Bruce Singer v. Henry Bushkin ( 2018 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 8 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re HENRY ISAAC BUSHKIN,                      No. 16-55644
    Debtor.                 D.C. No. 2:15-cv-06489-CJC
    ____________________________________
    BRUCE SINGER and SINGER                         MEMORANDUM*
    FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
    Appellants,
    v.
    HENRY ISAAC BUSHKIN,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 9, 2018**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District
    Judge.
    Henry Bushkin and Bruce Singer agreed to create a book about the comedian
    Johnny Carson. Singer Financial Corporation (“SFC”) fronted the money, and
    Bushkin agreed to write. The book ultimately did well, but before Bushkin could
    realize significant profits, he declared bankruptcy. Under the terms of the
    collaboration, Bushkin owed money to SFC, but in his bankruptcy filings he listed
    Singer—not SFC—as a creditor. Notice was mailed to Singer of the deadline to
    object to any discharge of Bushkin’s debt.
    The deadline came and went without objection, and the bankruptcy court
    discharged Bushkin’s debts. Eventually, both Singer and SFC disputed the discharge,
    claiming that they never received notice of the bankruptcy or their chance to object.
    The bankruptcy court rejected their argument, applying the rule that properly
    addressed letters are presumed received. See, e.g., Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    729 F.3d 917
    , 921 (9th Cir. 2013).
    On appeal, the primary question is the burden of proof. We answered that
    question in Moody v. Bucknum (In re Bucknum), 
    951 F.2d 204
    , 206–07 (9th Cir.
    1991) (per curiam), in which we held that when notice is mailed to a creditor, it is
    ***
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    presumed received unless the bankruptcy court finds otherwise by clear and
    convincing evidence, a finding we review for clear error. Singer’s evidence that he
    did not receive the notice may be plausible, but it is not akin to what Bucknum
    suggested would be sufficient, and we cannot say that the bankruptcy court clearly
    erred in finding it less than clear and convincing. We thus affirm the bankruptcy
    court’s decision to reject Singer’s untimely objection. We affirm as to SFC for the
    same reason: although the notice was not mailed with SFC’s name on the envelope,
    notice was mailed to Singer, and Singer was the registered agent for SFC. See, e.g.,
    Frankfort Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. John B. Stevens & Co., 
    220 F. 77
    ,
    79 (9th Cir. 1915).
    Singer and SFC also object to the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of their
    request for a declaratory judgment that they owned rights to the book, rights that
    were never part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court correctly denied that
    judgment because it would not have done any good. See Bilbrey ex rel. Bilbrey v.
    Brown, 
    738 F.2d 1462
    , 1470 (9th Cir. 1984). As the district court explained:
    [T]he bankruptcy court could have decided what rights, exactly,
    belonged to Bushkin’s estate. But Singer and SFC’s claims against
    those rights were discharged. And even if the bankruptcy court had
    figured what proportion of the rights—if any—belonged to Singer and
    SFC, and not to the estate, an action to collect on those rights would not
    have been a “matter[] concerning the administration of the estate.”
    28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
    3
    Because we rule against Singer and SFC on their other claims, their claim for
    an accounting of the book’s profits, a derivative remedy, was also inappropriate. See
    Faivre v. Daley, 
    29 P. 256
    , 258–59 (Cal. 1892); Duggal v. G.E. Capital Commc’ns
    Servs., Inc., 
    96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383
    , 393 (Ct. App. 2000).
    AFFIRMED.
    4