Chauncey Mann, III v. Structured Asset Mtge Inv. II , 692 F. App'x 416 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 5 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHAUNCEY LUTHER MANN, III,                      No. 15-56379
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:14-cv-01723-JGB-SP
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE
    INVESTMENT II TRUST 2007-AR3,
    MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
    CERTIFICATES SERIES 2007-AR3; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 24, 2017**
    Before:      THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
    Circuit Judges.
    Chauncey Luther Mann, III, appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    Dumas v. Kipp, 
    90 F.3d 386
    , 389 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Mann’s Truth in Lending Act
    (“TILA”) and Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) rescission
    claim, and fraud claims seeking declaratory relief, because these claims are time-
    barred. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 1635
    (f) (borrower has three years to rescind under TILA);
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1640
    (e) (one-year statute of limitations for TILA and HOEPA
    damages claim); 
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 337
    (1), (3) (four-year statute of
    limitations for action seeking rescission based on fraud); Miguel v. Country
    Funding Corp., 
    309 F.3d 1161
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (borrower’s rescission under
    TILA not effective when it was not provided to the lender within three years, even
    though servicer received the notice within the three-year window).
    The district court properly dismissed Mann’s quiet title claim because
    Mann’s failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (plaintiff must plead sufficient factual
    matter to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is
    liable).
    The district court properly dismissed Mann’s claim related to the
    securitization of his loan because Mann has not established that he has standing to
    2                                     15-56379
    bring such a claim. See Hess v. Ford Motor Co., 
    41 P.3d 46
    , 51 (Cal. 2002) (third
    party may enforce a contract only if the contract was made for its benefit); see also
    Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 
    365 P.3d 845
    , 858 (Cal. 2016) (plaintiff
    bringing wrongful foreclosure claim has standing only when challenging a void
    assignment).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mann leave to
    amend because amendment would be futile. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health
    Plan, Inc., 
    244 F.3d 708
    , 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review); Dumas, 
    90 F.3d at 389
     (leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to set
    aside default because it properly found that defendants established meritorious
    defenses. See United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle,
    
    615 F.3d 1085
    , 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth the three-factor test to
    determine whether good cause exists to set aside default and noting that to
    establish a meritorious defense, a party only has to “allege sufficient facts that, if
    true, would constitute a defense”); Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests.
    Grp., Inc., 
    375 F.3d 922
    , 925 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).
    We reject as without merit Mann’s contentions that the district court was
    biased against him.
    We do not consider Mann’s contentions regarding the district court’s order
    3                                     15-56379
    denying Mann’s motion for reconsideration because Mann failed to file a new or
    amended notice of appeal after the district court issued this order. See Fed. R.
    App. P. 4(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the
    judgment or order appealed from).
    Mann’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 34) is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   15-56379