Madhuri Trivedi v. Usdhs , 711 F. App'x 827 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MADHURI TRIVEDI, No. 17-15217
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01122-JD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Madhuri Trivedi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from the denial of her I-140
immigrant visa petitions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Trivedi’s
request for oral argument, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, is denied.
review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), Fajardo
v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999), and under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Carolina
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014). We may
affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys.,
LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Trivedi’s claims under (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (unfair
immigration-related employment practices), (2) the Health Insurance Portability &
Accountability Act, (3) the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 299b-22, (4) the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a, (5) 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512, 1513 & 1621, and (6) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, was
proper because Trivedi failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for
relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) (“To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Fajardo, 179 F.3d at 699 (“A judgment on the pleadings is
properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s
pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
The district court properly dismissed Trivedi’s False Claims Act cause of
action because none of the defendants is alleged to be a government contractor or
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to otherwise have presented false claims to the government. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting knowingly presenting to the government a “false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Trivedi’s claim
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, for review of defendant
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (“USCIS”) denials of
Trivedi’s I-140 visa petitions, because the complaint failed to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s requirement of a short and plain statement of the
claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . .”); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674
(9th Cir. 1981) (complaint that is “verbose, confusing and almost entirely
conclusory” violates Rule 8); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“We review dismissal of a complaint with prejudice for failure to
comply with a court’s order to amend the complaint to comply with Rule 8 for
abuse of discretion.”).
We reject as without merit Trivedi’s contention that the district court was
required to hold a hearing or oral argument before ruling on defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and Trivedi’s contentions regarding alleged judicial bias.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
The court’s July 27, 2017 order denying Trivedi’s emergency motions for
injunctive relief and sanctions (Docket Entry No. 56) stated that no motions for
reconsideration, clarification, or modification of these denials would be filed or
entertained. Accordingly, we do not consider Trivedi’s motions for rehearing en
banc and for “initial hearing en banc” of the July 27, 2017 order (Docket Entry
Nos. 58, 59, 63).
Trivedi’s motion to accept electronically filed briefs (Docket Entry No. 62)
is denied as moot.
Trivedi’s motion to expedite oral argument and decision in this matter
(Docket Entry No. 63) is denied as moot.
All other pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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