United States v. Michael Clarkson , 585 F. App'x 536 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-50602
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00229-R-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL DANELLE CLARKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 7, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: TALLMAN, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Michael Clarkson appeals the district court’s decision denying his motion to
suppress evidence that officers found while conducting a probation search of
Clarkson’s home. Clarkson argues that the officers needed reasonable suspicion to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
search his home, and that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion before
entering his home. We need not decide what level of suspicion was required, or
whether the officers had the requisite level of suspicion. At the time of the search,
our precedent authorized suspicionless searches of probationer’s homes. See
Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1174 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by
United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The discovered
evidence is therefore not subject to the exclusionary rule even if the search was
unlawful. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011)
(“[S]earches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.”).
Clarkson also argues that the officers did not have probable cause that the
searched residence was Clarkson’s home and that officers obtained incriminating
statements from Clarkson in violation of his Miranda rights. Clarkson waived
these arguments because he neither raised them below nor preserved the right to
make them on appeal in his plea agreement. See United States v. Hawkins, 249
F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The failure to raise a particular ground in support
of a motion to suppress constitutes a waiver of that challenge.”); United States v.
Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 583 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that when a defendant reserves
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the right to appeal only the order on a motion to suppress, he “waive[s] his right to
appeal all grounds not addressed in that order”).
AFFIRMED.
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