Cynthia Wills v. First Republic Bank ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 18 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CYNTHIA S. WILLS,                               No.    19-17001
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:19-cv-01819-NC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    FIRST REPUBLIC BANK,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Nathanael M. Cousins, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 7, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,*** District
    Judge.
    Cynthia Wills appeals the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice the
    breach-of-contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    raised in her first amended complaint against First Republic Bank pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss
    under Rule 12(b)(6), Judd v. Weinstein, 
    967 F.3d 952
    , 955 (9th Cir. 2020), and
    review for abuse of discretion the court’s decision to dismiss Wills’s claims with
    prejudice, Chappel v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 
    232 F.3d 719
    , 725 (9th Cir. 2000). We
    affirm.
    “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
    matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). A plausible claim requires “more than an unadorned, the-
    defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and “a formulaic recitation of the
    elements of a cause of action will not do.” 
    Id. at 678
     (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    ). Likewise, conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences will not defeat
    a motion to dismiss. Sanders v. Brown, 
    504 F.3d 903
    , 910 (9th Cir. 2007).
    To plead a breach-of-contract claim under California law, Wills was required
    to allege facts supporting: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s
    performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
    1
    All parties to this case consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
    2
    resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 
    250 P.3d 1115
    , 1121 (Cal. 2011). To plead an NIED claim under California law, Wills must
    allege facts supporting: (1) a duty of care owed to her by First Republic Bank, (2) a
    breach of that duty by First Republic Bank, (3) that First Republic Bank’s breach
    caused her injury, and (4) damages. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Renz, 
    795 F. Supp. 2d 898
    , 924–25 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 
    349 F.3d 1191
    , 1203
    (9th Cir. 2003)). Wills did not plead facts to support all the elements of either claim.
    Instead, Wills did what Twombly and Iqbal forbid: she recited the elements of
    breach-of-contract and negligence and concluded that First Republic harmed her,
    without providing supporting factual allegations. Accordingly, the district court did
    not err by dismissing her claims.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Wills’s claims
    with prejudice. The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly
    broad where the plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint. Chodos v. W.
    Publ’g Co., 
    292 F.3d 992
    , 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). Before dismissing Wills’s claims
    with prejudice, the district court allowed her to file an amended complaint and
    provided her “with notice of the deficiencies in [her] complaint in order to ensure
    that” Wills would use “the opportunity to amend effectively.” See Akhtar v. Mesa,
    
    698 F.3d 1202
    , 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Wills did not address the deficiencies in her
    complaint despite the district court’s step-by-step guidance. We cannot say the court
    3
    abused its discretion in then dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. See
    Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 
    794 F.3d 1136
    , 1144 (9th Cir. 2015).
    AFFIRMED.
    4