Catherine Woolsey v. Jp Morgan Ventures Energy Corp , 691 F. App'x 308 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CATHERINE WOOLSEY; et al., No. 15-56697
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
3:15-cv-00530-WQH-BGS
v.
J.P. MORGAN VENTURES ENERGY MEMORANDUM *
CORPORATION and JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RICE,*** Chief District
Judge.
This appeal requires us to again consider the application of the filed rate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, Chief United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
doctrine to claims involving California’s wholesale electricity market. Plaintiffs-
Appellants Catherine Woolsey, Carol Ball, and Rachel Reidinger (“Plaintiffs”)
appeal the dismissal of their Complaint against Defendants-Appellees J.P. Morgan
Ventures Energy Corporation (“JPM Ventures”) and its parent company,
JPMorgan Chase & Company. Plaintiffs sought damages in a civil action under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961, et seq., alleging that JPM Ventures fraudulently manipulated rates in
California’s wholesale electricity market, resulting in higher electricity costs for
retail consumers. The district court held that the filed rate doctrine barred
Plaintiffs’ RICO claim.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
Our court has had numerous occasions to reaffirm the reach of the filed rate
doctrine’s formidable barrier to suit in cases involving California’s wholesale
electricity market. See, e.g., Wah Chang v. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC,
507 F.3d 1222, 1225-27 (9th Cir. 2007); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v.
Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 760-62 (9th Cir. 2004); Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1 of Grays Harbor Cty. Wash. v. Idacorp Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 650-52 (9th Cir.
2004); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 852-53 (9th Cir.
1
Plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s alternative ground for dismissal. We
need not reach that issue because the filed rate doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
2
2004); Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918,
929-33 (9th Cir. 2002). In our most recent foray in this area, we held that the
doctrine barred a claim virtually identical to the one asserted by Plaintiffs. See
Wah Chang, 507 F.3d at 1225-27 (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred a retail
electricity consumer’s civil RICO claim seeking damages for increased electricity
costs allegedly caused by defendants’ fraudulent manipulation of wholesale
electricity rates).
Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the filed rate doctrine should not apply here
in light of our decision in Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc., 705 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.
2012). In Carlin, we declined to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar RICO claims
arising from alleged price manipulation in the milk industry because the rate-
setting agency had explicitly rejected the relevant rates as resulting from fraud and
attempted to recalculate them. Id. at 873-83. We carefully cabined our holding in
Carlin to the particular facts presented, however, and specifically indicated that our
reasoning in that case would not extend to claims involving rates set by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission—the rate-setting agency in the present case. See
id. at 875 (“Obviously, where the controlling statute prohibits the federal agency
from altering a filed rate retroactively [as the Natural Gas Act2 does for FERC]. . . ,
2
The present case involves FERC’s regulatory authority under the Federal Power
Act rather than the Natural Gas Act, but the two statutes are “substantially
3
then the agency cannot effectively suspend or set aside the published rates for
purposes of a lawsuit seeking recovery based on injuries arising from the
imposition of those rates.”); id. at 879 (“[T]his case presents a narrow exception to
the general rule that the filed rate doctrine not only applies but functions so as to
bar . . . price-related claims [involving federally regulated milk rates].”). On its
face, Carlin thus does not encompass claims involving FERC-approved rates.
Plaintiffs’ other attempts to evade the doctrine are similarly unavailing. Try
as they might to distinguish their claim for relief from actions we have barred in
the past, Plaintiffs cannot escape the fact that they—like those who have come
before them—fundamentally allege that the FERC-approved electricity rates in
California’s wholesale market were, for a time, too high. Our precedents make
clear that the “only avenue” for such a complaint, however framed, “[is] with
FERC.” Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 653; Snohomish, 384 F.3d at 762 (“FERC
approved tariffs that governed the California wholesale electricity markets.
Therefore, if the prices in those markets were not just and reasonable or if the
defendants sold electricity in violation of the filed tariffs, [plaintiff’s] only option
is to seek a remedy before FERC.”).
AFFIRMED.
identical.” Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 649 n.8 (quoting Ark. La. Gas. Co. v. Hall,
453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981)).
4