Jose Valdez v. Ken Clark , 587 F. App'x 414 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE DAVID VALDEZ, No. 10-55737
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00596-AG-DTB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KEN CLARK,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: SILVERMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BELL, District Judge.***
Jose Valdez appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas petition challenging his California convictions for witness intimidation,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
brandishing a firearm, and street terrorism. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
The state court reasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), when it denied the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise a juror bias claim on direct appeal. Because there was no specific evidence
that any juror was actually biased, the state court reasonably held that Valdez failed
to prove both prongs of the Strickland test.
The state court reasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979),
to hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for dissuading
a witness with a threat of force in violation of California Penal Code § 136.1(a)(1)
and brandishing a firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 417(a)(2).
Evidence at trial established that two individuals, Moreno and Gonzalez, had been
stabbed and beaten by members of Valdez’s criminal street gang, and the victims
were scheduled to testify in juvenile court against members of Valdez’s gang. On
May 16, 2004, the day before the victims were scheduled to testify, Valdez
repeatedly advised the victims’ friend, Galvan, to tell Moreno and Gonzalez, in
effect, to get their stories straight and keep their mouths shut to avoid trouble with
Valdez’s rival street gang. While issuing this warning to Galvan, Valdez sat in the
front passenger seat of a car, leaned back, and ominously allowed Galvan to
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observe the assault weapon he was holding on his lap. Valdez admitted that he was
a member of the Laurel Hood Thugs criminal street gang, he had the conversation
with Galvan, and he carried his assault weapon during the conversation with
Galvan. The state court reasonably held that a rational juror could have found that
Valdez brandished a firearm and intentionally used threats to dissuade Moreno and
Gonzalez from testifying against Valdez’s fellow gang members in the juvenile
court prosecution. Cal. Penal Code §§ 136.1(c)(1) & 417(a)(2); People v.
Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 733-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). In addition, a
rational juror could have found that Valdez dissuaded the witnesses with the
specific intent to benefit or promote the criminal activity of his gang. Cal. Penal
Code § 186.22(b)(1); People v. Jasso, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 483 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012).
Valdez argues that there is insufficient evidence to support two convictions
for violating California Penal Code § 186.22(a), street terrorism or active
participation in a criminal street gang. After the district court denied federal
habeas relief in this case, the California Supreme Court decided People v.
Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2012). Rodriguez held that the prosecution must
prove that a defendant’s underlying felonious criminal conduct in a § 186.22(a)
case was committed by at least two gang members. Id. at 1134. The warden now
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concedes that, in light of Rodriguez, there is insufficient evidence to support the
street terrorism conviction alleged to have been committed on May 20, 2004
because Valdez was by himself – not with others – on that occasion. As for the
May 16, 2004 incident, the district court has not yet had an opportunity to assess
whether that conviction passes muster under Rodriguez. We reverse the district
court’s denial of the sufficiency of the evidence challenges to the two street
terrorism convictions and remand for the district court to reconsider the claims in
light of Rodriguez. We do not reverse the May 20, 2004 conviction at this time
because of issues of exhaustion and procedural default that remain for the district
court to determine in the first instance.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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