United States v. Peter Wong , 603 F. App'x 639 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10184
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:12-cr-00483-EMC-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PETER WONG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, OWENS, Circuit Judge and COLLINS,*** Chief
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
* ** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, Chief District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Peter Wong appeals his conviction of three counts of theft concerning a
federally funded program in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reject his arguments and affirm.
First, the warrant alleged sufficient facts establishing probable cause to
search Wong’s home. See United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399
(9th Cir. 1986) (judges are “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where
evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of
offense”); United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2002)
(issuing judges may rely on an officer’s training and experience). Moreover, under
United States v. Leon, this was not a warrant “so lacking in indicia of probable
cause” that it was unreasonable for officers to rely on the judge’s probable cause
determination. 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Luong, 470 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding no suppression
because the affidavit established “at least a colorable argument for probable
cause”).
Second, the district court did not err in refusing to give a mistake-of-fact
jury instruction; the instructions as a whole apprised the jury of the specific intent
required and adequately embodied the defense’s theory. See United States v.
Anguiano-Morfin, 713 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 2013) (the instructions given
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adequately conveyed the offense’s elements, informed the jury of the dispositive
issue, and presented the defense’s theory); United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470,
1485 (9th Cir. 1995).
Finally, the juror did not introduce extraneous prejudicial information to the
jury during deliberations; he merely relied on his personal experience in the
banking industry to interpret the evidence introduced at trial. See United States v.
Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1991). Like a doctor-juror who
“will doubtless have knowledge and experience bearing on any medical questions
that may arise” during trial, Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir.
2004), a juror with banking experience will bring his knowledge to bear on
banking issues. “Evaluation of credibility necessarily relies on experience,” id.,
and the juror’s reliance here was neither unexpected nor improper.
AFFIRMED.
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