Rafael Arroyo, Jr. v. Baseline Enterprise LLC ( 2022 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 8 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAEL ARROYO, Jr., No. 20-56151
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-10641-DFM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BASELINE ENTERPRISE LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company;
CAR CARE WEST, INC., a California
Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
RAFAEL ARROYO, Jr., No. 21-55102
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-10641-DFM
v.
BASELINE ENTERPRISE LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company;
CAR CARE WEST, INC., a California
Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Douglas F. McCormick, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and LIBURDI,**
District Judge.
Rafael Arroyo (Arroyo) is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility.
In August of 2019, Arroyo went to a gas station owned and operated by
Defendants. Arroyo experienced a sales counter that he asserted was not in
compliance with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Arroyo
filed this action, alleging that he was denied full and equal access in violation of
the ADA and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act). Arroyo
specifically alleged that the lower counter that was provided for customers in
wheelchairs was not in compliance with the ADA standards because it was too
cluttered with merchandise.
The district court ultimately dismissed Arroyo’s ADA request for
prospective relief as moot because the gas station replaced the counter with one
that complied with Section 904 of the 2010 ADA Accessibility Guidelines
**
The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
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(ADAAG). However, the district court also ruled on the merits that the ADA
guidelines contain no requirement mandating a certain amount of clear counter
space.
We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. See Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185,
1189 (9th Cir. 2021). In doing so, we must determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See id. We review the denial of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of
discretion. See Avery v. First Res. Mgmt. Corp., 568 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.
2009), as amended.
“Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh
Act.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in public accommodations
against individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on a
claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) disability under
the ADA; (2) “the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a
place of public accommodation”; and (3) he was denied access to the public
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accommodations by the defendant because of his disability. Molski, 481 F.3d at
730. Here, only the last element is in dispute.
Section 904.4.1 of the ADAAG sets forth standards for the height and
length of transaction counters. 36 C.F.R., Pt. 1191, App. D, § 904.4.1. As the
district court noted, those standards do not contain a requirement for a minimum
amount of clear space. See id. Consequently, Arroyo failed to raise a material
issue of fact that Defendants violated the ADA.
Because there was no material issue of fact raised regarding the existence of
an ADA violation, Arroyo had no viable damages claim under the Unruh Act. See
Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 670 (2009) (requiring proof of an ADA
access violation to “obtain statutory damages” under the Unruh Act). In addition,
no injunctive relief is available under the ADA or the Unruh Act, because the
counter was replaced. See Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“Because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief . . . under
the ADA, a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can
have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.”) (citation omitted).
We agree with the district court that Arroyo’s claims are not frivolous.
Thus, Defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees. See Jensen v. City of San Jose,
806 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1986).
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AFFIRMED.
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