Derek Todd v. Trilla Bahrke , 604 F. App'x 558 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEREK TODD, No. 13-16366
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No.
2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD
v.
TRILLA BAHRKE, California MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner, ALAN PINESCHI,
California Judge; et al.,
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BAR#:
161503, SPENCER SHORT, BAR#:
264419; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Derek Todd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations arising out of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)
(dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Todd’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of the
state court’s orders regarding custody and visitation and raises claims that are
“inextricably intertwined” with those orders. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772,
779 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining when claims are inextricably intertwined);
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims seeking to enjoin state family court orders); see
also Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even when a
federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would
deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Todd’s action
without leave to amend because Todd cannot correct the defects in his complaint.
See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the
2 13-16366
deficiencies in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Todd’s pending motions for judicial notice are denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
3 13-16366