Jerry Gilliam v. Debbie Magistrado , 691 F. App'x 837 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 30 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JERRY GILLIAM,                                  No. 16-15081
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01271-TLN-CKD
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DEBBIE SUE MAGISTRADO; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 24, 2017**
    Before:      THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
    Circuit Judges.
    Jerry Gilliam appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his diversity action alleging state law claims arising from a custody dispute. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a district court’s
    dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Gilliam’s action as barred by the
    doctrine of res judicata because Gilliam’s claims were raised, or could have been
    raised, in a prior action between the parties that resulted in a final judgment. See
    Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 
    604 F.3d 1142
    , 1148-49,
    1149 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law
    and explaining that it bars subsequent litigation of claims that were raised and
    claims that could have been raised in the prior action); see also Stewart v. U.S.
    Bancorp, 
    297 F.3d 953
    , 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a dismissal for failure
    to state a claim constitutes a final judgment on the merits).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Gilliam’s action
    without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Serra v.
    Lappin, 
    600 F.3d 1191
    , 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and
    explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gilliam’s motion
    for a new trial or to amend the judgment because Gilliam failed to establish any
    basis for such relief. See State of Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal
    Packaging, Inc., 
    425 F.3d 708
    , 718 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard of review); see also
    2                                     16-15081
    Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th
    Cir. 1993) (setting forth grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
    We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in
    the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Aulakh’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 5) is granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                  16-15081