Jamisi Calloway v. Rangel , 624 F. App'x 607 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMISI JERMAINE CALLOWAY, No. 14-17245
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00193-GSA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RANGEL, Sergeant; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted December 9, 2015**
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Jamisi Jermaine Calloway, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
Calloway consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2003 alleged excessive force incident. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.
2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382
F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of a statute of limitations).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Calloway’s action because, even with
the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Calloway failed to file his
action within the applicable statute of limitations and failed to demonstrate he was
entitled to equitable tolling. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1 (two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year tolling period due to
incarceration); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007)
(forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to
§ 1983 actions); see also Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1999)
(three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California; plaintiff was not entitled to
equitable tolling where “actions were not a reasonable and good faith effort to
pursue his claims in an alternate forum or case” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Thomas v. Gilliland, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 524 (Ct. App. 2002)
(“In the absence of a statute, a party cannot deduct from the period of the statute of
limitations applicable to his case the time consumed by the pendency of an action
2 14-17245
in which he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but which was dismissed
without prejudice to him.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject Calloway’s contentions that his claims are not time-barred due to
his pro se status, or because of his alleged incapacitation after the statute of
limitations had already expired.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-17245