United States v. Adriana Navarrete , 697 F. App'x 536 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 14 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50194
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:15-cr-00596-BEN-5
v.
ADRIANA NAVARRETE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 10, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
“We review the district court’s interpretation of the [U.S. Sentencing]
Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of
the case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
error.” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The record establishes that the district court considered the enumerated
factors in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 when assessing whether Navarrete
should receive a sentence reduction for playing a minor role in the offense. See
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C) (2015). Defense counsel listed all five factors in the
guidelines commentary, and the district court stated that it had “considered the
application notes of 3B1.2.” “We assume that district judges know the law and
understand their obligation to consider all of the [sentencing] factors.” United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). “The district court need not tick
off each of the [sentencing] factors to show that it has considered them.” Id. The
district court did not improperly rely solely upon Navarrete’s “essential role” in the
conspiracy, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a minor role sentence
reduction.
2. There is no doubt that Navarrete knew the laundered funds were the
proceeds of cocaine sales or were intended to promote the distribution of cocaine.
The district court therefore properly applied a six-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1).
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3. Navarrete entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). The district court was not bound by its terms,
compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), and at her
change-of-plea hearing, Navarrete confirmed that she understood the nature of her
agreement. When the district court rejected the plea agreement, it provided a
robust explanation of the nature of the offense and Navarrete’s role. There was
thus no error in the district court’s rejection of Navarrete’s plea agreement.
4. All arguments raised for the first time in Navarrete’s reply brief are
waived. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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