Camille Zamorano v. City of San Jacinto , 585 F. App'x 397 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 09 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CAMILLE ZAMORANO; JOE ALEX                       No. 12-57112
    ZAMORANO,
    D.C. No. 5:12-cv-00965-GAF-
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,           DTB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF SAN JACINTO, JIM AYRES,
    JOHN MANSPERGER, JIMMIE DALE
    STUBBLEFIELD, JAMES POTTS,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 7, 2014**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: HAWKINS and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and SEDWICK,*** District
    Judge.
    Plaintiffs Camille and Joe Alex Zamorano appeal from the district court’s
    order dismissing their complaint, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
    for failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims,
    brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as time-barred, and
    remanded their remaining claims to state court.1 We affirm.
    1. We review de novo "the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for
    failure to state a claim and the legal issues it presents," including whether the
    statute of limitations has expired. Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media
    Corp. PLC, 
    733 F.3d 1251
    , 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2013). A civil rights "claim accrues
    under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the actual
    injury." Lukovsky v. City of San Francisco, 
    535 F.3d 1044
    , 1051 (9th Cir. 2008).
    The "actual injury" is the alleged harm underlying the complaint, not the "legal
    wrong" of discrimination that makes the injury actionable. 
    Id. at 1048.
    Contrary
    to Plaintiffs’ contention that Lukovsky applies only in the employment context, the
    ***
    The Honorable John W. Sedwick, United States District Judge for the
    District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
    1
    Plaintiffs do not separately challenge the remand of their state claims, in
    the event that their other arguments do not succeed.
    2
    "actual injury" rule applies equally to all cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
    1983, 1985, and 1986. See, e.g., Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 
    666 F.3d 577
    , 581 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Lukovsky’s accrual rule to a § 1983 case
    involving a school district’s failure to report suspected child abuse); see also
    
    Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1050
    (discussing the statute of limitations rule under the
    Federal Tort Claims Act and noting that the rule for federal civil rights plaintiffs is
    precisely the same as the rule for other tort plaintiffs).
    Plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of all the delays that had occurred
    with respect to their application for a building permit by May 2009, when the
    application was approved. Their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was governed by a
    one-year statute of limitations. Their claims under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 were
    governed by a two-year statute of limitations, borrowed from California law. Cal.
    Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; see 
    Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048
    (applying the forum
    state’s statute of limitations when the federal statute does not otherwise provide a
    limitations period). Plaintiffs therefore had until May 2010, at the latest, to bring
    their § 1981 claim, and they had until May 2011, at the latest, to file all their other
    federal claims. But they did not file this action until February 2012. All their
    federal claims, therefore, are time-barred.
    3
    2. Because the district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim,
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ first amended
    complaint as true, Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    668 F.3d 1136
    , 1140 (9th Cir.
    2012). The facts being undisputed for present purposes, we review de novo the
    legal question whether equitable remedies apply. Jones v. Blanas, 
    393 F.3d 918
    ,
    926 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Plaintiffs do not plead facts to show either "due diligence" or "excusable
    delay," so equitable tolling does not apply. Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 
    202 F.3d 1170
    , 1178 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzalez v. INS,
    
    272 F.3d 1176
    , 1194–96 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Similarly, Plaintiffs do not
    allege that Defendants prevented them from filing in time through "some active
    conduct by the defendant above and beyond the wrongdoing" underpinning their
    claim, so equitable estoppel does not apply. 
    Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1052
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Finally, the discovery rule does not toll Plaintiffs’ claim
    because that rule "is already incorporated into federal accrual law," 
    id. at 1048,
    and
    Plaintiffs’ complaint shows that they had already discovered their
    injuries—repeated denials of the permit application—by May 2009.
    AFFIRMED.
    4