Vannessa Luu v. Hewlett-Packard Co , 599 F. App'x 636 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 23 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
VANNESSA LUU, No. 13-15118
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:11-cv-02133-EJD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 12, 2015
San Francisco California
Before: McKEOWN, MURGUIA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Vannessa Luu appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Hewlett-Packard Company on her California and federal law retaliation claims.
We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Reviewing de novo, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2000),
we conclude that the evidence presented to the district court was sufficient to
establish “a causal link between” her protected activities and her termination.
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). Under both
federal and California law, a prima facie case can be established by “circumstantial
evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in
protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the
allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376
(9th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); accord Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69-70
(2000).
Luu’s declaration states that she lodged complaints with her supervisors
about gender discrimination, racial discrimination, and accounting irregularities
shortly before Hewlett-Packard terminated her employment. In light of the close
proximity between these claims and the termination, these allegations are sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination. See Coszalter v. City of
Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that, “[d]epending on the
circumstances,” an adverse employment action “three to eight months” after the
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employee engaged in a protected activity “is easily within a time range that can
support an inference of retaliation”).
The district court correctly concluded, however, that Luu failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hewlett-Packard’s
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s]” for her termination were “pretext.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973). The record
developed in the district court does not include “specific and substantial
circumstantial evidence” that Hewlett-Packard’s “true cause for firing [Luu] was
unlawful retaliation.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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