Demetrius Wilson v. Jeffrey Alvarez , 694 F. App'x 497 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEMETRIUS ANTWAN WILSON, No. 16-17151
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02096-JAT-DMF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY ALVAREZ, Medical Director; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
Circuit Judges.
Demetrius Antwan Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations related to
his medical needs in county jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213
F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by the
record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claims against Maricopa
County Correctional Health Services, Maricopa County Jail, Maricopa County
hospital, and Maricopa County, because Wilson failed to allege facts sufficient to
show that a policy or custom of the county caused him to suffer constitutional
injury. See Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (pleading
requirements for a liability claim against a county under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claim against the Superior
Court of Maricopa County as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Greater
L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (suit
against superior court was suit against the state, which was barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Massengill v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., 3
Ariz. App. 588, 591 (1966) (“There is but one Superior Court in the State of
Arizona”) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 1)).
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claims against Maricopa
County judges Mahoney and Mroz, and attorneys Flaggman, Mack, Leiter, and
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Mundell, on the basis of judicial and prosecutorial immunity. See Ashelman v.
Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (judges are immune from suit
for acts performed in their official capacity); Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837
(9th Cir. 1991) (government attorneys are entitled to immunity for acts intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the litigation).
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claims against Provider
Balaji, Jane Doe, Medical Director Alvarez, Lieutenant Karas, and Provider
Phillip, because under any applicable standard, Wilson failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that these defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk
to Wilson’s health and safety. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“A prison official acts with deliberate indifference ... only if the [prison
official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety”;
neither a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere
negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference);
Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee’s
claim of medical deliberate indifference is analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, but
same standards apply); cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-
71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (setting forth elements of Fourteenth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim by pretrial detainee).
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Dismissal of Wilson’s claims against Provider Pam and the Special
Response Team was proper because Wilson failed to allege facts sufficient to show
deliberate indifference or an unreasonable seizure. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057;
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1997).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Wilson’s claims
against Nurse Paula, Provider Barker, and Detention Officer B8902 as duplicative.
See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[p]laintiffs generally have no
right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the
same time in the same court and against the same defendant” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir.
1995) (“There is no abuse of discretion where a district court dismisses under §
1915(d) a complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s due process claim against
Officer B8902 and Sergeant Sanchez because Wilson failed to allege facts
sufficient to show a protected liberty interest. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d
850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a
specific prison grievance procedure” (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640
(9th Cir. 1988)).
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Dismissal of Wilson’s claims against Detention Officer B2912 was proper
because Wilson failed to allege facts sufficient to show the infliction of severe
psychological pain or deliberate indifference. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (allegation that prison guard entered cell while prisoner
was on the toilet and rubbed his thigh did not rise to the level of severe
psychological pain required to state an Eighth Amendment claim); McGuckin v.
Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) overruled on other grounds by WMX
Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A serious medical need
exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson leave to
amend his complaint. See Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149,
1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[t]he
district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint”).
AFFIRMED.
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