Lance McDermott v. USPS , 700 F. App'x 701 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 31 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LANCE McDERMOTT,                                No. 16-35630
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00377-JCC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
    also known as USPS; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 23, 2017**
    Before:      McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Lance McDermott appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his action alleging various claims arising from his employment at the
    United States Postal Service (“USPS”). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on the basis of claim
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    preclusion. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 
    297 F.3d 953
    , 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We
    affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed McDermott’s action because
    McDermott’s claims were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions
    between the parties or those in privity with them, and those prior actions resulted in
    final judgments on the merits. See 
    id.
     (setting forth elements of claim preclusion);
    see also Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
    322 F.3d 1064
    , 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when the parties are not identical, privity
    may exist if there is substantial identity between parties, that is, when there is
    sufficient commonality of interest.” (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    To the extent that McDermott alleged a violation of the Hatch Act, the
    district court properly dismissed the claim because McDermott failed to allege
    facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-
    42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a
    plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim
    for relief).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in declaring McDermott a
    vexatious litigant and imposing a pre-filing order against him because it gave
    McDermott notice and an opportunity to be heard, developed an adequate record
    2                                     16-35630
    for review, made findings regarding his frivolous litigation history, and narrowly
    tailored the restriction in the pre-filing order. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty
    Corp., 
    500 F.3d 1047
    , 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review
    and factors a district court must consider before imposing a pre-filing restriction on
    a vexatious litigant).
    All requests set forth in McDermott’s reply brief, including his request for
    appointment of counsel, are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    16-35630
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-35630

Citation Numbers: 700 F. App'x 701

Filed Date: 10/31/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023