Angel Carbajal v. Robert Neuschmid ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 28 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANGEL CARBAJAL,                                  No.    17-17443
    Petitioner-Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01127-JKS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ROBERT NEUSCHMID, Warden,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 9, 2019
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Angel Carbajal, a state prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas corpus petition challenging his state conviction on one
    count of making a criminal threat. Carbajal argues the trial court improperly joined
    that count with two unrelated counts and that he was prejudiced by the joinder.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Carbajal petitioned for habeas relief to the California Supreme Court, which
    summarily denied the petition in a single-line order with citation to two cases.
    People v. Carbajal, No. C073292, 
    2014 WL 660141
    , at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 21,
    2014) (“The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall
    (1995) 
    9 Cal. 4th 464
    , 474; In re Swain (1949) 
    34 Cal. 2d 300
    , 304.)”). We read
    the citations to Swain and Duvall to mean the California Supreme Court denied
    Carbajal’s habeas application on a procedural ground—because he had not pleaded
    facts with sufficient particularity—and did not render a decision on the merits.
    Cross v. Sisto, 
    676 F.3d 1172
    , 1177 (9th Cir. 2012); Seeboth v. Allenby, 
    789 F.3d 1099
    , 1104, n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). “Where, as here, there is no state court decision
    on the merits, the district court reviews the merits de novo.” Scott v. Ryan, 
    686 F.3d 1130
    , 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).
    Carbajal contends the state violated his due process rights at his second trial
    by consolidating counts related to two different, though similar, incidents.
    Carbajal argues the state consolidated two weak cases to make a stronger case.
    Carbajal notes the state presented the same evidence regarding the count of
    conviction at both trials, but the first jury deadlocked on that count while the
    second jury found him guilty. Carbajal argues the only difference between the
    trials was the consolidation at the second trial of two additional counts for an
    2
    unrelated incident. As to those two additional counts, the jury in the second trial
    found Carbajal not guilty of one and deadlocked on the other.
    The court may grant habeas relief for improper consolidation “only ‘if the
    joinder resulted in an unfair trial. There is no prejudicial constitutional violation
    unless simultaneous trial of more than one offense . . . actually render[ed]
    petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.’”
    Davis v. Woodford, 
    384 F.3d 628
    , 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sandoval v.
    Calderon, 
    241 F.3d 765
    , 771–72 (9th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original).
    Unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation only “if the impermissible
    joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
    verdict.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Sandoval, 
    241 F.3d at 772
    ).
    In evaluating prejudice, the court considers several factors to determine
    whether the jury properly compartmentalized the evidence rather than considered it
    cumulatively. Bean v. Calderon, 
    163 F.3d 1073
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). These
    factors include whether each crime was simple and distinct, cross-admissibility,
    similarity of the cases, strength of the evidence, relative strengths of the joined
    cases, jury instructions to consider the evidence of each count separately from the
    evidence of the other counts, and a verdict indicating the jury was able to
    compartmentalize—such as, in particular, an acquittal on the counts alleged to be
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    prejudicial. See id.; Sandoval, 
    241 F.3d at 772
    ; Davis, 
    384 F.3d at
    638–39; United
    States v. Johnson, 
    820 F.2d 1065
    , 1069–70 (9th Cir. 1987); Featherstone v. Estelle,
    
    948 F.2d 1497
    , 1503–04 (9th Cir. 1991); Park v. California, 
    202 F.3d 1146
    ,
    1149–50 (9th Cir. 2000). “[T]he failure of the jury to convict on all counts is ‘the
    best evidence of the jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence’” and assess
    the evidence related to another charge separately. Park, 
    202 F.3d at 1150
     (quoting
    United States v. Baker, 
    10 F.3d 1374
    , 1387 (9th Cir.1993)); Featherstone, 
    948 F.2d at
    1503–04; see Bean, 
    163 F.3d at
    1085–86 (“[N]o such acquittal offered
    affirmative evidence of the jury’s ability to assess the [] evidence separately.”).
    Here, the acquittal on one joined charge and a failure to convict on the other
    joined charge suggests that the jury was able to assess the evidence related to the
    charges separately, and thus that there was no prejudice from joinder. Carbajal
    threatened a neighbor, and allegedly his brother on a different date in a different
    location, with a knife while yelling at each man that the man had killed Carbajal’s
    daughter. The jury convicted him only of the single count related to his neighbor.
    On the two counts involving his brother that form the basis of Carbajal’s claim of
    prejudice, the jury found him not guilty of one and deadlocked on the second. The
    jury’s failure to convict is the best evidence of both its ability to compartmentalize
    and that Carbajal was not prejudiced by the consolidation. Park, 
    202 F.3d at 1150
    .
    4
    Though the judge did not give a limiting instruction and the prosecutor urged the
    jury to consider both of the similar incidents, the alleged crimes were simple and
    distinct from one another as to time, place, and victim. Additionally, evidence for
    the count on which Carbajal was convicted was much stronger, with a lucid victim
    who called the police at the time the incident was happening. The jury’s failure to
    convict Carbajal on either count related to his brother establishes that the jury was
    able to compartmentalize and consider the evidence of each count separately from
    the other counts and that Carbajal was not prejudiced by joinder. 
    Id.
    AFFIRMED.
    5