Freedom Foundation v. Wa State Dep't of Labor & Indu ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 7 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FREEDOM FOUNDATION, a                            No.   21-35342
    Washington State Nonprofit Corporation,
    D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05937-BJR
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT
    OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES, a
    Washington government agency;
    HEATHER NORMOYLE, in her official
    capacity; ELIZABETH SMITH, in her
    official capacity,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 10, 2022
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: BYBEE, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Freedom Foundation’s canvassers were ejected from the second-floor terrace
    in the Washington Department of Labor and Industries’ (L&I’s) Tumwater
    Headquarters on June 27, 2019 pursuant to L&I’s Policy 5.04. Under the policy,
    outside groups wishing to use the space for an event must make a request in
    writing and the event must not conflict with a previously scheduled activity.
    Freedom Foundation sued, arguing that Policy 5.04 violates its First Amendment
    free speech rights. The district court granted summary judgment to L&I. We
    affirm.
    The parties disagree about whether the second-floor terrace is a designated
    or a nonpublic forum. We need not decide the category of the forum because
    Freedom Foundation’s First Amendment claim would fail even under the more
    exacting test for restrictions on forum access. If, as Freedom Foundation argues,
    the second-floor terrace is a designated public forum, Policy 5.04’s scheduling
    requirement is permissible if it is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.
    See Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 
    682 F.3d 789
    , 802–03 (9th Cir. 2012). “Such
    restrictions are constitutionally valid if they are (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly
    tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ‘ample
    alternatives for communication.’” United States v. Griefen, 
    200 F.3d 1256
    , 1260
    (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Linick, 
    195 F.3d 538
    , 543 (9th Cir.
    2
    1999)). First, Policy 5.04’s scheduling requirement is content neutral because it
    “serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression.” See Ward v. Rock
    Against Racism, 
    491 U.S. 781
    , 791 (1989). The object of the scheduling
    requirement is not to exclude speech of a particular content, but to minimize
    conflicting uses in limited space and to avoid interference with agency business.
    See Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 803. Second, Policy 5.04 is narrowly tailored to
    further this compelling interest because it requires an applicant to request the space
    in advance by submitting a facility use application and allows L&I to deny an
    application if it conflicts with a previously scheduled activity or would interfere
    with agency business. Finally, the policy leaves open ample alternatives for
    communication—Freedom Foundation, like other outside groups, could have
    secured permission to use the second-floor terrace at a different time had it
    submitted a request to reserve the space for a time when no other activity was
    previously scheduled for the space.
    Freedom Foundation also argues that Policy 5.04 is an unconstitutional prior
    restraint because L&I’s failure to define “use,” “event,” and “activity” grants
    decision makers unbridled discretion. This argument is unavailing. “[U]ncertainty
    at a [policy’s] margins will not warrant facial invalidation if it is clear what the
    [policy] proscribes ‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’” Gospel
    3
    Missions of Am., a Religious Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 
    419 F.3d 1042
    , 1047
    (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 
    271 F.3d 1141
    ,
    1151 (9th Cir. 2001)).
    AFFIRMED.
    4