts the medical opinion of Dr. Sassman should
    be sufficient to prove she had a new, repetitive motion injury.
    “Whether an injury has a direct causal connection with the employment or
    arose independently thereof is essentially within the domain of expert testimony.”
    Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 
    526 N.W.2d 845
    , 853 (Iowa 1995). “The weight
    to be given such an opinion is for the finder of fact, in this case the commissioner,
    and that may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert and
    other surrounding circumstances.” 
    Id.
     “When an expert’s opinion is based upon
    an incomplete history, the opinion is not necessarily binding upon the
    commissioner.” 
    Id.
    The deputy noted Dr. Sassman’s opinion but found other evidence did not
    support a finding that Mahoney experienced a new work injury. The deputy found
    “Mahoney had consistently experienced symptoms and difficulties in her right wrist
    from the auto accident as late as 2012 and 2013.” The commissioner affirmed and
    adopted these findings. The district court stated the commissioner could have
    concluded Dr. Sassman was not provided with accurate facts concerning
    6
    Mahoney’s job description at Tax Act and the date her wrist symptoms began. The
    commissioner determines the weight to be given to an expert medical opinion. See
    Dunlavey, 
    526 N.W.2d at 853
    . We find the commissioner appropriately considered
    Dr. Sassman’s opinion.
    IV.    Substantial Evidence
    A.     Mahoney asserts that there is not substantial evidence in the record
    to support several of the deputy’s findings, which were adopted and affirmed by
    the commissioner. The deputy stated, “While the claimant did suffer some new
    symptoms during that timeframe, I do not find the quality of evidence in this record
    to qualify these symptoms as a new, distinct work injury. The claim was not worked
    up independently.” Mahoney claims she received independent treatment for a right
    arm injury in 2015.
    Mahoney fell at work on October 20, 2014. She initially claimed that she
    injured her left arm and reinjured the right arm when she fell. She later stated the
    right arm injury was due to fast-paced repetitive typing.       Melissa Fagan, a
    registered nurse practitioner, recommended an ergonomic evaluation of
    Mahoney’s workstation after noting her problems with both arms. While there is
    evidence Mahoney complained of pain in her right arm and wrist, there is
    substantial evidence to show her complaints were not limited to her right arm and
    wrist, and thus there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
    commissioner’s finding that her right arm problems were “not worked up
    independently.”
    B.     Mahoney claims the commissioner’s findings on causation are not
    supported by substantial evidence. She states the evidence does not support a
    7
    finding that she “consistently experienced symptoms and difficulties in her right
    wrist from the auto accident as late as 2012 and 2013.”
    Medical records from February 16, 2013, state, “Right forearm screw
    coming undone. Result of car accident in 2006.” The records also state her right
    forearm was tender. Records from another doctor visit on June 20, 2013, state
    she had increased pain and numbness around the area where there were screws
    in her arm. We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
    commissioner’s finding that Mahoney continued to have “symptoms and
    difficulties” from the 2006 automobile accident into 2013. See St. Luke’s Hosp. v.
    Gray, 
    604 N.W.2d 646
    , 649 (Iowa 2000) (noting we consider whether the evidence
    supports the findings actually made by the commissioner, not whether the
    evidence supports a different finding).
    V.     Cumulative Injury
    Mahoney claims the commissioner abused his discretion by finding she did
    not have a cumulative injury to her right arm and wrist on March 2, 2015. On the
    issue of the application of the law to the facts, “[w]e allocate some degree of
    discretion in our review of this question, but not the breadth of discretion given to
    the findings of fact.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 
    710 N.W.2d 213
    , 219 (Iowa 2006). The
    application of the law to the facts “can be affected by other grounds of error such
    as erroneous interpretation of law; irrational reasoning; failure to consider relevant
    facts; or irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to the facts.”
    
    Id. at 218
    .
    We have determined there is substantial evidence in the record to support
    the commissioner’s factual findings.         Contrary to Mahoney’s argument, the
    8
    commissioner did not ignore important and relevant evidence. The commissioner
    appropriately determined the weight to be given to the evidence in the case and
    found Mahoney did not establish her claim of a cumulative injury. We conclude
    the commissioner did not abuse his discretion. The commissioner’s decision was
    not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m)
    (2019); Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris, 
    778 N.W.2d 192
    , 196 (Iowa 2010).
    We affirm the district court’s decision that affirmed the ruling of the workers’
    compensation commissioner denying Mahoney’s claim of a cumulative injury to
    her right arm and wrist.
    AFFIRMED.