United States v. Daniel Lopez-Betancourt , 621 F. App'x 473 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 29 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10406
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00075-TLN-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DANIEL OMAR LOPEZ-
BETANCOURT, AKA Daniel Nicholas
Lopez, AKA Daniel Omar Lopez, AKA
Juan F. Munoz, AKA Juan Francisco
Munoz,
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10407
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00230-TLN-1
v.
DANIEL OMAR LOPEZ-
BETANCOURT, AKA Daniel Nicholas
Lopez, AKA Daniel Omar Lopez, AKA
Juan F. Munoz, AKA Juan Francisco
Munoz,
Defendant - Appellant.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: CHRISTEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE,*** Senior
District Judge.
Daniel Omar Lopez-Betancourt pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his
supervised release and illegally reentering the United States after being deported
following a felony conviction. Lopez-Betancourt appeals, arguing that: (1) the
district court abused its discretion by requiring him to use the services of an
interpreter; (2) the district court abused its discretion by ordering his sentences
to run consecutively rather than concurrently; and (3) his sentence was
substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.1
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
1
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will not recount them
here.
2
Where “ability to communicate [is] not inhibited by language problems,
appointment of an interpreter [is] within the district court’s discretion.” United
States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Petrosian, 126
F.3d 1232, 1235 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). After proceeding without an interpreter,
Lopez-Betancourt requested an interpreter at a change-of-plea hearing. The court
warned Lopez-Betancourt that from that point forward he would have to proceed
with an interpreter to avoid unnecessary “back and forth.” Lopez-Betancourt
agreed. One month later at a status hearing, Lopez-Betancourt changed his mind
about the interpreter and requested to speak directly to the court. Given Lopez-
Betancourt’s prior agreement to use an interpreter in all subsequent proceedings,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing an interpreter or in
denying Lopez-Betancourt’s attempt to waive use of an interpreter. Moreover,
even if Lopez-Betancourt’s later request to proceed without the interpreter should
have been granted, Lopez-Betancourt has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced
in any way by the use of an interpreter.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering Lopez-Betancourt’s
sentences to run consecutively. “[I]n determining whether the terms imposed are to
be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, [the court] shall consider . . . the
factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). But the district court
3
need not “tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered
them.” See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Here the district court stated that its sentencing determination was based on “the
defendant’s criminal history” and “his level of involvement” in the crimes. This
sentencing statement was consistent with §§ 3553(a) and 3584(b), and the decision
to allow the sentences to run consecutively was not an abuse of discretion.
The district court’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. Lopez-
Betancourt claims that the district court sentence was substantively unreasonable
because the court did not consider potential mitigating factors. There is no support
in the record for this assertion. The district court stated that it reviewed the case in
detail and specifically referred to the background information provided by
probation and defendant’s counsel. Lopez-Betancourt’s sentence was at the low
end of the Guideline range. Given Lopez-Betancourt’s history of repeated
deportations and serious criminal violations, his sentence was not unreasonable.
AFFIRMED
4