Pia Beaty v. Santa Rosa III Hoa , 599 F. App'x 314 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PIA D. BEATY, Nos. 13-17499
14-15100
Plaintiff - Appellant,
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01807-RCJ-NJK
v.
SANTA ROSA III HOA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2015**
Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Pia D. Beaty appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
state laws and the district court’s subsequent award of attorney’s fees to defendant.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.6
(9th Cir. 2004). We review for an abuse of discretion an award of attorney’s fees
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Price v. State of
Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1991). We affirm as to the judgment and
vacate as to the attorney’s fees.
In No. 13-17499, the district court properly dismissed Beaty’s complaint for
failure to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Poulos v. Caesars
World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2004) (there is no jurisdiction where a
claim “appear[s] to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 664
(9th Cir. 2002) (if a district court dismisses federal claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court has no discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims); Price, 939 F.2d at 707-08 (under § 1983, “private
parties are not generally acting under color of state law”).
Contrary to Beaty’s contention, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Beaty’s complaint without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review); see also
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per
2 13-17499
curiam) (discussing the factors that weigh against granting leave to amend,
including bad faith and prejudice to defendant).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Beaty’s motions for
disqualification of opposing counsel because the record supports the denial. See
Cohn v. Rosenfeld, 733 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1984) (this court “will not disturb a
district court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel if the record reveals any
sound basis for the court’s action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng’r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.
1983) (setting forth standard of review).
In No. 14-15100, the district court did abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees for defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 42
U.S.C. § 1988 after dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entering
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 292-93 (9th
Cir. 1995) (attorney’s fees cannot be awarded under § 1988 following a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Beaty’s motions, filed August 9, 2014 and January 27, 2015, are denied as
unnecessary.
Appeal No. 13-17499: AFFIRMED.
Appeal No. 14-15100: VACATED.
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