Electric Ins. Co. v. Jessica Gaudet , 692 F. App'x 459 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 13 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 15-15314
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01395-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL LEE CRANE, husband and
CRANE, Unknown, named as: Jane Doe
Crane/ wife,
Defendants,
and
JESSICA GAUDET, individually and as
surviving beneficiary of: deceased Bruce
Gaudet; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 6, 2017**
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: GRABER, SACK,*** and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises from an insurance dispute. Michael Crane lived for a time
with his grandmother at her home in Phoenix, Arizona. Crane’s grandmother had a
homeowner’s insurance policy with Electric Insurance Company (Electric) that
covered residents of her household. On January 26, 2012, more than a month after
he left his grandmother’s home permanently, Crane allegedly killed Bruce Gaudet
elsewhere in Phoenix. Electric’s potential obligations to defend or indemnify
Crane depended on whether Crane was a resident of McAllister’s household on
January 26. Electric did not defend or indemnify Crane, or settle with Gaudet’s
beneficiaries (the Gaudets). Electric sued for declaratory relief, seeking to
establish that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Crane. The district court
granted summary judgment to Electric. The Gaudets timely appeal, arguing the
district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue and also erred on the merits in
granting summary judgment to Electric.
We review de novo whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed. Yokeno v.
Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1992). “We review the district court’s
findings of fact relevant to its determination of subject matter jurisdiction for clear
error.” Id. We review de novo any questions of state law. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce,
***
The Honorable Robert D. Sack, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
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600 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010). Reviewing the grant of summary judgment
de novo, Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000), we
affirm.
1. The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), gives
federal district courts jurisdiction only over actual controversies. See Aetna Life
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937). An actual
controversy exists when “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.” Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). The
plaintiff must have had a “real and reasonable apprehension” of potential liability.
Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng’g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 944
(9th Cir. 1981). Here, the Gaudets filed a wrongful death action against Crane in
state court and sent a demand letter to Electric offering to settle claims for
$300,000, the full amount of coverage under the policy. Those facts establish an
actual controversy sufficient to give the district court subject-matter jurisdiction
over Electric’s claims.
2. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Electric was
appropriate because Crane was not a resident of his grandmother’s household after
December 6, 2011, under Electric’s homeowner’s policy. Arizona identifies the
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“household” of an insured by “an objective evaluation of the totality of the
relationships between or among the individuals, their connection to a shared
dwelling where they have developed and maintained those relationships, and the
permanency and integration of the individuals into a family unit.” Mendota Ins.
Co. v. Gallegos, 302 P.3d 651, 655 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). When considering the
attributes characteristic of a household, no reasonable trier of fact looking at the
record could find that Crane was a resident of his grandmother’s household on
January 26, 2012. Rather, Crane had stayed only briefly and temporarily in the
home several weeks earlier.
AFFIRMED.
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