Daniel Alexandruk v. Jefferson Sessions , 692 F. App'x 418 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 6 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DANIEL ALEXANDRUK; TEREZA                       No.    13-73609
    ALEXANDRUK,
    Agency Nos.       A088-537-682
    Petitioners,                                      A088-537-683
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 18, 2017**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE,*** Senior District
    Judge.
    Daniel Alexandruk (Alexandruk) and his wife, Tereza Alexandruk, petition
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
    for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an
    Immigration Judge’s denial of their joint application for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because
    Tereza Alexandruk’s claim is derivative of her husband’s, we focus on his
    eligibility. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.21
    (a). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), and we deny the petition for review.
    (1) The BIA’s denial of asylum is free from legal error. Despite
    Alexandruk’s protestations to the contrary, the BIA did not require him to show
    continuing injury from his alleged past persecution and did consider the cumulative
    effects of his mistreatment, the fact that he was a child when much of the alleged
    mistreatment occurred, his psychological harm, and other evidence in the record.
    (2) The BIA’s denial of asylum is supported by substantial evidence. See
    Ling Huang v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2014). Alexandruk did not
    establish that he suffered past persecution on account of his religion or perceived
    ethnicity. “Persecution is an extreme concept that means something considerably
    more than discrimination or harassment.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 
    553 F.3d 1206
    ,
    1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although there is
    evidence that Alexandruk was bullied by other children, a teacher, and coworkers,
    even considering all of the incidents cumulatively and taking his youth into
    consideration, the record does not compel a conclusion that his mistreatment rose
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    to the level of persecution. See id.; cf. Halim v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 971
    , 975–76 (9th
    Cir. 2009); Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 
    333 F.3d 1012
    , 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Because Alexandruk did not suffer past persecution, he must show a well-
    founded fear of future persecution. See Halim, 
    590 F.3d at 976
    . The behavior
    Alexandruk fears—that he may experience difficulty gaining a job or be assigned
    less-desirable tasks because of his religion or perceived nationality—does not rise
    to the level of persecution. Because Alexandruk did not suffer past persecution
    and did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, he is not entitled to
    asylum. See Hanna v. Keisler, 
    506 F.3d 933
    , 937 (9th Cir. 2007).
    (3) Because Alexandruk is not eligible for asylum, he is also not eligible for
    withholding of removal. See Halaim v. I.N.S., 
    358 F.3d 1128
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (“[F]ailure to satisfy the lower standard of proof required to establish eligibility for
    asylum . . . necessarily results in a failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding
    of deportation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    (4) Alexandruk did not present his claim for humanitarian asylum to the
    BIA. That claim is therefore not exhausted and we do not have jurisdiction to
    consider it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 674
    , 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
    (5) The BIA’s denial of CAT relief is supported by substantial evidence.
    “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include
    lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . .” 8
    
    3 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(2). Alexandruk did not present evidence that it is more likely
    than not that he would be tortured if returned to the Czech Republic. See Tamang
    v. Holder, 
    598 F.3d 1083
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2010).
    DENIED.
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