Glenn Eagleman v. Rocky Boys Chippewa-Cree , 699 F. App'x 599 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 21 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GLENN EAGLEMAN; et al.,                         No.    15-36003
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 4:14-cv-00073-BMM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ROCKY BOYS CHIPPEWA-CREE
    TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE OR
    COUNCIL, Richard Morsette, Chairman; et
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 6, 2017
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: FERNANDEZ, CALLAHAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    Appellants Glenn Eagleman, Celesia Eagleman, and Theresa Small
    (collectively, the “Eaglemans”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing their
    claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Appellees Rocky Boys
    Chippewa-Cree Tribal Business Committee or Council, et al. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    to determine our own jurisdiction, United States v. Ruiz, 
    536 U.S. 622
    , 628 (2002),
    we review the district court’s order dismissing a case under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b) de novo, Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 
    464 F.3d 1044
    , 1046 (9th
    Cir. 2006), and we affirm.
    I.
    The Eaglemans seek a declaratory judgment that the tribal court of the
    Chippewa Cree Tribe (the “Tribe”) erred in dismissing its common law claims
    against a tribal housing authority and two of its employees on the ground of tribal
    sovereign immunity. Because this Court, like the district court, is a court of
    limited jurisdiction, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 
    437 U.S. 365
    , 374
    (1978), we may only consider the Eaglemans’ claims if their complaint pleads
    allegations that support federal subject matter jurisdiction, see Okla. Tax Comm’n
    v. Graham, 
    489 U.S. 838
    , 840–41 (1989).
    The Eaglemans invoke federal jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , asserting
    that tribal sovereign immunity is a “federal question.”1 To be sure, tribal sovereign
    immunity is a matter of federal law, Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok
    Indians, 
    832 F.3d 1011
    , 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2016), and questions of the scope of
    tribal sovereignty are, in certain circumstances, reviewable in federal court, see
    1
    The district court assumed jurisdiction, but held that sovereign immunity
    precluded the Eaglemans’ suit.
    2
    Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
    471 U.S. 845
    , 852 (1985).
    For example, a tribal court’s assertion of jurisdiction over a non-tribal-member is a
    question that is answered “by reference to federal law and is a ‘federal question’
    under § 1331.” Id. But here, Appellees are not non-tribal-members; they are part
    of the Chippewa-Cree Tribe. Nor is there any suggestion that the tribal court
    lacked jurisdiction over the Eaglemans’ claims. To the contrary, the Eaglemans
    both sought and submitted to the tribal court’s jurisdiction.
    The Eaglemans insist that asserting tribal sovereign immunity suffices to
    invoke federal question jurisdiction. But tribal immunity arises as a defense to
    suit, meaning it “does not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”
    Bodi, 832 F.3d at 1023 n.16 (citing Graham, 
    489 U.S. at 841
    ); see also Morongo
    Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 
    858 F.2d 1376
    , 1386
    (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that tribal sovereign immunity arose there “only by way of
    defense”). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a claim must actually arise
    under federal law to trigger jurisdiction under § 1331. See Graham, 
    489 U.S. at
    840–41. A litigant may not plead his way into federal court by asserting an
    opposing party’s federal defense. See 
    id.
    Here, tribal sovereign immunity arose as a defense in tribal court, and the
    allegation that the tribal court erred in applying the defense is not a question
    “arising under” federal law for purposes of § 1331. Cf. id. The Eaglemans’ lone
    3
    affirmative claim—that the tribal appellate court erroneously “put them out of
    court”—is not a question of federal law, and so cannot supply the requisite federal
    hook for purposes of § 1331.
    The Eaglemans essentially ask the district court to sit as a general appellate
    body to review the decision of the tribal court. This miscomprehends the
    relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. Tribal courts are
    not vertically aligned under the federal judicial hierarchy. They are institutions
    within coordinate sovereign entities vested with the power to regulate internal
    tribal affairs. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 
    480 U.S. 9
    , 14–15 (1987).
    Asserting jurisdiction here would effectively expand this court’s authority to
    superintend matters of tribal self-governance. And because we lack general
    appellate power over the tribal court, we would be unable to afford effective relief
    to the Eaglemans even if we determined that the tribal court erred.
    II.
    Although the district court exceeded its authority in considering the
    Eaglemans’ declaratory judgment action because it lacked jurisdiction to do so, it
    arrived at the correct result in dismissing the Eaglemans’ suit. The judgment of the
    district court is therefore
    AFFIRMED.
    4